The United States could be forced to return to service an F-117 formation that we know continues to fly under a classified program. The new Russian countermeasures in Syria, with the entry into service of the S-400 with those 500 km of air coverage in the axis formed by the cruiser Moscow at the base of Hmeymim, they impose profound revisions to the current Allied air tactics.
Of course, the US could continue to bomb ISIS in Syria with the fourth-generation platforms deployed in the Region, but it should do so in concert with Russia and Iran (legitimized by the Damascus government to operate in their territory on which, in theory, they would still sovereignty). Utopia probably. So then, the choice to use F-117 preserved in Nevada, for a possible and immediate use in case of emergency, is more than an indiscretion.
Although the 52 F-117 have been withdrawn from service in the 2008, some of them continue to fly. The last operational F-117 were spotted last July. The Air Force, despite its age, complexity, high costs and having shown that it is not immune to some defensive countermeasures (such as the Serbian one), continues to fly on the F-117. Just during the war, in the 1999, a Nighthawk he was struck down by a SA-3 Goa. Despite this, the US continues to support economically and logistically i Nighthawk within budgets covered by military secrecy. As was the case for its entire development, military secrecy was again imposed on the F-117.
In addition to the role of tests experimental (both for the latest-generation radar and for new radar-absorbing materials), some F-117 may have been converted back into the role unmanned. If so, they would be the first tactical bombers stealth unmanned on a “combat proven” operational cell. Using F-117 in Syria, to escape the Russian system would also make sense from an economic point of view. If the US really had a force Nighthawk combined (automated or not), they could perform precision attacks with multiple ammunition like two JDAMs or twelve SDBs against highly protected targets. At costs, however, exorbitant, but certainly lower than those of the B-2, an increasingly deterrent and propaganda weapon that is truly functional in a modern asset.
Just the use of the B-2, the "bomber that costs more per gram than gold", is sipped by the Pentagon. A fleet of 21 bombers, although powerful, cannot be considered as a "game changer", also analyzing all the operational theaters in which the United States is engaged. The use is reduced even more considering, finally, that few current scenarios (excluding a conflict with the super-powers and also in that case would be too few) require a high technological profile like that of the B-2. If we were in a symmetrical war context between two super-powers, the use of the B-2 would be certain, but the Syrian question does not require such a capacity and such an outlay. This means that the entire US strategy requires a review.
Theoretically, against a multilevel protective screen formed by S-300 / S-400 platforms, the US would field a "Global Strike Task Force". A combined strength of B-2 and F-22, able to "soften" the latest generation hostile ground-to-air defenses. The Global Strike Task Force represents the bridgehead for airborne superiority and previous generation ground attack aircraft. This formation is structured for a war against Russia and China. It is not applicable to an asymmetric context like Syria where the US should hit ISIS, avoiding being intercepted by the Russians for violating their operational airspace granted by the Damascus regime.
Finally, the costs would not be sustainable for an air campaign that, despite the press releases of the affected targets, does not have standard "fixed" positions, or traditional armored command centers. So then, the use of the "new" F-117 in Syria is more than a hypothesis currently examined by the Pentagon. The F-117 could, just in Syria, test the new penetration tactics in highly protected systems. We remember that the Moscow gives 150 km coverage to 360 degrees from the port of Latakia. At 77 km away lies the base of Hmeymim. Moscow has put in place a double line of defense. The S-300 is considered lethal against all fourth-generation fighters and, in any case, against all non-tech carriers stealth. The S-400 version, on the other hand, was designed to intercept threats stealth Westerners.
The Russian General Staff was clear: every enemy threat will be disintegrated. It must be understood when a threat, once detected on the radar, will be detected as such. Those 500 km of Russian air cover demand a reflection. If the US were not to establish cooperation with Russia, Syria and Iran, they should review the entire flight route and in any case could not hit the same targets under the Moscow aerial screen. If this were the case, F-18, F-15 and F-16 could see their task resized, on pain of a possible escalation in the Region. It is also true that the USA could attack the Russian positions electronically, but such an action would be considered an act of war. Hacking a system to protect an operational area (granted by the host country) would mean undermining the already perishable situation in the Region. And finally, one could not think of "downloading" the entire air campaign of attack on the B-1 deployed at Al Udeid Air Base, in Qatar: although powerful are too few (same problem also for F-22 ) and those 63 thousand dollars per hour of flight for each individual aircraft are particularly relevant. So then, calling up an F-117 component might make sense.
Or the US could compromise with the Russians (as the Israelis and now the French have already done two months ago) and create the desired cooperation that could avoid unpleasant incidents like the one that occurred in Turkey. It should be noted that the agreement signed between Russians and Americans last October, defines the guidelines for safe distances between aircraft, radio frequencies for the United States and Russian pilots to be used in flight and a communication line on the ground between the two aircraft controls. The goal is to avoid possible accidents between aircraft (including drones) operating in Syrian airspace.
The Pentagon stressed that the agreement "does not establish areas of cooperation, sharing of intelligence or information of sensitive targets. It does not constitute the beginning of cooperation or support of Russian policy in favor of Assad".
(photo: US Air Force)
