Soviet, and later Russian, industrial and technological (S&T) espionage was known to never really stop. But no one had imagined how much and to what extent.
The debts to Western and American technology are immense. This is what a study by the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security shows, Lifeline silicone (2022). The study of RUSI, among whose authors are James Byrne (director of Open-Source Intelligence and Analysis) and dr Jack Watling (Senior Research Fellow), was shared by with the BBC, Bloomberg and side by side in exclusive from Reuters. Team RUSI scrutinized 27 different weapon systems and found at least 450 different types of foreign-made (non-Russian) components.
The majority of these components are of American origin and specifically of two of the largest companies in the field of microcircuits and microcomponents for precision calculators (including Texas Instruments, Analog Devices and Xilinx). The companies that the Russians “use” illegally to achieve the qualities and quantities required to produce local missile systems (then also sold to foreign powers) are the best in absolute terms in the microcircuit market. At least 55 are the European companies that have been found traces in the Russian weapons systems inspected, among which the Netherlands (SNXP Semicodunctors) and Switzerland (with the Italian-French STMicroelectronics) are the main ones followed by Germany, France and United Kingdom. Components from Asian companies such as Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea were also found. China and Singapore also play a pivotal role in the production of such strategic weapon systems technologies.
The study highlights, in fact, the extent of Russia's dependence on the technology of the sector, which still fails to produce microchips of equal quality or, in any case, not in sufficient quantities to guarantee a prolonged war effort with regard to high-quality ammunition. accuracy of both Kalibr, Kh-101 and Iskander 9M727 cruise missiles (photo). Is this US-preference Western microcircuit “market” legal? Of course it isn't.
The RUSI highlights how of the more than 450 components, more than 80 different types of the same are subject to export controls by the American side with specific ECCN codes and even more under the EAR99 code. The authors, in fact, argue that this is not a novelty even only in the sense of a systematic Russian activity of evasion of export controls of critical technology.
Nothing new under the sun, one might think, since Moscow's industrial and technological espionage system is based on a permanent activity of the FSB for the S and T directorates, among the most important of the entire bureau and made up of exceptionally qualified agents intelligence. But of course this cannot fail to be a serious problem, especially today when the Russian invasion of Ukraine raises questions to which answers must be given.
The study claims that Russia has spent important quantities of high-precision ammunition with systems assembled with technology that Moscow itself is unable to produce but is capable of reselling (creating some embarrassment), the fact remains that this, paradoxically, is a card to be played by the powers involved in the support, political and / or military, in Kyiv.
The RUSI study suggests starting with exploitation that perhaps are related to the countries from which these technologies finally arrive in Russia: China, USA, Malaysia, Germany, Taiwan and Hong Kong (SAR), Thailand, United Kingdom, Philippines and Finland. There is a certain correlation between the producing countries and the channels through which Russia reaches semiconductors and microelectronics but there are many curious roads to Moscow (as suggested by Thailand and the Philippines, which do not have a historical production of similar high-precision technologies either in the science of materials and in manufacturing). However, the dual dependence of both production and the Western market remains clear (although most of the thousands of exports come from China (147,260), the USA also remains extremely close in this sense (141,672), p. 49). USA, Germany, United Kingdom, Japan, Taiwan, etc., in short, there is something for everyone. And for Italy?
One of the main microcircuit and semiconductor manufacturing companies is the Italian-French STMicroelectronics based in Switzerland (Geneva), another of the countries in which first the USSR and then Russia maintain a systematic and constant apparatus of economic and industrial intelligence. From STMicroelectronics there are microcontrollers present in Russian UAVs including the Orlando-10, E95M, Eleron-3SV and the KUB-BLA.
The study shows that the Russian ability to circumvent international controls in the export of strategic technology is long-lasting and constant, but also susceptible to counter-intelligence operations. In fact, if the Russians have to exploit networks, undercover companies, support apparatuses, etc., it means that if properly protected, the sending of know-how and weapons systems technologies in Russia can be blocked.
According to RUSI, a different approach of the intelligence departments and agencies involved in strategic export control can significantly diminish Moscow's ability to operate with high-precision weapons, so important since the beginning of the conflict where Russia has shown that it does not have significant air dominance.
Photo: MoD Russian Federation
