"Mum them Turkish!". This time it is the Saudis who shout it, promoters of the regional crisis with Qatar but now grappling with a diplomatic diatribe that got out of hand.
On the one hand there is the Ottoman neo-Egonian design, aided by the ancestral divisions of the Arab world; On the other hand, there is the legacy of a geopolitical growth in Saudi Arabia, which is not always supported by a coherent course of conduct and crystalline positioning.
In any case, Qatar continues to receive Turkish aid, and what matters most, reinforces the military contingent Ankara has begun sending to Doha last month, on the pretext of helping a small country "Inhumane and non-Islamic treatment".
Qatar, which in June had declared ready for everything (read article), beats his chest, becoming the force of Turkish aid. The crisis in short, instead of being half-way between one fake and a condo lite, it widenes.
Turkey seems increasingly drawn to its pro-Qatar impetus and beyond the unreliable solidarity, Erdogan's choices look far away and seem to frustrate Saudi interests. Possible?
The events deserve some investigation, far beyond the news reports and the alarmism of the last hour.
The link between Doha and Ankara (sealed on July 24 by Erdogan's trip to the emirate with great fanfare) goes beyond local interests and is not new. At the beginning of the Libyan civil war, following the dissolution of the Jamahiriya of Qadhafi, Qatar has worked to support the Islamist factions of Tripolitania, to share the Turkish support to the government of Al Serraj, recognized among other things by the UN and the West.
In open contrast to the position of the United Arab Emirates, the main supporters along with Egypt's shadow parliament of Tobruk and General Haftar, leader of the Cyrenaica front, Qatar has supported the growing power of the Muslim brotherhood in Libya, consolidating the link with the much-debilitated Islamist movement in Turkey of Erdogan.
La Muslim brotherhood is the boss of discord that divides the Arab world and more general Islamic, with repercussions throughout the Middle East. Alter ego ideological of Hamas, has been the 2010 the main reason for the cooling of relations between Turkey and Israel, the region's historic allies.
On this point, the difficult position of Saudi Arabia has been revolted in 2013 Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, without, however, clarifying the hidden relationships that it continued to nurture in Yemen in the context of the war on Shiite rebels Houthi.
Just the wall between Muslim Brotherhood and Riyadh, on the one hand, contributes to the secret idyll between Arabia and Israel, on the other it creates friction with Ankara and especially with Qatar.
Turkish-Saudi relations had a moment of great breath in the context of the Syrian war, where an at times common goal (the end of Syria united under the Assads) brought the two countries closer until the first half of 2016. "every man for himself" of the Sunni jihadist front in Syria, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have moved away again, bringing the positions back to those of a few years ago: Ankara chirps with Doha and Saudi Arabia tries to reassemble the lost ground.
Above all in Libya, Saudi Arabia held an ambiguous position to the point that it did not facilitate its strong political positioning. In 2015 he supported Egyptian raids against Islamists (helped by Qatar), but the collapse of relations between Riyadh and Cairo (read article) has also emptied the Libyan chessboard of consistency for the Saud dynasty. Today in the land of Africa, the countries that have taken sides without hesitation are reaping the benefits: the Egypt of Al Sisi and the Arab Emirates, who have always supported Tobruk. Right now that the star Haftar seems to shine again, the non-unique address of Saudi diplomacy risks bringing new critical issues.
In this regard, it is important to underline some aspects, too often underestimated when it comes to Gulf countries or "petromonarchie". The crisis between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which involved other nations of the region (read article), actually hides a lack of internal homogeneity to the Gulf Cooperation Council, formed from Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Emirates, Oman and Qatar. Combined with anti-Shiite and anti-Iran phobia (the main reason for the isolation of Doha, accused of flirting with Tehran since the 90 years), oil monarchies are often often divided into vital themes. All is well worth the divergence between Saudi Arabia and the Arab Emirates in the policy to follow in Yemen: Riad wants the annihilation of the secular Shiite onset, aspiring to control the entire Arabian peninsula; Abu Dhabi intends to consolidate its presence in the former South Yemen, fueling the separatism of militia around the former capital Aden. Divergences have led to armed clashes (read article) between opposing factions in recent months, scratching the Sunni face.
In all this gloom, Iran, sworn enemy of Saudi Arabia, has all the interest in joining the cracks of the Arab world. On this Teheran horizon, Ankara joins, with which it shares a few strategic goals, despite the official coldness. Today, Turkey and Iran have a not too far-reaching interest in Syria (curb the US-led Kurds) and point to a not only regional hegemony, strong in current good relations with Russia, which in turn is particularly inclined to increase its weight in the area .
This last aspect weighs heavily on relations with the United States, whose current administration inherits twenty years of catastrophic choices in the Middle East. In long-term conflictual relations with Iran, the disappearance between Washington and Ankara has become a real crisis after the July 2016 attempted coup against Erdogan.
Qatar was co-responsible for the Syrian crisis and the creator of Islamic anti-Islamist anti-Assad (together with Riyadh), but by the necessity of survival, it adjusts the shot and pushes on more profitable land.
At this time, the original Ankara-Tehran-Doha triangle seems more engaging than flattening on Saudi lines, which is not profitable.
After all, Qatar owns half London, including the financial district, the American embassy and the Harrods warehouses; besides checking pieces of Wall Street, Qatar Holding it is within the half-world administration councils and enjoys great credentials in the West.
Doha, whatever you say, can sleep quietly ...
(photo: Türk Kara Kuvvetleri / Qatari Army)