For several years, in some contexts in particular (eg NATO's eastern allies) there has been an increased importance of the territorial tasks assigned to the armed forces, after about twenty years of focus on so-called capabilities expeditionary, that is, of projection at a distance from the national territory.
Such a fact is not surprising, since, in all states, the first mission of the armed forces is the defense of the homeland. Intervention in international missions has always been functional to guaranteeing one's own safety, especially to face large-scale threats or to overcome national limits. It is more pertinent to ask, however, whether a real "cultural evolution" is taking place on the raison d'être of the armed forces and on the set of tasks entrusted to them, in the light of strategic and geopolitical evolutions. What is the real extent of this phenomenon and what could be the indications to be drawn?
We will try to deepen these points, starting with the case of Germany.
The choice of Germany
In the wake of the war in Ukraine, Germany announced the establishment of a territorial military command, in Berlin, starting from 1 October 2022, in order to ensure the conduct of tasks related to territorial defense. The decision of the Ministry of Defense was motivated by the need to adapt the organizational structure of the German armed forces to the new challenges.
The experience of the pandemic was one of the factors that determined this choice. The German armed forces and the Ministry of Defense have played an important role - as happened in Italy too - in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. General Carsten Breuer (pictured below on the right), commander of the new facility, was previously the head of the Chancellery's COVID emergency response team.
However, it is a adaptation more than a revolution. In fact, various military structures had already existed for years, essentially responsible for interfacing with the civil authorities in the event of natural disasters (eg floods, health emergencies, earthquakes, etc.). A network of commands and units, consisting of an operational center for monitoring the situation (H 24 and throughout the year) and units at the regional level throughout the country ensures a timely branching of alarms and a prompt intervention capacity, verified in periodic civil-military cooperation exercises (COCIM).
In the future, the territorial command of the Bundeswehr will be called upon to carry out, in addition to the COCIM tasks, also the operational coordination of the national forces for the homeland security, including tasks of an administrative nature and in the field of disaster relief. Not only. The command, which should be operational from March 2023, will also have the important function of ensuring the regular flow of any forces from other countries through Germany, organizing their movement, in close coordination with NATO commands. To this end, the existing structures will be reinforced with additional personnel and logistical assets, for CBRN defensei and the Military Police, accelerating response times to emergency situations, in times of peace, crisis and conflict.
The demands of NATO tasks were the third factor that brought about the change. In fact, as is well known, for about a decade the Alliance has been insisting on the need to restore the ability to conduct high-intensity operations in Europe, following the more aggressive attitude taken by Russia in recent years. Several Command structures have been set up for this purpose, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC), precisely in Germany, in Ulm, whose coordination mission consists in helping to prepare the reinforcement of the Alliance where and when required, also guaranteeing the support of the forces, in case of crisis and conflict.
The new national command will have to establish a close relationship with the JSEC in order to build and strengthen the network of reinforcements and Allied logistical support in Europe. The national factor should facilitate coordination, as the commander of the JSEC is a German general.
Finally, it is interesting to note how the establishment of the territorial command has introduced a clear separation between tasks related to the command of the armed forces in Germany, entrusted to it, and missions abroad, entrusted to the operational command of Potsdam. Moreover, the first will be placed directly under the Ministry of Defense, facilitating the rapid establishment of crisis cells at the Chancellery, on the model implemented for the COVID emergency.
An isolated case?
One wonders whether this is an exception or whether similar decisions have also been taken by other countries. In this regard, we can analyze the situation in Poland, a country that for years has declared itself concerned by the Russian attitude to raise awareness among the international community and, internally, to justify a renewed attention to defense issues, after the period of relative calm following the accession to NATO in 2004.
The outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine further exacerbated the concerns of Poland, which, already a few days later, in mid-March 2022, adopted theHomeland Defense Act. Entered into force on April 23 of the same year, the document authorizes an increase in the Armed Forces to 300.000 men (of which 250.000 professionals and 50.000 in territorial defense), an increase in military spending, reaching the 3% of GDP by 2023, the modernization of the army and the introduction of a form of voluntary military service.
Several Polish politicians have declared the need for their country to equip itself with a military apparatus that is up to the current geopolitical situation, able to repel any attacks and act as a deterrent. The Minister of Defense went further, declaring the ambition to reach 5% of GDP in the volume of military spending, giving Poland the "most powerful army in Europe".
On closer inspection, the provision had been in the air for some time and the first draft had already been presented in October 2021, acknowledging the concerns of various political parties and military circles. For months, in fact, Moscow had been amassing troops in Belarus and Minsk, for its part, favored the migratory flow towards Poland, creating not a little disquiet in this country. The tragic evolution at the end of February 2022 had the effect of introducing further measures into the law and speeding up the timing of its entry into force.
The main measures concern, in addition to what has already been indicated, the revision of a large legal corpus consisting of 14 previous laws concerning national defense, leading to the reorganization of the armed forces, the introduction of the concept of common defense, the simplification in the organization of military service, the restoration of the reserve, the improvement of training systems and a series of measures aimed at promoting the attractiveness of the military profession (salaries, additional incentives for long service, career development).
On the financial level, in addition to the resources assigned to the Ministry of Defense, the modernization of the armed forces (especially the army and aviation), the establishment of a support fund financed by the treasury, bank bonds, companies operating in the defense sector was envisaged. , proceeds from the sale of weapon systems.
In terms of weapons systems, Poland has already made commitments to the USA, for the supply of tanks, anti-aircraft defense systems, artillery and F-35 aircraft, and, above all South Korea, for the purchase of 1000 wagons and 600 howitzers, to be manufactured under license in Poland.
This military apparatus is strongly oriented to the defense of its territory against external aggressions, given the low Polish presence in peacekeeping missions. Given that Warsaw's focus will continue to be, in the years to come, security against threats from the east, the orientation of its armed forces will be primarily, if not exclusively, towards territorial defense tasks.ii. This net of the real results that will be achieved by the reform launched, also according to what is declared in its strategy, regarding possible commitments in humanitarian and stabilization missions and assuming that they should not jeopardize the national defense capacity.
An underlying trend, with some differences
It is certainly not two cases that determine a trend. But, if the examples of the Baltic Republics are not enough, which are also grappling with the same problem as Poland (with the substantial difference in their territorial and geopolitical dimensions), we will consider another country, Hungary which, at the end of 2021, has elaborated a new national military strategy.
The document, approved by President Orban, expressly indicates that "The defense of the national territory is an objective of the whole nation", involving a cooperative effort of all the actors involved, the development of industrial capacities and a broad civic cohesion and commitment for the defense of the homeland. The reorganization of the Hungarian defense will serve to ensure national sovereignty, the security of the territory and citizens and the interests of the country in general, increasing Hungarian autonomy.
Nonetheless, the strategy is not lacking in realism. The efforts undertaken, in fact, will openly serve to increase both Hungary's military self-sufficiency and its contribution to regional and allied security. Realistically, the strategy places NATO and its collective defense system at the center of national security, recognizing that stronger national defense is the prerequisite for cooperation in the Alliance. According to the Hungarian country, the EU would have a complementary role, together with multinational cooperation.
Hungary's approach is therefore a mixture of national autonomy and international cooperation, in which it wants to be able to play its role, also through a stronger national defense industry. Of course, autonomy in defending against external attacks and threats refers to states or armed forces of a similar level, while defense against larger threats will be ensured in the NATO-EU context.
There are also references to the development of resilience capabilities, in order to guarantee the continuity of government services and the life of the country in the event of attacks or emergencies and natural disasters, in which the military would play a fundamental role. Strengthening the personnel and capacities of the reserve forces (on a voluntary basis) would be the fundamental prerequisite for improving resilience and supporting the armed forces in the event of a crisis and conflict.
Also in this case, the renewal of the armed forces involves a forecast increase in the defense budget to reach the level of 2% of GDP by 2024 (as requested by NATO at the Wales Summit).
To corroborate the thesis of a return of territorial defense as a priority of the defensive apparatuses, one could also consider the growing attention that in France is given to the ability to respond, even autonomously, in the event of a high-intensity conflict. Of course, the transalpine country has always claimed its autonomy in terms of security and defense (think of the choice to equip itself with a nuclear weapon and the decision, in the 60s, to leave the military structure of NATO).
Here too, political choices are moving towards the strengthening of the armed forces, to make them able to face conflict situations in Europe, the strengthening of industrial capabilities to be able to move to a "war economy" and the strengthening of military forces. reserve, to increase resilience.
The new defense minister recently declared his intention to double the volumes of the reserve (which currently has about 40.000 units), precisely to ensure national defense, launching a broad reflection that goes beyond the physical requirements only (less important for the tasks entrusted to the reserve) to take into account the skills of each (eg in the field of cyber defense).
What lessons?
The war in Ukraine and also the increased assertiveness of other international actors have brought back old concerns and have further stimulated a broad reflection on national and international security, on the relations between the two and on the raison d'être of the armed forces. This reflection, however, in several cases had already been going on for some time.
In the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea, when the Atlantic Alliance was still focusing its efforts on capacity building expeditionary e deployable (intended, that is, to be projectable and usable at considerable distances from their bases), some members asked to be able to devote more efforts and resources on homeland defense. After twenty years of focus on mobility and cuts in “permanent” capacities, a change of perspective has begun, with a push that has recently become even greater.
Therefore, this trend of increasing attention to territorial defense is, as we have seen, a reality under the eyes of all. What can we deduce?
The first consideration concerns the realism on which the strategy of a state or an alliance must be built. The threat to territorial integrity, even if remote, must never be overlooked and the ways to face it must resort to collective security mechanisms, based on credible military capabilities of their own. The availability of a pool of diversified forces, balanced in the different components, well equipped and trained is essential. After all, beyond the integrated command structures, the NATO defense (and also that of the EU) is based on what is made available by the countries.
Secondly, the recipes with which to guarantee national security are not all the same, because they must adapt to the reality of the individual state: geographical position, size, international role, etc. Alongside the choices of some states to strengthen their territorial capacities, reducing the commitment in other missions, there could also be places that continue, for example, to leverage the projection capacity even at great distances to ensure greater flexibility of intervention. . Think of states like Italy that have important land and sea borders, with respect to the surface of the territory. In this case, it would be unthinkable (as well as strategically wrong, in the presence of a varied threat picture) to imagine a return to a concentration of forces in some border regions. The strong mobility of the assets could allow their projection where necessary, in case of need.
This brings us to the third reflection, concerning the importance of mobilization systems, to ensure resilience against more serious threats. A few years after the end of the Cold War, almost all countries abandoned the mobilization mechanisms that served to ensure the supply of the units necessary to respond to the attacks of the forces of the Warsaw Pact, already at the first signs of crisis. The measures went hand in hand with the suspension of the compulsory conscription, which guaranteed the volumes necessary to activate the mobilization, as well as the structures able to do so (conscription offices, districts, draft lists, etc.). As Russia is experiencing, it is essential to brush up on the ability to quickly mobilize important human resources, not being able to maintain oversized armies for long.
Closely linked to the issue of mobilization, there is that of the availability of reserve forces adequate in number and quality to support the regular forces and replace them, for tasks of a logistic nature or for controlling the rear. Not only. With the advent of the new domains of operations - cyber and space - new professional skills and competences are important, more available in the civil context. Mapping highly qualified personnel who are available to join the reserve could be a good track to ensure effective development of strong skills. In other words, it would be necessary to extend to classic operations what has been done in the past to form the selected reserve, which has proved to be very useful for crisis response operations.
Finally, the problem of stocks of materials and ammunition deserves particular consideration. For several years, stocks of materials and ammunition have been dwindled for several reasons: reduced needs, the need to reduce costs related to acquisition, storage, management and disposal, once the same material exceeds the validity period. It is not a situation that can be maintained for a long time, without taking strong risks. Rapid replenishment of stocks is not an easy problem to solve and on the other hand one cannot think of periodically destroying large quantities of ammunition, since this would entail significant economic losses, in addition to environmental damage. The ability to switch to a "war economy", capable of rapidly accelerating production times, could be a solution, as recent statements by the French Defense Minister seem to indicate.
The overview we have done does not claim to be exhaustive. Everyone has the freedom to deepen the ideas just mentioned or find other stimulating paths for reflection. One fact is certain: the national territory and the population that occupies it seem to have once again become the main security objective of many countries and the objective of the new armament programs.
i Chemical Bacteriological Radiological Nuclear
ii Moreover, the Polish FAs have a branch called the Territorial Defense Force, which is clearly separated from the three traditional FAs and is now made up of over 30.000 personnel, made up of professional and military personnel from the reserve.
Sources and insights
https://www.defence.hu/news/national-military-strategy-of-hungary.html
Photo: Bundeswehr / NATO / gov.pl - Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej
i Chemical Bacteriological Radiological Nuclear
ii Moreover, the Polish FAs have a branch called the Territorial Defense Force, which is clearly separated from the three traditional FAs and is now made up of over 30.000 personnel, made up of professional and military personnel from the reserve.
