The world has changed. I feel it in the water. I feel it in the earth. I feel it in the air. The elf Galadriel felt it in Middle-earth, we feel it in the smoke of the explosions of Jenin, Jerusalem, Soledar.
It is history that flows, it is history that passes; it is the story that, certainly, is not over. The magnetism of geopolitical poles changes abruptly and seeks other balances.
In fact, in Palestine the PNA is out of the picture, now other-directed and interpreted by Hamas and Jihad. That Iran wields strong influence with its crescent is certain; that the equilibrium is mutably unstable, too.
A new multipolar cold war is facing, the fault points double and flare up simultaneously, while the anarchist constellation returns to Europe to be talked about. The Palestinian attacks underline the continuity of a policy that welcomed the new head of the Armed Forces of Jerusalem, Herzi Halevi, who was forced to reevaluate a renewed tactical approach to the operation Guardian of the Walls without however being able to take his eyes off Tehran, committed to capitalizing on the impasse in the negotiations for the JCPOA, useful for allowing the enrichment of uranium for war purposes.
The fire in Jerusalem still flares up and tragically in the days of memory of the Shoah.
Another fault point ends up splitting the underground crust of international relations, now increasingly labile and magmatic, in Ukraine and launches an echo that reverberates in the Middle East. The political dialectic, often confused, speaks in terms of thesis and antithesis, it cannot find, wherever it is, the crux of the skein of a possible and sensible synthesis.
How regional can the Ukrainian conflict be considered, in the face of the globalization of the interventions that are still taking place? Can the world be said to be engaged in a global conflict, albeit localized and restricted (for now) in a regional context? How far and alien can that be considered from the example offered by the Korean War?
China, a silent spectator, observes and draws its conclusions about the inevitably exorbitant price to pay for the desired invasion of Taiwan, in the light of a historical moment in which the pandemic and recession are knocking at the door. But what to do with Russia, forced to face such a complex political-military situation?
The question is the same that resonates in the rooms where one tries to plan the outcome of increasingly imminent elections, as in Turkey. Just the hypothesis of a regime change to get to settle situations more and more similar to a juniper? We don't believe it, and indeed we intend to direct attention towards hypotheses which, from a political-military-social point of view, lead to a worsening of the context.
If Russia gives in, it will have to do so without external pressure, without attempts to trigger further fuses, with its own conscience: Moscow will have to act autonomously by adopting a policy that accepts the birth of new walls and new colder wars than the one that ended in 1989.
Would the West be able to deal with the consequences of the domino effect of a hypothetical new Russian collapse, followed by a vehement nationalist revanche? Impossible for a Europe more accustomed to finance than to the exercise of a common policy. Yet common sense says that you have to prepare for the worst, but how? For a vague community line, or according to national paradigms, in the same way as those adopted by Germany, increasingly attentive to the interests of its own backyard?
It is precisely the current situation that requires solid and sensible pragmatism, not hypotheses or hopes. The need for balance, possibly cold, can no longer be postponed.
Pictured: Construction work on the Berlin Wall on November 20, 1961
