Interview with gen. Tricarico: Libya, NATO, Russia ... Italy's (few) merits and too many missed opportunities

(To Federico Castiglioni)
14/11/17

General Leonardo Tricarico was commander of the Italian air forces during the conflict in Kosovo (1998-1999) and later military adviser to the Prime Minister. He held the position of Chief of Staff of the Air Force from 2004 to 2006. He is currently president of the ICSA Foundation - Intelligence Culture and Strategic Analysis.

General, we would like to focus on a series of topical subjects that pertain to the issue of national security. Let's start with the Libyan crisis. The North African country has been shaken by the 2011 conflict which saw NATO intervening against the Gaddafi regime. What are your impressions of the role that Italy has had on events and its position within the Alliance to influence its decisions?

Unfortunately, the Italian government has a historical problem, namely the difficulty in making decisions in a coordinated way. In the 2011 France and Great Britain, countries more structured than us in this respect, they intervened supporting their positions in a more incisive way. This is a pity because I am absolutely convinced that, without the Italian logistics, that war was not made: without the Italian bases and the national logistics all the actors, even the most convinced ones, would certainly have retired because the costs would have become too high. Among other things, it does not seem to me that the United States, for example, had a particular interest in intervening in Libya. On the contrary, I remember well an occasion in which General Robert Gates in the inter-ministerial meeting Nato complained that the United States during the cold war paid about half of the costs of NATO, while in the early years 2000 supported its costs for about 70%.

For the United States, Libya was not a priority, not least because the costs of operations once again fell mainly on them and not on Europeans. The White House was recalcitrant to intervene but it was found, almost without choice, because Europe could not have conducted that operation alone.

When the first interventions began, in mid-March, there was such a lack of coordination between European countries. In the aviation sector, the concrete possibility presented itself that we would do ourselves harm ... Only the intervention of NATO at the end of the month made it possible for the operations machine to proceed in an orderly manner. Unfortunately, a second mistake was made here, that is, after the Nato intervention, we were limited to waiting for the collapse of the regime: a state building process was missing, for example for the establishment of a High Commissioner, on the stock of what happened for the former Yugoslavia. Today we are bringing home a domestic conflict in Libya on which we have not intervened and which is at the origin of the failed process of pacification.

Everyone wonders what to do in the current situation. If I had to say today where the thread of the Libyan problems lies, I would say that it is the lack of jobs, jobs and livelihoods for all those freedom fighters who initially faced Gaddafi in the hope of a better Libya but then found without anything, even the means to survive, going to exacerbate the situations of instability. Instead, let us take the positive example of UCK in Kosovo: there the young people who fought for the independence of the country were regimented and expressed the future political class of the country and are at the base of its process of democratization. In Libya something very similar could be done and in truth there was an Italian project that tried to think about the future of Libya and the construction of a new state. A project that today is still current and passable. According to this proposal all the territorial and local commands of the country had to engage in providing men for the protection of the borders and this would have favored a sense of institutionalization of these militias in the new Libyan state.

It became known that the new Libyan government has "confirmed its previous commitments with Finmeccanica (now Leonardo) for 300 million euros". Yet the original agreement was 5 billion and not 300 million. How do you explain this discrepancy?

On this it is necessary to clarify. The project was presented the 17 February 2012 in Benghazi to the deputy minister of the Libyan defense, assisted by a Libyan technical commission and as counterpart representatives of Finmeccanica and some Italian diplomatic exponents. On that occasion a border protection plan was illustrated, which excited the Libyans who only asked whether it was possible to possibly divert the 5 billion due to Italy for the construction of the Benghazi-Tripoli motorway. The diplomats on the spot clearly did not have the authority to reply, but the talks must have been successful if in Rome a memorandum of understanding was signed a few months later between the Italian government and its Libyan counterpart. This memorandum is still valid and could also represent an Italian best practice if completed, also because many Sub-Saharan countries have shown a considerable interest for this idea of ​​arming a border control force in their countries.

To carry out this project in Libya and therefore perhaps in other countries, not only is it an activism of the Italian government but also a strategic governance of the companies in the sector that are involved in promoting Italian defense excellence. Unfortunately, the realization of this memorandum is complicated by the absence of an interlocutor in Libya that exerts an effective control of the territory. This is part of a group of initiatives that could be implemented and which could see Italy in a leadership role. For example, few know that Leonardo is always a leading company in the satellite sector and can boast of technologies that - perhaps - only the Americans can equate. These excellences should be enhanced.

This is true, also because the international context is favorable. For example, the European Union is setting the need for State building in Africa at the top of its political priorities for the next decade. Italy could therefore also exploit the European framework.

No Italy can play a clear role, if it is used in Europe. This is not happening much. For example, this agreement was signed between France and Germany, which already directs new European defense funds to some Franco-German traction projects, such as the famous V-generation fighter. A project with an unknown cost that we absolutely do not need. Instead, they would need serious projects to finance, especially research.

I am skeptical about the possibility of starting to build Europe from defense, it seems to me a pindaric flight since the European foreign policies are still lacking the necessary coordination to express a common position on current issues. Libya was the striking example, the most evident demonstration of a lack of European coordination on the one hand and a very poor effectiveness of the divided European armies on the other.

The Europe of Defense is a necessity, not an option, but we must start even further upstream from Defense, that is from foreign policy. From this point of view, this institution of a High European Representative for European foreign policy is welcome.

Have you ever met Gheddafi?

No, I've never had the pleasure, but I once met some Libyan colleagues, also from the aeronautics, during a conference.

Yet in the 2011 some of them were accused of using air force to suppress dissent, for example by bombarding demonstrators demanding the resignation of the Libyan dictator. Do you believe it's true?

No, a moment, in this case it is not a question of "believing" but of "knowing". There are some countries that responsibly use air forces, taking maximum account of the lives of civilians, including Italy. I can guarantee this by experience. Then there are countries that give little or no importance to respect for human life in the use of the instrument, including Russia, for example, and without any doubt Gaddafi's Libya. I do not know the details but I know for sure that Libya did not respect international standards for respect for human life.

But it is not so strange, in fact even the United States sometimes there are few problems in using the bombing tool. The American officers get a little carried away. I saw it during the Kosovo war, for example.

If possible, I would call on Europe, coming back, to intervene and save the world these hundreds of thousands of deaths caused by drones and bombings, so that it will be felt internationally for respect for human life. The unscrupulous use of bombers in recent years is reminiscent of dark periods of history, such as the Second World War.

In the absence of other assurances, the respect of the NATO code on bombing could be required as a condition of European support.

So far we have talked about asymmetrical threats, such as countering terrorism or movements that do not respect individual rights. But there is a potentially symmetrical threat on the horizon: Russia. How can Europe stem the issue and take the necessary precautions?

On Russia we start from the beginning. After the Cold War a historic window opened up in which Russia had to involve itself in a broader alliance by binding it to NATO. The Italian government was one of the architects of this policy and achieved a partial success in Pratica di Mare at the hands of the then Berlusconi government after the September 11 2001 attacks.

At Pratica di mare a Russia-NATO discussion forum was born which, however, did not have an easy life from the beginning and today seems to have stopped. The main culprits of this failure are undoubtedly the United States: they have abused the role of majority shareholder of NATO to turn this formidable tool towards Putin.

Italy has been trying to warn for so many years that the world is changing, that it is moving forward, but it is unheard. NATO is increasingly provocative: for example, the Europeans send their Eurofighter to protect Bulgaria or the Baltic countries from a non-existent Russian aggression, when in reality the risks for Europe are located on the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

Russia today is on the corner and placed under sanctions. Clearly the Russians respond blow by blow and have a share of responsibility in this escalation, but I am sure that they too would be in favor of a renewed attempt at dialogue.

We must meet Russian needs and keep them tied to the West. Moscow aspires to have a base in the Mediterranean, for example in Benghazi? I would like someone to explain to me why Russia has no right to have it, if it wants to.

In recent years, the United States has withdrawn from some scenarios and Russia is trying to fill this gap. Think of the Middle East ... This is not necessarily negative, if we find new alchemy and agreements that protect mutual interests.

A European NATO would be needed, because the states of the Union must be able to determine the balance in their neighborhood on their own, including relations with Russia. Our interests are often different from American ones, we need to understand that.

Italy is the one that most tried to build bridges with Moscow, but in the end it always allied itself with the American position. This does not mean that there are no problems with Russia. There are undoubtedly thorny issues, like Ukraine, but here too a constructive spirit is needed and misunderstandings must be avoided. For example, Ukraine's entry into NATO is a good and provocative one. Putin is right to say that it is an attack on their national security and no one can wrong him; same speech applies to Montenegro. The more Russia feels threatened, the less it will be respectful of human rights and international balance.

Today Putin has an excellent relationship with Eastern Libya and with Egypt, strategic sectors for Italy as well. What do we want to do, travel the path of conflict? It would clearly be madness. Italy, once again, must raise its voice, develop a strategic vision as the D'Alema government had it and give birth to a more mature relationship with the United States. It seems too silent on many issues.

Let's take the discourse of the NATO bases in Italy. Their use should be re-examined in its contractual terms, because the principle behind their use by the United States is that they can only be used for NATO purposes. Everything else should be subordinated to the Italian consensus. Actually the opposite happens: practically the Americans consider them US military bases in Italian territory.

Do we remember the case of Sigonella? I think it is explanatory. How many times have those bases been used for improper purposes? I believe that the Italian government is probably often kept in the dark about what the United States is doing in Italy. Demanding a more equal relationship with the Americans does not mean moving away from the Atlantic alliance. I believe that Italy must be a friend of the United States, but that on Russia and on other issues a relationship between Rome and Washington is needed, but in general between Europeans and Americans more serious and attentive. The Italian government has a very respectable curriculum on its side to attract American attention, if only for the massive Italian presence in all NATO missions abroad. Our presence in Afghanistan, for example, must not be unconditional, but must be critical both for our position within the alliance and for compliance with all the NATO regulations on human rights.

Also because Italy pays the costs of this contribution. I bring the case of Italian soldiers involved in these missions in large numbers and that after eight or ten years they are demobilized and unemployed. This is a cost not only economic but also social that our country pays for missions abroad.

Yes, our ICSA Foundation has also treated this subject in depth. We organized a meeting last year to discuss the human costs of military missions, which were also attended by the presidents of the Defense Commission of the Chamber and Senate.

I think a possible outlet for these ex-military personnel could be that of the private security companies, the so-called "contractors", to defend Italian assets abroad. Currently we have to rely on British or American security companies because Italian laws prohibit creating them in Italy. Yet we should think about how to change this rule, even for a simple matter of national security. If, let's say, Eni's CEO is accompanied to some country by an escort from one of these companies, do you really think that his movements are not reported to foreign governments, perhaps in competition with us? It would be naive to think so.

It is in the national interest that former Italian soldiers can defend our strategic interests in the world. To do this we also need a new culture of defense in Italy, which can change some senseless taboos due to bad information.

(photo: Online Defense / US DoD / NASA / UK MoD / Aeronautica Militare)