Does Italy send special departments to Libya? We make clarity

28/02/15

We decided to hover over the other newspapers. The news reported this morning by some media outlets on the Italian ship San Giorgio, which left for Libya to form an alleged intervention force, has left us a bit of surprise.

Italy, a country that only a few days ago requested NATO intervention in Libya in vain, would it decide of its own free will to send a small contingent close to the Libyan coast for a possible projection in hostile territory?

Prevaricated. We have said it.

After a brief meeting between our analysts, we asked ourselves only one question: would Italy really send a "commando" of just under three hundred men?

Three hundred soldiers, we said. Certainly not a landing force.

Special departments?

A few dozen men embarked, perhaps something more. Therefore, by definition, the latter would not have the tasks of the first line, but the sensitive targets, the safety of some strategic areas, the acquisition of targets.

But what has left us perplexed and that has led us to the meticulous analysis of what is happening, is the air cover.

Really, we asked ourselves, would Italy have decided to send its children without air cover or a cover force able to guarantee that essential Close Air Support in an asymmetrical context like the Libyan one?

While the Italian newspapers continued to beat agencies on the possible invasion force, we consulted sources very close to the Naval Staff.

So what's happening?

In the Mediterranean various exercises are taking place in which Italy also participates. For causality (already scheduled), the San Marco was scheduled to be sent some time ago and it is not a question of any landing force.

Therefore, Italy has not given the green light to military action (three hundred soldiers in hostile territory are not a landing force without considering the safety of an area with little air support or the absence of armored vehicles , need for a bridgehead, a rapid extraction force, supply, logistics), but it continues to train its men to have a force always ready to fight in line with the needs of the twenty-first century.

The context could change if Italian interests were targeted, for example, the Greenstream underwater pipeline, owned by Eni with its Mellitah compression station, now protected by militias loyal to the loyalist regime.

In that case (but they would always spend a few days to guarantee the CAS aircraft in the area), could Italy really start a military operation?

Doubts, even in this sense. We consider that the three hundred soldiers on board were all, those for their own specialization, ready for combat. We are not talking about a "simple" infiltration and exfiltration of a team, but the deployment of a small contingent that could not happen without the domination of the skies considering the anti-air weapons in the possession of the fundamentalists.

The variables are many, too many, but to assume our active involvement is at the moment pure utopia without the support of the USA and their aircraft.

It should be stressed that Italy does not have a tactical aircraft after the end of the Peace Caesar program and that we should send our Tornadoes to the area for bombing which, we remember, due to their mission profile would fly very low and, that is , at the mercy of the enemy infantry fire.

Do we really want to sacrifice lives?

Give the enemy our pilots?

An assault force protected by the Harriers, fighters that have never been suitable to protect a ground force due to their limited ability to carry weapons?

Do we really want to think that our government can send infantry without helicopters for war to support and protection?

They will protect Eni's interests in Libya, perhaps with some blitz (per se risky) to save lives and return to safety (perhaps, but the only possible option), but without affecting the security of our military and, if possible, avoid another case marò.

Franco Iacch

(photo: MM archive)