Starting from February 2010 the Pentagon's analyzes of the growing "Russian danger" have become daily bread.
The syndrome of the alleged westward expansion of Moscow followed the alarm for the birth of the Eurasian Economic Community of 2000, an act by which Russia placed the Asian pieces of the Soviet puzzle under its sphere of influence.
The die was cast: officially, with the beginning of the Putin era, Russia emerged from the 90 years, a painful tunnel between the end of communism and the birth of a new empire. The times when he raged at the Armata Armata, heir to the Red Army, were probably finished to make room for new strategic horizons.
Based on the annexation of the Crimea of the 2014, not touching the map of Europe was the first new one warning launched by Washington on a global scale. That the Crimea was historically Russian and that from the reunification of Germany onwards NATO has incorporated de facto the Warsaw Pact, three former Soviet republics and tried with at least two others, we pretend not to know.
In this regard, it is curious to recall that the importance given by the international community to unilateral secessions is different depending on the case: the detachment of the Crimean canonized with the referendum of the 2014 has been badly digested; the one of Kosovo, recognized by 23 of the 28 members of the European Union, was very much appreciated. If the legal distinction revolves around the interference of a third country (Russia in the Ukraine-Crimea litigation, none in the Belgrade-Pristina dispute) there is doubt that Kosovo's failed annexation to Albania has been suggested precisely for this: to make unassailable a choice mostly political of the United States and the EU, in spite of the History and the recriminations of anyone.
While boiling the Ukrainian pot, the second lit up warning world-wide: the rebirth of a Russian profile in the Middle East with the renewed friendship between Moscow and Damascus and the consolidation of excellent diplomatic relations with Iran.
The Syrian crisis concretized in the 2013 with the threats of American bombardment, just today back on the shields. For the most naive, Latakia can be considered the Phoenician and Roman city that gave birth to Assad the father; for the Russophobes it is instead the end of a pincer which, starting from the Black Sea Fleet, descends through the Caucasus and circles Turkey, the second absolute NATO army.
Whether Russian naivety or syndrome, it is undeniable that from the beginning of the first mandate Putin Moscow continues to play with geography, following its geopolitical interests also through the use of the military instrument. The first important steps, a rehearsal for a return to the global scene, have been moved to the Caucasus, a backyard garden that has always been untidy but has become unmanageable for 15 years. Two significant moments:
- The 2008 blitzkrieg in the former Soviet Georgia bewitched by EU sirens and Bush's weapons, but annihilated by the Russian tanks on the road between the Roki tunnel and the outskirts of Tbilisi. Today, in spite of those who are agitated, Russia controls Abkhazia and another part of the Black Sea ring.
- In the 2009 the official closure of the Second Chechen War, which steadily reassembled the Caucasus and the south of the Federation. As questionable is the current ruling class in Grozny, two facts are conclusive: Chechnya has returned to the fold and uprooted Islamic independence.
The world obviously has not been watching, on the contrary. Under the direction of Washington, the old specters have resumed dancing. Between one warning and the other, between sanctions and oil prices, the Russian syndrome in four and a half is back in fashion, with all the hype ethical of its best times. The bear of the East returns to be a villain and Putin becomes the presidentissimo who squirms on the outside to cover the holes of a fake democracy.
In light of the new geopolitical equilibrium of the planet, however, we should return to reflect on Socrates and understand which model of democracy is referred to. The good / bad Manichean dichotomy has probably lost its appeal. It would not be absurd to think of a new Yalta, perhaps ignoring that the city, due to the mockery of geography, is right in the Crimea ...
Whether Russia goes to war or not, whatever the war, it matters to many. What matters most, however, are the consequences of the disorientation of the United States, forced to adapt to new global geopolitical assets faster than previously thought.
After twenty years of unipolar domination, it is natural and understandable that there is tension in Washington for the rebirth of a credible antagonism. Even more so if Russian. Avoiding pirouettes with international law or recourse to unilateral ethical codes, it would be reasonable to make it clear. Moreover, protecting one's own interests is sacrosanct and legitimate.
More appearance, less appearance, the plots of history always return, like the subjects of famous films. If experience teaches us that important actors never change, the question is whether the same applies to the roles to be assigned. Nobody sees the same films in the end any more.
