7 months after falling into an obvious trap (see article) the word "war" had not yet been officially used by the Russian president in reference to the Ukrainian conflict. Although used once in today's speech and referring to the ongoing conflict since 2014, it has now unequivocally appeared.
La partial mobilization unequivocally reveals the dimension the country has entered: "... those citizens who are in the reserves and above all, those who have served in the armed forces, have certain military specializations and relevant experience will be subject to conscription".
It took many months between the reshaping of forces and fronts, purges of commanders and above all ... tens of thousands of dead and wounded to arrive at the decision.
Late move, not "desperate"
For some time, the Ukrainian president had been declaring the full restoration of the borders, including Crimea, as a goal. The "territorial integrity" of Russia was therefore already at risk; certainly not the referendums (already written) to join the Federation to change anything or to justify the possible escalation.
For their part, the leaders of the Russian armed forces did not wait for the formalizations: for weeks, modern vehicles (such as the T-90M - opening photo) have been massing in various areas close to the Ukrainian border.
Is the storm coming?
A slow but steady advance in recent months had turned into a war of position which, between trenches and massacres of civilians, had brought to mind (respectively) previous world conflicts.
The forces involved in the "special operation" were not adequate to take defensive positions strengthened by months of work. Is it possible that some officers have wondered if the strategy to adopt was not to retreat instead of bleeding forward?
If so, quickly leaving a territory - prepared and already well known - and the Ukrainians (drunk with victory also due to their own irrepressible propaganda) come out into the open, the Russians could soon unleash a deadly blow being able to launch raids along the almost 2500 kilometers of border (including the Belarusian border).
We remember the basic rule in the game in progress: the Russian territory is not touched (the encroachment would justify an immediate military "upgrade" by Moscow). Is this rule still valid? Of course, the Ukrainians can only advance along the disputed territory, at home. Violating it would lead to a mobilization total granting immense moral strength to those who until now have more or less inevitably felt like an invader.
What could the Russians do now? Doubling (international) funding for the same adversary propaganda: sudden and unexpected "alarm clocks" do not sometimes cause those who are surprised to get off the ground.
In the West, on the other hand, patience is needed and - most of all - do not underestimate an opponent who cannot afford a defeat also on the ground.
"Politically" Russia has already lost the same February 24: it has destroyed an international position gained in decades of work to become the servant of a superpower (the People's Republic of China) that can officially also afford formal distances or even hypocritical mediation. In any case, he will always have to go and eat in her hand ...
It is therefore necessary to prepare to collect a tremendous counter-offensive, leaving space and word only to professionals in uniform.
This also in the information: cheap propagandists make you smile for a while but in the long run they are always counterproductive.
Peace is far away. And for the umpteenth time in history it will be decided by weapons, not by good intentions.
In Italy, beyond the "we are ready", are we really ready? (Putting his head out of a hole in the ground)
Photo: Уралвагонзавод / MoD Russian Federation / Kremlin