Russia-Iran-Turkey: So decide the future of Syria

(To Giampiero Venturi)
27/12/16

That Russia and Iran understood each other wonderfully is well known. The alliance, which has never been ideological, arises from concreteness, on the basis of the fact that a common enemy is almost always the basis for a solid friendship. It all started with the deposition of the Shah of Persia and with the removal of Tehran from Washington in the late 70s. From the advent of the ayatollahs onwards, they have always been roses and flowers, despite major shocks such as the collapse of the USSR and the consequent strategic repositioning of Moscow: Russia and Iran, giants of the Eurasian bloc and oil giants, have too many interests in common not to go hand in hand.

In Syria, the roads between the two countries have crossed over for decades. The support of the Assad dynasty in the "anti-Western" function of the Russians has always found a shoreline in the Shiite axis that oversees the historical flirtation between Tehran and Damascus.

At the table of the troika Russia-Iran-Turkey of which so much is spoken in recent days, the outsider therefore can only be Turkey. For many months, on Online Defense, we monitor the health of Ankara-Moscow relations and without hesitation we have always maintained that the way of peace in Syria passes precisely from Ankara.

Russia, Iran and Turkey are the only political and military powers that the so-called Middle Eastern countries have boots on the ground and they are the only ones who will go to the negotiating table to collect the credits accrued in blood.

The involvement of Russia is all too well known in the news. 

That of Iran has apparently remained more discreet, but the support given to Damascus both indirectly through Hezbollah and directly with the blood tribute paid on Syrian soil every day, has been nothing short of conspicuous: there are hundreds of Iranian victims who in silence they fought on the main theaters of war, often decisively affecting the final results.

For Turkey, a separate discussion is worthwhile. 

Deployed on the anti-Assad front until the end of 2014, Erdogan understood in time how the wind was changing. Instead of sticking to an Atlantic table (of which he is a full member) destined to be updated with the change of guard at the White House, he has veered on a pragmatic line. After mistakes and havoc in Syria in the wake of the chaos imposed by the West, Ankara has aimed at its direct interests well aware that without its direct involvement, the future of Damascus would still be impossible. Erdogan's bet was to play on the downsizing of the role played by the USA, forced to close the parable of the Arab springs, so dear to the Obama administration, with a failure. Trump's statement for Ankara represents a great political victory, because it unloads on Washington the defeat of the political plan in which Turkey had invested for years: financing an anti-Assad revolt to redefine the balance of a large part of the Middle East. Erdogan, several times on the edge of the abyss, sitting at the table with Russia and Iran, saves goat and cabbage: he re-establishes Ankara's leading role in the region and avoids paying the bill for the mistakes made since 2011.

What will happen now?

Assad will remain in power in a presumably less strong (and territorially reduced) country but politically similar to that of six years ago.

On this basis, the Russia-Iran-Turkey troika deals with paper and pen.

Russia is in a hurry to cash in on the investments made in Syria. The political weight in the region through the consolidation of the military presence will be the most striking aspect. In reality, the real credit gained will be essentially moral: the war on terrorism has helped to repaint Moscow's image in the eyes of Western public opinion, resulting in a great strategic victory for Putin.

Iran, once it reaches equilibrium in Syria, will in turn get the downsizing of the Sunni cause, with a great price of the eternal rival Saudi Arabia. In the regional comparison with Riyadh, Iran will collect a "nothing done" in the Syrian theater that actually smells of great victory. Waiting for the fruits that will come from Yemen, Tehran could not hope for anything better. In this respect, the gem of the ayatollahs has been to collect Egypt's unusual support for its Middle Eastern policies, essential for breaking the wall between Arabs and Persians for whom Iran has been a victim for decades. 

Turkey, for its part, is succeeding in playing three cards. From Grand Imputed in the War on Global Terrorism, he will enter the list of crisis-solving countries. With just a few hundred fallen (including the victims of the attacks), the Kurdish threat can be removed once again, boasting new relations with Moscow and pointing at 2017 on the rebirth of those with Washington.

Russians, Ottomans, Persians: it would be said that they are always the heaviest pens to write about History. In this sense Israel should not be forgotten. Netanyahu is among the great demiurgeurs of the future set of Syria (and the Middle East). In one fell swoop and without exposing himself, he managed to get rid of the hated Obama administration, keep Iran at bay and keep an easy enemy, like Assad's Syria. Foresight always gives its fruit.

(photo: web)