The last red-hot UN resolution regarding the immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, reports yet another evaluation of the information flow on a conflict that began more than 5 months ago. Given that the UN resolution has no binding value, it is presumable to expect that Tel Aviv will not conform to it, despite the political message that Washington intended to convey to Netanyahu who, in the face of the questions still on the table regarding the achievement of the objectives set regarding the annihilation of Hamas and the political planning of the post-conflict, he dipped his pen in the inkwell of obstinacy.
As mentioned, in the face of a conflict still in full swing, the analysis of sources and events cannot cease, also taking into account that the impact produced takes on a global character and is largely capable of contemplating multiple connections extending even towards relatively distant countries such as Algeria and Morocco, also because the same balance of power must take into account the fact that the so-called militias, having ballistic weapons at their disposal, have risen to a politically and operationally higher rank than that held by organizations of an eminently regional nature.
War operations, even if carried out within a limited scope gazawi, have had the ability to impact the pre-existing regional and world order, starting with neighboring Egypt, hit hard by the lack of collections of duties for transits through the Suez Canal and moreover already penalized by a pre-existing particularly critical economic situation which seems capable of making predict a collapse capable of further destabilizing the area; a situation that also involves Jordan which, on the tormented Red Sea, must be able to count on the recovery of its only port, Aqaba, as soon as possible. It is inevitable to think again about the only regional political entity capable of uniting instability belt the whole area: Iran.
In this context the Houthis, perfect proxy and impeccable third-party interpreters of strategic power projections, are none other than bearers of clear and well-directed messages from the Iranian hegemon, interested in the upheaval of the international order; so interested as to try to tighten Israel in a vice even from the Lebanese north, agitated by Hezbollah, yet another proxy Persian.
It is difficult, but not impossible, to hypothesize the next explosion of a conflict with the militia of Nasrallah, an understandable outcome for a country, Israel, condemned to maintaining a devastating and indispensable deterrence with which to preserve security and survival.
It is worth remembering what President Meloni declared regarding the Houthis, Iran and the Red Sea, during communications in the Senate in view of the approach of the European Council; the president did not fail to describe the attacks carried out in the Red Sea as part of a broader plan involving Iran, aimed at supporting, in addition to the Houthis, also Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
If, for the moment, October 7th seems to have passed or, better, shelved, however, we must think of a possibility after, that takes into account the political changes that have occurred not only on a local but global level, also in light of the unresolved controversy of both the hostages, still held by Hamas, and what was committed and documented during the initial assault. In short, remaining on an analytical level of the identifiable sources, net of more strictly cognitive evaluations, there remains an operational problem of particular importance connected to the conquest of Rafah as the last base of the residual forces of Hamas, presumably attested to around 4 battalions. It is obvious that an action that is not decisive and that spares the strategic objectives in Rafah would undermine, from Tel Aviv's point of view, the operational advantages achieved so far. To be considered, however, is the impact that an Israeli assault would produce on such a densely populated area close to already suffering Egypt, which could find itself having to face a biblical and uncontrollable wave of refugees.
Hence the understandability of the American position, which however did not indicate immediate and practical alternatives, and which meant that Israel did not participate in an operational summit in Washington with the simultaneous halt to the Doha negotiations which could instead bring about stabilization and normalization with Riyadh.
The actors are therefore different and relevant, with Russia and China more than in the background; the complex of events and consequent decisions suggests that now also an operation of de-escalation would cool the situation while reserving for the generations a new and more violent explosion of war to which Israel intends to react by taking back the snitch of astrategic initiative that does not contemplate two-state diplomatic solutions.
Photo: IDF / Presidency of the Council of Ministers
