Exclusive interview with Professor Shaul Shay, former deputy head of Israel's National Security Council

(To Maria Grazia Labellarte)
23/01/17

Professor Shaul Shay (Colonel of the Israel Defense Forces) was Deputy Head of Israel's National Security Council and Director of Research at the International Institute For Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya in Israel. We had the pleasure of interviewing him about the release of his new book, entitled “Israel and Terror Abductions (1986 - 2016)”. It also addresses the difficult issue of kidnappings of both civilians and soldiers in Israel by various terrorist organizations and the difficult bargaining for their release.

Professor Shay on January 1986st his new book called “Israel and Terror Abductions (2016–1983)” was published by the Sussex-academic publishing house and available in English on Amazon. Essentially, the book addresses the difficult issue of the challenges posed by Islamic terrorist groups and Israel's response to the kidnappings carried out by the political party Hezbollah (2016-1989) and Hamas (2016-XNUMX). What would these challenges be?

The issue of the release and / or return of Israeli prisoners of war, military and hostages is one of the most sensitive issues faced by Israeli society and its leadership. Sensitivity in this regard derives from several main values, including that of human life and personal freedom in the eyes of our society; the religious aspect, that is, the obligation to redeem prisoners; the religious and moral importance attributed to the restitution of the bodies of civilians and soldiers for Jewish burial; the moral obligation on the part of the state to preserve the life and safety of its citizens; the obligation to protect IDF soldiers and members of the security forces who act on behalf of the State of Israel and fall prisoner into the hands of the enemy. The principle of the return of prisoners of war, kidnapped IDF personnel and fallen has been held sacrosanct since 1948.

In the first decades of its existence, Israel traded with its Arab enemies, provided for by the Geneva Conventions, following the cessation of all war. However, the rules of the game have changed. Many of Israel's enemies are non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas. These organizations operate outside the legal framework of war laws, routinely with war crimes such as indiscriminate attacks (deliberate actions against civilians as such) and perfidy (disguising militiamen in civilian clothes).

When Israel makes prisoner swapping possible, it is natural for its enemies to see the kidnapping of Israelis and the violation of their rights in captivity as an extremely profitable business. For terrorist organizations, kidnapped Israeli soldiers and civilians are high value and relatively cheap bargaining chips for bringing home their terrorists held in Israeli jails.

Are abductions a central element in the "offensive repertoire" of a terrorist group? What do they earn?

In the 1980 Hezbollah began to kidnap and keep held hostage by Westerners in order to bargain for the release of Shiites held in Israeli or other state prisons. Hezbollah thus transformed hostage-taking into a central bargaining tool to achieve political and military goals set by the organization and its clients in Iran. Between 1982 and 1988, there were about sixty-seven kidnappings in Lebanon, Hezbollah was responsible for fifty-five of these.

A key element of the dispute in the protracted conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is the issue of prisoners. Hezbollah has grasped the sensitivity of Israeli society and its decision-makers towards its civilians and military. Therefore, the kidnapping of soldiers has become a central goal within the organization's modus operandi. The hostages have become a "strategic asset" which uses the organization to further its goals in the conflict with Israel and to strengthen its position in Lebanon and the Arab world.

Kidnappings of Israelis began in the late 60s as attempts to ransom prisoners. On April 17 each year, Palestinians commemorate "Prisoners Day". Given the importance of prisoners to Palestinian society, there is no doubt that the abduction of an Israeli soldier is of strategic value for all Palestinian terrorist organizations. Since the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) was founded in 1987, the movement has kidnapped more than 20 Israeli soldiers and settlers, but not all of them have reached the stage of making a trade deal. It appears that Hamas has been systematically engaged in kidnapping over the years. This is by improving and refining its operational aspects by virtue of the lessons learned from real and attempted kidnappings, investing in introducing this fighting doctrine into the consciousness of activists and motivating them to act when necessary. Hamas has published several versions of "Kidnapping Field Manuals" that provide practical and doctrinal information. The text demonstrates widely the kidnapping of Israelis as a means of securing the release of Palestinian prisoners from prisons.

What is Israel's response to kidnapping?

As a general rule, when Israel has had the option of releasing hostages or prisoners through a military operation without yielding to the demands of the terrorists, decision makers have preferred this alternative. In other cases, when a military operation was not an option, Israel in general demonstrated flexibility (lit. a "flexible policy", ed) and worked to obtain the release of the hostages through negotiations, following the requests of the organizations. partially or completely terrorist.

In October 2011, when Prime Minister Binjamin Netanyahu explained how he was able to sign the agreement that set a new record in compliance with a terrorist organization - the release of 1.027 prisoners, many of them with "bloody hands" of Israeli blood (against the liberation of an Israeli military hostage) said "We had no choice."

Netanyahu would have been happy to try to save Israeli prisoner Gilad Shalit with a military operation, but the intelligence failed to locate him. In the end, the dilemma was whether to leave Shalit to rot in a pit of a Hamas prison or make a courageous decision. This is what Netanyahu did. When Israel accepted the conditions for the exchange of Gilad Shalit, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, during a council of ministers, has attributed the asymmetry of the numbers to the ethical teachings of Judaism: "The nation of Israel is one people".

Do the terrorists once they recover, return to terrorist activity?

The answer is that the most worrying long-term consequence of such exchanges is that many of the released terrorists return to commit attacks and related actions. But this is only part of the problem.

As regards the hostages, it is undisputed that the concessions encouraged additional actions due to the richness of the ransoms. If, rather, the terrorists knew in advance that they have nothing to gain from a kidnapping because of a strong government position, they would no longer kidnap anyone. Indeed, many governments - including the United States - have adopted a policy of firmness in hopes of reducing hostage-taking.

Releasing convicted terrorists undermines the penal system. It is unfair to release individuals who have committed serious crimes before they have served their sentences. In addition, such releases can reassure terrorists who are planning attacks, as they can hope, if captured and convicted, to be exchanged for kidnapped Israelis.

Israel could potentially declare that from now on, there will be no more negotiations. The problem is that this is easier said than done, and the government will have difficulty explaining to the family of the next soldier why he is not willing to negotiate the release of his son. There is no easy answer, but given the Israeli intelligence warning of increased motivation among terrorist groups to kidnap soldiers, a clear policy is needed.

On 12 June 2014, three kidnapped Israeli teenagers were killed, the bodies were found on 30 June. On June 2015, 63.000, Hussam Qawasmeh, a Hamas member was arrested for the murder and sentenced to pay $ XNUMX in compensation to the families of the victims. Professor, how come the three young men were killed when, with an exchange, Could the kidnappers have obtained the release of more Palestinian prisoners?

Naftali Fraenkel and Gilad Shaar, both 19, and Eyal Yifrach, 12, were kidnapped June 2014, XNUMX, while hitchhiking home from their religious schools in the West Bank. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu immediately blamed Hamas for the kidnapping of the three boys. A Hamas spokesman in Gaza promptly replied that Netanyahu's comments that they blamed them were "stupid and baseless." Therefore, there was no negotiation with Hamas.

After an 18-day search, the bodies were found buried under rubble in a field not far from the point of the kidnapping. Israeli police argue that they probably were killed within minutes.

After Saleh Arouri was found, a Hamas leader commented at a conference in Turkey that the military wing of the group was behind "the heroic action". "It was an operation by your brothers in the al-Qassam Brigades," Arouri argued, adding that Hamas nevertheless hoped to use the Israeli boys for an exchange with Palestinians held in Israeli prisons.

After the death of the kidnappers, Salah Bardawil, a spokesman for Hamas in Gaza, declared that the group "mourned the two martyrs ... murdered by the Zionists". He also said that the killing of the two Palestinians would not have occurred without the support of the Palestinian Authority security forces in the West Bank, a help that Hamas deplored as a collaboration with the enemy.

Israel's crackdown in the West Bank has raised rumors of collective punishment with thousands of homes searched, 400 Palestinians - including many Hamas leaders - arrested and five killed while throwing stones or confronting soldiers.

Israeli forces on September 23, 2014 shot and killed two Hamas operatives suspected of kidnapping and killing three Israeli teenagers in June 2014. Another Hamas member, Hussam Kawasmeh, uncle of Marwan Kawasmeh, was accused by Israel in September 2014, for organizing and financing the kidnapping.

(photo: Israel Defense Forces)