Egypt takes a clear position in words but ambiguous in facts about Libya: "Sirte and Al-Jufra are a red line not to be crossed" Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said to his troops deployed at the Sidi el-Barrani air base on the border with Libya, threatening direct cross-border armed intervention to protect Tobruk's Parliament and Marshal Haftar.
The President-General of Cairo is aware of the risks that Egypt would run if the Tripoline forces - assisted by the Turks - broke through the front in Sirte, opening the way towards the "oil crescent" of Cyrenaica. The risk to Egyptian national security according to al-Sisi and his Foreign Minister, Sameh Shoukry, is concrete and is the result of the "Deployment of militias in Libya by Turkey". Shoukry concluded by stating that "Attempts to militarily end the Libyan conflict will fail" and that Cairo, while considering how last resort the military option firmly supports the political solution of the war after negotiation, sponsored by the Arab League.
In the meantime, neither al-Sarraj nor Erdogan seem to have been impressed by the words of al-Sisi and have resolutely continued the offensive against Sirte until breaking the Haftarian defense line, the last bulwark before a harsh siege on the birthplace of Gaddafi or his peaceful delivery to the Tripoline troops.
Despite the diversity of perspectives within the Tripoli executive, with vice-premier Ahmed Maiteeg inclined to a truce and Interior Minister Fathi Bashaga in charge of the "hawks", al-Sarraj's collaborators agree on one thing: the situation the previous one to the military campaign of Haftar started in 2019 must return and this foresees a complete retreat of the Haftarians in Cyrenaica therefore the abandonment - with or without bloodshed - of Sirte and Al-Jufra.
Just the offensive action of the Turkish-Tripolines seems to be the litmus test that unmasks all the Egyptian political weakness in this phase of the Libyan conflict. In fact, the risk of being ousted from the proxy war Libyan after the Turkish and Russian interventions, the Egyptians proposed a mediation readily accepted by a Haftar with water in his throat but rejected by al-Sarraj.
Although al-Sisi's proposal vanished within 24 hours, passing almost unnoticed in the international press, in fact Tripoli's refusal marked a serious defeat for Egypt forced to raise its voice and threatening, with the presidential speech of Sidi el-Barrani, to enter arms in Libya and tracing a hypothetical "red line" between Sirte and Al-Jufra not to be crossed which is not so much equivalent to a potential casus belli as for a new geographical boundary. This is because since the beginning of the second Libyan civil war in 2014, Egypt has never made a secret of preferring the partition of the country into two distinct state entities (leaving the Fezzan region to the raids of the Tuareg allies of the jihadists) subject to influences well defined exterior by putting a clear mortgage on the future of Cyrenaica which, at the time, was in the conflict in the lion's share.
The Turkish armed intervention has - politically and militarily - cleared the cards on the table, catching on the counterattack practically all the international actors involved in various capacities in Libya. Egyptian diplomacy itself has no longer been able to pursue its "unilateral" policy in Libya by constantly seeking support from an important but frayed supranational body such as the Arab League. After all, the presence on the field of regular Turkish soldiers has imposed some serious reflection in Cairo on the possibility of direct military intervention which would amount to discovering a bluff on capacity combat if the Egyptian Armed Forces were to be engaged against the second largest army of the Atlantic Alliance, beyond the missiles deployed on display in Sidi el-Barrani for the benefit of the satellites open source and the propaganda machine.
A scenario to be doubted but which, by pure theory, gives war games, reveals all the contradictions and risks for al-Sisi of a more active policy in Libya, aimed at safeguarding independent Cyrenaica (but above all outside Turkish influence). The short-term goal of al-Sisi is to "save the savable" thus responding to requests for support from the border tribes who, in addition to being among the most convinced supporters of Haftar, also have a very strong link with Cairo for historical, geographical, ethnic and political issues.
Ensuring the political viability of this "fifth column" would be tantamount to guaranteeing its own from the point of view of al-Sisi who, in order to be strong at the negotiating table, will have to keep his Armed Forces in operational readiness.
For this purpose, the modernization program of the Egyptian military instrument continues, in fact, after the purchase of two FREMM frigates, there is talk of further orders including 24 Typhoon fighters and AW-149 helicopters, always supplied from Italy.
Photo: web
