The issue of the protection of armored and armored combat vehicles from anti-tank and aerial offenses, especially today in a constantly evolving technological framework, is undoubtedly a constant that accompanies the evolution of combat "platforms" over time (and not only), according to the traditional comparison "shield VS spear".
The combat vehicles are conceived by seeking possibly a perfect balance of the parameters of the so-called "tactical formula" (firepower, protection and mobility) in relation to the operational capabilities that they must express / guarantee ("operational requirements"). It is quite clear that if we wanted to attribute the maximum value to all the aforementioned parameters, we will end up with a combat vehicle (MBT, IFV, busway) absolutely not usable, due to its heaviness and maneuverability, even in terms of firepower. Therefore, the "North Star" that guides the design / construction of a combat vehicle is, first of all, the achievement of the purpose of its use (the aforementioned "operational requirements"), nor does it follow that the tactical formula must be suitably calibrated in order to give the weapon system an effective performance in terms of firepower, protection and mobility; the foregoing, pending adequate financial sustainability to implement the project.
With regard more specifically to the "protection" issue of the platform, which includes the survivability of the crew and / or troops transported as well as of the vehicle itself, given the continuous technological refinement of anti-tank weapons and aerial offense systems (see drones "Kamikaze") and their wide and widespread use, this parameter has been increased over time ("shield VS spear") through the use of additional passive, reactive or semi-active armor (with regard to anti-tank offenses) and more than recently by inserting innovative systems in the platforms (some of which are already in service with the Israeli, US, Russian Armed Forces - by way of example) based essentially on the ability to identify the threat both on land and in the air (through detectors / sensors) and then neutralize it, thus creating a sort of security bubble that "accompanies" the combat vehicle.
Regarding the use of additional passive armor, their application on the most sensitive areas of the combat platform obviously involves an increase in the overall weight of the vehicle, and therefore requires an engine power that does not affect the mobility requirement, especially in terms of instantaneous acceleration / breakaway. Specifically, normally a tank is structurally born with armor suitable for tactical use, that is to the maneuvered actions typical of encounter combat, breakthrough and continuation in depth (in the jargon "chariots forward", in the context of cooperation with infantry units), any use of additional passive armor must not compromise their mobility, otherwise the platform will be vulnerable.
A similar approach applies to the combat vehicles of infantry units, whose structure, unlike tanks, is lighter to enhance their mobility, in order to conduct tactical actions, usually in cooperation with tanks, aimed at disarticulate the adversary device, even through the landing of troops. The marked mobility and agility of movement constitutes an integrating factor of the "tout court" protection of this type of combat vehicle (and troop transport).
On the front of the additional reactive armor, the weight factor does not affect the same as for the passive ones, however their use, at least for the first generation ones, is conditioned by the side effects that would occur when the so-called "bricks" explode, which could cause damage to footed infantry units adjacent to the vehicle. With regard to the semi-active armor, unlike the reactive ones, they are lighter but offer lower protection (instead of the explosive, an inert filler has been inserted between the two plates of the tile: liquid or semi-liquid material or rubber material), which does not it has side effects.
Last but not least, the most interesting innovation for the protection of combat vehicles is, as mentioned in the introduction, the inclusion on the platform of systems for detecting and preventing the threat against tanks and air, I quote in this regard, one of all, the well-known system trophy APS among the most advanced in the specific sector, created by "Rafael Advanced Defense" (Israel).
This system, in addition to equipping Israeli land units, was supplied two years ago by the US army at brigade level, as the first step to modernize its armored units. Even the German and English armies have already recently started the procurement process for the "Trophy", primarily for armored units.
In this specific innovative technological segment, I would like to point out the collaboration started between "Leonardo Spa" and a team of experts from the United Kingdom, for the creation of a system called MIPS (Modular Integration Protection System) of high-tech protection for armored vehicles that would combine different levels of electronic and physical protection technologies, in order to create an effective defensive shield against tanks and against aircraft.
With reference, in general, to the anti-aircraft defense of the "mobile forces", I highlight the implementation of highly technological integrated systems designed by "Rafael Multi Layered Air & Missile Defense" ("Spider - SR": Short Range Air Defense System and "Spider - MR": Medium Range Air Defense System), which give additional short and medium range protection to the units, even if equipped with platforms equipped with “Trophy” systems.
Finally, I would like to focus on the general concept of survival on the battlefield, with particular regard to armored and armored troops, i.e. beyond the continuous search (permanent process) of effective solutions (cost / benefit ratio) to make more protected combat vehicles, the issue of logistical support remains open, which relates precisely to the survival of the deployed assets, and I am referring to the necessary and unavoidable activities of transport, refueling, recovery and evacuation.
The armored and armored troops (heavy components of the maneuvering units) must have adequate logistical assets, both in terms of technical capacity and tactical / logistic speed, giving life to a virtuous process that can support "any time" and in the combat effort, under penalty of making the operational commitment vulnerable.
In conclusion, my reflection on the "rotated VS tracks" issue, it is clear that where the track goes, the wheeled one does not go, even if it is armored (with a 120 mm gun.). The armored units have always associated with the tank (MBT), a combat vehicle (IFV) on tracks, not only to have an almost homogeneous operating speed (see video), not only to facilitate logistical activities (transport, refueling, recovery and clearing), but especially to create a common feeling typical of armored troops. Similarly, armored units, on wheels, must be able to operate in a "homogeneous" way, so that the heavy busway with cannon must be able to correspond to a busway dedicated to explorers (Centaur~Arrow).
My hope, indeed I am sure, that these simple reflections of mine have long since matured within the Armed Forces with a view to maintaining high efficiency and effectiveness of the military instrument.
gen. d. (aux.) Carmelo Cutropia
Photo: US: Marine Corps / US Army / IDF
