It is embarrassing that in such an important country for Italy there is so little media coverage on the ground. Mostly agencies and ... showgirls are elaborated and reworked. To try to get a better picture of the situation, we met again a man who had a privileged observation point on the North African country, Admiral Giuseppe De Giorgi.
The news that comes to us from the other side of the Mediterranean are disturbing: tremendous for the ordinary life of the Libyan population itself (but nobody ever cares about such a "detail"!) And scandalous for the background of a real Affair.
Admiral De Giorgi, what do you think of the news from Libya?
In Libya there are two games in progress. The first, all Italian-Italian, is played on the electoral theme of immigration, which will have, along with that of security in the broadest sense, a decisive weight on the outcome of the upcoming political elections and on the balance of power within the PD. The second is the strategic one, of defense against national interest in Libya. It is hardly necessary to note how the two games are intertwined and affect each other.
Immigration control should be seen in the broader context of Libya's normalization. From this point of view, the Government's action has been developed, led by the Minister of the Interior Minniti. Strong knowledge of Libya also gained as an Undersecretary with responsibility for the Services and its political courage has in fact been replaced by the Foreign and Defense, starting a series of important initiatives including, the signing of collaboration agreements with the Katribes of Fezzan, for securing the borders with Niger.
There was talk of the possible sending of Italian soldiers to patrol the southern border of Libya, a hypothesis immediately vanished, as soon as France, has made it clear that it does not like an Italian presence, close to the borders of its so important area of influence. Despite the difficulties, some results nevertheless begin to be seen.
Regarding the situation of the maritime border, after the expulsion of the ships of Safe Sea, arranged between July and September 2016, the waters facing Libya, without the control of our ships, had returned sanctuary of the traffickers of human beings, that they were more likely to stop, or destroy the boats (recovered with impunity to be re-used for other transports).
The massive increase in deaths at sea, due to the reduced timeliness of the rescue, due to the absence of the Italian navy, had caused numerous NGOs to travel around the world, soon becoming "advanced operative arm" of the SAR of the Port Authority that he regularly coordinated the interventions (albeit untitled as in an area outside his SAR jurisdiction), then directing them to the Italian ports for the disembarkation of the survivors.
Over time, the ships of some NGOs were getting closer and closer to the Libyan shores and, from the rescue of shipwrecks collected in the sea or from boats about to sink, in many cases it was passed to the simple transshipment of migrants directly from the smugglers' boats, often near the place of embarkation. From the point of view of NGOs (I do not want to consider cases of bad faith), however, these actions aimed at removing the suffering of concentration camps in the hands of traffickers, the desperate ones fleeing war and misery. Turn off the AIS (Automatic Identification System), to get closer to the shore, without being seen by the Italian authorities, had to appear to volunteers on board the ships of NGOs, a venial sin committed for a good cause.
From the Italian point of view it was instead a matter of facilitating illegal immigration and in this sense some prosecutions were activated.
Given the ever-increasing numbers and the orientation of public opinion, the Government decided to reverse its policy towards immigration: from the reception, as an absolute value to be defended with Christian solidarity, to the blocking of emigration from the Libya at any cost.
In the meantime, Macron intervened to stir things up, and without coordinating with Italy, he called a summit in Paris between Al Sarraj and the warlord Haftar. The tactical objective was to further legitimize the latter, also placing him formally on the same level as Al Sarraj, consequently weakening the Italian role and prestige in the management of the Libyan crisis. It was a low blow, aimed at Italy to question its primacy in Libya with the strategic objective of having the field free, to extend the area to Libya (and its immense oil and natural gas fields). of French influence, consisting of the French-speaking countries of West Africa (Senegal, Niger, Mali, Chad, Gabon) and North West Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria).
Al Sarraj's "providential" request to have our ships intervene to ensure the sovereignty of Libyan waters, protecting the (Libyan) Coast Guard from threats from criminal organizations, shuffled the cards again, creating a diversion and an opportunity for reaction to the Italian Government.
The determination with which President Gentiloni declared the availability to intervene and the speed with which the Parliament granted the authorization, relieved, above all in the eyes of the internal public opinion, the pride wounded by the French slap. At least for a few days. In fact, the predictable reaction of Haftar arrived in two steps: initially threatening to bomb our ships; a few days later, unveiling to the public that no, he would not have bombed our ships any more, also because the number two of the AISE would have apologized to him saying that it was all a big misunderstanding and that we would not have followed the mission just approved from Parliament, without its approval. Haftar, telling, unequivocally denied, our submission to his will, tried to further undermine the strength of Al Sarraj, and to humiliate Italy before the Libyans and the international community, which, at this point, waits to see what it will do really Italy. If indeed our Government had ordered the ships to withdraw and had not modified the rules of engagement to enable them to intervene promptly in case of need, Haftar would have obtained its purpose. The former general of Gaddafi, in the same interview, also clarified that it would impose a heavy tribute to Italy, similar to Erdogan and Gaddafi, behind the threat of reopening the flow of exodus.
For those who in these days are going to carefree grow the ranks of the pro Haftariani, I remember that certainly Haftar has as a model Gaddafi, but once in power it is very unlikely to replicate its policy towards Italy. At the time of our alliance with the Libyan dictatorship, Gaddafi hated (reciprocated) France and the United States, he did not trust Russia and found foreign banks almost exclusively in Italy. Finally in the Mediterranean there was the 6 ^ Flotta. Now Russia has entered our sea, which leads with lucidity and its game in Libya without awe or any respect.
Hence, after Macron, Putin also invites Al Sarraj and Haftar to Moscow for Russian arbitration. This time Al Sarraji refuses the invitation, preferring to postpone it to a later meeting with Putin, but without Haftar. In any case, he will go to Russia, realizing that he must find a direct dialogue, to avoid being left without referents, if Italy eventually chooses to join France and Russia, giving up playing an active role in the Libyan affair.
Russia pursues exclusively its national interest: building a large air-naval base in Cyrenaica and obtaining agreements more favorable to Russian economic interests, thanks also to agreements with ENI negotiated by a position of strength. Favoring Russia, even beyond the borders of safeguard agreements for Eni in view of a possible collapse of Italian positions, may appear convenient in the very short term, but it is said that it is in the medium and long term, also because dancing with the bear, after the first intoxicating vaulting, you usually end up in his belly.
In many environments, one deludes oneself that if we move between the opposing sides we will be able to obtain great advantages. As often happened in our history, we will instead take beats from both sides, while Russia and France who supported Haftar, when his victory was not obvious, will agree among themselves, with us who will struggle to be admitted, even just formally, at the peace table (in this regard it is worth re-reading the first choir of the Adelchi ... reading still current and perhaps even more painful for this).
How do you judge the return of our ambassador to Egypt?
I believe it is part of the approach to the pro-Haftar block (Russia, France, Egypt, the Emirates). The "raison d'état" inevitably prevailed, a choice dictated also by the growing weakness of the Italian position in Libya and in the international arena in general, where we struggle to find a bank in our traditional protectors, the USA and England. Our move, however, has not escaped the attention of our ally of reference, which has made the first public tug of the ear on time. Through the New York Times, an authoritative figure close to the State Department thought it was the right time to tell the world that Renzi and Gentiloni had had information from the US about the murder and torture suffered by our compatriot Regeni who accused the Egyptian leadership. The news spread just when the Government abandoned the line of firmness with Egypt wanted to create a problem of domestic politics, embarrassing Gentiloni and Renzi. It was stiletted in the side, certainly not fatal, but painful. A warning, not to forget the loyalty to the reference ally, also in the Libyan and Middle Eastern game.
Libyan sources of Defense Online suggest that they could be "challenged" (read interrupted) agreements with giants such as ENI. Only when we see compromises the last business will we recover?
ENI, our company of the Indies, has conditioned Italian foreign policy from Mattei onwards. It is a role that performs very effectively, investing in the countries in which it operates, funding schools and hospitals. Not being able to count on our defense, has relied on robust departments of "contractors" or friendly militia, to protect his staff and his installations. When the context is too dangerous for institutional initiatives, Eni exists.
Our approach to Russia will probably have been coordinated with the ENI, in the hope of saving the salvable, through agreements with the great Russian state-owned companies, in anticipation of the victory of Haftar and therefore of Russia. It is clear, however, that Eni moves essentially, as it is logical, from a commercial point of view. It would be up to our foreign policy to frame this trend in the broader framework of national interest, supporting Eni with a stronger foreign policy action.
In Libya the game is very complex and the strategic consequences of choices that do not take into account the "big game" on a global scale, risk being heavily negative for Italy and in the long run also for Eni.
Does not it seem to you that the so-called 'Libyan coast guard' is an institution made too important by the media? What's behind it?
At this moment the outcome of the Italian elections depends to a large extent on the ability of the Libyan coast guard to prevent the departure of migrants to Italy. This is why the media close to the government and the centers of power that support it give so much space to the Libyan Capitaneria, whose effectiveness will last until the organizations that manage the trafficking of human beings, after this phase of observation of the Italian moves, will decide to go to the counterattack. It should be added that Haftar has no interest in the fact that the exodus from the Libyan coasts is interrupted before its conquest of power, in order to dispose, once installed at the top of Libya, a major negotiating lever towards Italy. It is also necessary to see how the Italian Coast Guard will behave if it receives a request for help from a vessel about to sink into the Libyan SAR area. So far he has always guaranteed the rescue, far beyond the area of his own responsibility, citing, in addition to humanitarian motivations, even the danger of criminal consequences in case of failure / delayed intervention (the case of C.te di Nave Libra is still hot). accused for having arrived on the scene of a shipwreck (outside the national SAR area), delayed despite having done everything in his power.After the August break, we will see if even the Harbor Office will have reversed course.
Now the point is if the Minniti line will hold until April and what price we will have to pay in the second game, that of national interest in Libya.
Eliminate Gaddafi in the 2011 and support Al Sarraj in a Libya disunited in the 2015: do you think that they were the two most serious mistakes made by Italian governments in recent years?
Italy suffered the war in Libya, trying to stay out of it as long as it could. Unlike Germany, which refused to participate in the bombing, Italy has bent to the will of France and England, initially making available our air bases and then participating in the bombing, albeit with a very limited number of airplanes. The Italian position in Libya, however, has come out much weakened, and then progressively improved thanks to the work of ENI and AISE, led by Director Manenti. It must be said that Gaddafi would have fallen even without Italian participation in the war. The greatest damage to our national interests, in the post-Gaddafi context, I think was caused by our lack of initiative and courage, in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the regime, to accelerate the stabilization of Libya, hoping now for the intervention of UN now in the help of the EU.
As regards the support to the Muslim Brotherhood and subsequently to Al Sarraj, the presence in the Tripolitania of the terminal (strategic for Italy) of Melita (managed by Eni), of Eni's oil platforms in the waters facing Tripoli, counted. of other important Eni infrastructures, in the areas governed by the pro Al Serraji camps. I think it was an obligatory choice. Instead, I think we could have done more to strengthen it, immediately after its inauguration, even militarily, most likely with the blessing of the UN, which had chosen it.
The situation, ultimately, seems to highlight that our country has not yet reached the bottom or that has been digging for years?
There are many risks of losing further ground in Libya. In my opinion, we will have to escape the temptation of ambiguity and exaggerated machiavellism, to which we often tend, in times of difficulty, when we delude ourselves that we can maneuver the great Powers, one against the other, to our advantage. It ended badly in the Italy of the 500, it would not be better now.
Credibility and national prestige are worth gold in the long run, in international relations. Losing them is a matter of a moment, to remedy it takes years.
In a country so close to ours there seem to be very few reporters ... The free information in Libya died in the 2011 with the first French bomb?
Some reportage is emerging. I am thinking of the pieces written by Doctor Quirico on the conditions of prisoners in the Libyan detention camps, which certainly do not agree with the policy that fights migrants and other courageous people who challenge the danger to tear apart the general indifference (between one tragedy and another) The difficulties encountered by these good journalists to see their testimonies published, with some important exceptions, are a testimony to the problem of independent information in Italy.
Do not you find that the information coming from "unopened" sources leaves something to be desired, judging by the government decisions taken on their undoubtedly influential basis? Sure, she will say: "If they leave those to be desired from Paris, let alone from Tripoli or Tobruk ..."
I have no recent evidence to judge the quality of our intelligence. As for Libya, I remember that when I was on duty it was very reliable. I think rather that beyond the intelligence information, our decisions are often conditioned by the weakness we highlight when we are forced to play as protagonists on the international scene, rather than as gregarious, camouflaged in "multilateralism", our historic refuge for escape the political responsibilities associated with the defense of our national interests.
In foreign policy, above all, we still pay the disastrous defeat in the Second World War and the consequent institutional set-up, characterized by the absolute weakness of the executive power.
Admiral what are the lines of action that you think should be fielded by Italy?
I share the Government's work on:
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to agreements with the Fezzan Katibe, to regain control of the southern border;
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the strengthening of the Libyan coast guard and its protection with the Italian ships, in spite of the threats of Haftar;
I believe that this line of action must be integrated by proceeding:
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a decisive increase in the Italian naval presence by deterrence and to exercise effective three-dimensional control in maritime areas of national interest, in the central Mediterranean and to the east, while ensuring respect for freedom of navigation, outside the Libyan territorial waters.
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urgent sending of "non-miltary capacity building" to be extended also to initiatives (sending of technicians and materials) to restore basic services in Tripoli (supply of electricity and water / sewage network, etc.) possibly with the protection offered by security providers used by Eni, unable to send the Army;
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the immediate launch by Italy of concrete initiatives, even without the European competition, consistent with the principles of the "migration compact", aimed at investing in infrastructure and security in Africa, to begin to remove some of the causes upstream of the exodus of masses of desperate people to Europe, I am thinking, for example, of two former colonies in Somalia and Eritrea that would need our help and are sources of migration to Italy;
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the improvement of living conditions in the government detention camps in Libya, starting from those in which the migrants recovered by the Libyan Coast Guard are imprisoned, awaiting repatriation;
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the opening of humanitarian corridors under the control of our Authorities, for those fleeing war and famine.
On the other hand, I see with concern any possible yielding to Haftar's threats, and the hypothesis of abandoning Al Sarraj to his fate, to "put ourselves at the window" or to jump belatedly on Haftar's chariot. We would lose all negotiating leverage and end up irritating those who have supported us so far in Libya. I doubt that Haftar can be grateful to us, who came last, after Russia, France and Egypt. I would also pay close attention to political agreements with Russia, which go beyond those stipulated by ENI as a last resort, even if imagined in an anti-French key. It is not certain that the Americans, now distracted by the dispute with North Korea and by internal problems, will gladly accept our help in inserting Russia in Libya, which would not be, it is good to immediately dispel the instrumentally optimistic hypotheses, published in some newspapers, contained in "business", but it would inevitably involve the acquisition of at least one naval air base in Cyrenaica, in an anti-US key and probably a renewed military collaboration with Egypt, (as it was in Nasser's time until the conversion of Sadat).
It is also possible that in the end it is France that will find a political agreement with Russia, at our expense, or that France itself will take on the task of defending the military interests of NATO and the United States in Libya, instead of 'Italy. For all these reasons it is appropriate that our policy is not ambiguous and looks at a broad time horizon, not limited to the Italian elections, in April. In summary, we should support Al Sarraj with linearity. Our negotiating position would be strengthened.
