Since ancient times, the sea has been seen as a source of well-being to be exploited and protected for the growth of one's country. The will of peoples to go beyond their borders to distant lands, crossing oceans and dangerous sea areas, in order to be able to impress their influence and seek new trade exchanges, has been the ambition of the main empires of history, which they entrusted to the brave navigators their own hopes. Of course, everything that brings wealth and prosperity must be protected and defended, not only by sea, by protecting the lines of commercial traffic, but also by land, in order to divert the will, or only the thought, of other suitors from bad intentions or claims. To avoid this, only a naval force that inspires fear and respect can assert its reasons and interests.
Only a few marinas in the world can be counted among those that have truly maintained and still maintain such an influence, not only near their coasts, but beyond the horizon, on continents where keeping commercial traffic alive is vital. importance. The Italian military maritime forces, but more generally the global ones, are one of the tools of foreign policy used to achieve pre-established objectives of national interest and are essential, not only to protect national interests at home and abroad, but for the prevention of an armed conflict and in the management of a theater subject to crisis. Dissuasion, as a deterrent tool, is today one of the main - if not the most important - means of managing security policy for the purposes of international political / military stability. What has been said cannot be separated from the availability of a fleet “in step with the times”, which is credible, flexible and readily usable, in order to create, simply by deploying it at sea, a deterrent effect on an adversary country. It is therefore necessary to develop credible and unique military capabilities, capable of guaranteeing the necessary deterrence and deterrence in the international context, especially in the "enlarged" Mediterranean, a crossroads of multinational interests and a primary national and European area of interest.
In the twentieth century there has been a continuous growth of technologies, but above all a resort to new technological discoveries and weapons to always be one step ahead of the competitor, not because in the end there was a prize to win, but because precisely, for inspire fear and respect, you must also have the means and the skills to do so. But these elements alone are not enough. Each nation must also have the will and determination to be credible on the international scene and this, unfortunately, is sometimes only achieved with force and / or deterrence. Everyone knows that to frighten someone you need to have something more than the other, but not only the courage of men is enough, you also need the support of means and armaments.
The rapid technological evolution and modernization of attack systems, in concert with the transformation that military campaigns have undergone in the last 50 years - just think of the advent of the A2 / AD bubbles (Anti-Acces Denial Area) opponents - confirmed the need to have a capacity with a high strategic profile, capable of engaging, and possibly neutralizing, sensitive targets placed at a considerable distance, within a potentially hostile territory, without having to compromise the security of men and vehicles in the field. Such a capacity, - cd "Deep Strike" - shared by the majority of allied and non-allied countries, it is embodied in the so-called cruise missiles "Cruise". These missiles are created to carry significant quantities of explosives over long distances and with very high precision (in the order of a meter), high resistance to countermeasures, thanks to different types of guidance and exceptional penetration capacity: it is above all the combination of these elements that makes the effect of the weapon so strategically relevant.
Il "Cruise" is a missile system which, unlike those for anti-aircraft or anti-ship defense, does not require either initial and / or terminal guidance radar subsystems, being completely autonomous in the execution of the "mission", or particularly propulsion systems reactive, being employed against fixed targets on land.
Therefore, having this missile capability is an enabling element for the military capabilities that can be expressed by a country, raising its rank and political weight in an increasingly variable international scenario. This is even more true if this system could be launched from a naval platform where, in addition to the large quantity of missiles transportable by a surface carrier, this capability would prove to be a strong deterrent when maintaining - even for months - such a attitude hundreds of km from the coast of a hostile country. This would make it possible to "keep the temperature low" of that country that shows hostility towards a nation.
By acquiring this instrument and by virtue of its rarity, Italy would place itself on the same level as a few other nations in possession of skills of this value and strategicity, giving it a prestigious role in the international community. A capacity for distant intervention, a peculiarity of a naval force such as the Navy, combined with the naval capacity of engagement in depth, would provide the political decision-maker with a ready and effective "tool", allowing him to exercise direct control over weapon for the entire duration of the mission, with the possibility, until the end, of canceling / canceling it. In this sense, the naval capacity of engagement in depth, due to the extended range (in many cases exceeding 2.000 km), would exercise a latent and concrete deterrent function.
Although Italy already has capacity "Deep Strike" thanks to the availability of the SCALP EG (Storm Shadow) missile supplied to the Italian Air Force, some considerations on the strategic nature of this weapon would lead us to think that, in reality, this is not the case, leading us to define the Storm Shadow like a missile land attack rather than a real vehicle from Deep Strike.
Some factors, certainly not negligible, such as the reduced range of the missile (250/300 km compared to the 1.000 km of a real missile deep strikes), demonstrate that the use of SCALP as an aerial platform does not satisfy the necessary tactical-operational requirements in a highly variable conflict scenario. The Deep Strike National "aircraft" is affected, in fact, by some tactical limitations with obvious strategic repercussions, in particular the reduced autonomy of the launching platform (currently on Tornado IDS fighter-bomber), the general lower range and payload of the warhead, the reduced number of missiles transportable, the high cost per flight hours of the launching platform, the need to have a national airport or a possible allied nation and the authorization of an airspace and, last but not least, the active exposure of personnel embarked on the aircraft (in this regard, it is recalled that on 17 January 1991, during the “Desert Storm” operation, the Tornado IDS of Major Bellini and Lieutenant Cocciolone was shot down by Iraqi anti-aircraft and the two pilots were taken prisoner for 47 days).
Downstream of these considerations, it is easy to conclude that the above risks are much more mitigated for a naval platform: a naval power, which embarks long-range cruise missiles (remember that western cruise missiles type Tomahawk o ScalpNaval have a range of over 1.000 km) sends its clear message to a potential adversary, providing a more resilient and continuous attack capability in depth, that is, without any potential risks to the safety of the personnel on board. Unlike airplanes, Naval Units could be pre-positioned in the theater, they can remain in a crisis scenario for long periods and they can impose their presence on several operating theaters at the same time, acting with firm deterrence even in aid of ongoing diplomatic actions. by the political authorities.
Furthermore, operating in international waters, the naval platform is free from the diplomatic constraints normally placed on aircraft that need to obtain authorization for the use of airspace. The quantity of transportable missiles is significantly higher than that of an aircraft and does not “have to deal with” weight and fuel. Thanks to the large quantity of missiles embarked, it is possible to carry out several launches at the same time on more resilient targets, “hardened” in hostile territory. The risk for the personnel is practically nil if we consider both the distances involved from the coast of the hostile country (if we want more than 1.000 km), and the self-defense capacity of a warship.
In the event that Italy considers the opportunity to acquire capacity Deep Strike from a naval platform in the short term (about 5 years), the most convenient solution would be the acquisition of existing systems tested in real operations. The above technological options can essentially be traced back to the missile ScalpNaval, MBDA production France, tested in real use by surface naval units in 2018 in Syria and with satisfactory operating results; it is a system that has the advantage of being produced by a company with national branch (MBDA Italy), as well as requiring some existing arrangements on national naval units.
Another option could be the famous missile That's itmahawks, of American production, extensively tested in real operations, recently updated for use also against naval targets, with remote control capability from the command center and terrestrial control via link satellite, but entirely of American production (Raytheon), which already in the past (2014) has shown itself available - like the US political authority - to support any integration and supply to the Navy.
Some assessments of a political, strategic and industrial nature, Raytheon's product could, in reality, be penalized compared to its French counterpart. Among these, certainly the use of GPS by the US system, which would bind us in a binding way to the American partner. The purchase of the ScalpNaval instead, it would guarantee us greater autonomy, in consideration of the recent approval by the EU of the GEODE project, aimed at the militarization of the GALILEO system (also controlled by Italy) on which undoubtedly the European weapon systems, such as the missile ScalpNaval, they will rely on in order to locate and hit their targets, thus eliminating their dependence on US GPS.
On an industrial level, moreover, it is necessary to consider the fact that MBDA is partially controlled by Leonardo and that MBDA has an all-Italian branch (MBDA ITALY): this would certainly favor the participation of our industrial system in the production and maintenance of these missiles, with all the advantages of the case, in terms of economic gain and, above all, of acquiring know-how. Furthermore, the probable purchase of the French missile would certainly lead to a future Italian collaboration in the French-English FC / ASW (Future Cruise / Anti-Ship Weapon) program, born from converging requirements expressed by France and the UK for a missile that had both anti-ship capabilities. long range that deep attack capability to hit hardened targets in hostile territory.
The Italian participation in this program could be decisive in the active involvement of the national industry, bringing not only economic benefits in the short term, but also in the medium-long term. Finally, one must necessarily consider the fact that there is a considerable complementarity between the system ScalpNaval and Storm Shadow already in possession of the Air Force. The system ScalpNaval, in fact, it is the naval version of the Storm Shadow, therefore it shares the same means Storm Shadow already present in Italy: Targeting structures, Mission Planning, logistics equipment, sub-assemblies and the target library, common to both systems.
This is important as the acquisition of the MBDA product would guarantee us not only the complementarity for both systems but a considerable saving in economic / operational terms and, certainly, a partial sovereignty of the weapon.
However, it is important not to underestimate how important the logistical and training aspect is: to acquire a missile system Deep Strike but do not enjoy the necessary facilities logistics and continuous training for the personnel concerned (both user and maintenance personnel) is not an advantageous aspect for the Armed Force. We must be aware of the fact that we must invest a lot in these two aspects in order not to frustrate the efforts, both in economic and operational terms, supported by the administration.
In conclusion, it can be said that a capacity deep strikes from the sea, through naval and / or submarine platforms, to be considered complementary to that already in the possession of the Air Force and in concert with the development of a national employment doctrine, in addition to all the advantages in terms of enabling capabilities for the country of Italy, it would allow us to excel in a profoundly variable and unpredictable international context. Costs, effectiveness, benefits and security therefore make it an option politically, strategically, militarily and technically indispensable.
American President Theodore Roosevelt, years ago, uttered a famous phrase that has remained indelible in the memory of posterity: "Speak softly and carry a big stick: you will go far" ("Speak kindly but carry a big stick; you will go far")
We live in a world of democratic and liberal values, where the use of force is strictly prohibited as a means of resolving international disputes. However, it seems clear that the possession of the cruise missile from a naval platform could be interpreted as a highly deterrent tool that would allow to support any diplomatic actions and would induce the counterpart to do what we deem desirable, without using coercive ways.
second lieutenant of vessel rn (DT) Giuseppe Cozzi
Photo: Navy / MoD Russian Federation / MBDA / US Navy
