The empire strikes again: Azerbaijan target

The evolution of Ukrainian events leads to the expansion of the geopolitical theaters of interest. Political relations towards the east of the EU involve both (relatively) democratic countries affected by integration processes; both autocratic political subjects characterized by sectorial relationships; both hybrid actors¹ as for political-military dependencies that foment latent conflicts.

In recent years, Azerbaijan has been the protagonist of a constant decrease in the democratic indexes, and of an increase in military spending in fact aimed at rekindling the conflict with Armenia in the territories of Nagorno Karabakh.

In a broader perspective, Baku has increased its geostrategic and energy importance as an alternative to that of Moscow, as a country of origin and transit of gas and oil. This aspect clarifies why, realistically and in the darkest hour, no one in the ideologically pure Europe, which even in the recent past has appeared apathetic in relations with Azerbaijan, now poses particular problems in terms of democracy and human rights, opting for much more paying strategic partnerships, facilitated by an effective caviar diplomacy capable of giving Baku a position in the Caspian equal to that of Dubai in the Gulf. Given the moment, according to the intentions of President Ilham Aliyev, head of state since 2003 (!), Azerbaijani gas production will be increased, thanks also to the exploitation of new fields², useful for satisfying domestic demand and that of a Europe³ called to offer technological counterparts.

Everything easy? Not at all. In addition to the lack of infrastructures, which cannot be implemented if the gas has not already been sold and monetized in order to guarantee investments, relations with the Kremlin cannot be neglected.⁴, with which Aliyev signed a cooperation agreement aimed at guaranteeing territorial integrity, compliance with the principle of non-interference, and committing to avoid engaging in activities that may cause damage to the interests of the other party; to this must be added the considerations regarding the quantities of gas produced and the infrastructure⁵ dedicated to them, volumes that cannot form the basis of a valid alternative to Russian quantities.

If the Ukrainian invasion has relegated Azerbaijan between the anvil of Kiev and the hammer of Moscow, the clauses of the signed agreement have increased the influence of the Kremlin on the energy projects of Baku, which has not joined the CSTO.⁶ under Russian leadership, and not even in the Eurasian Economic Union, but carefully avoiding expressing any intent to join NATO, a desire anesthetized by Moscow's foreign policy which has avoided hindering Azerbaijani success in Nagorno-Karabakh over Armenia, a partner to whom he still sold armaments.

Realpolitik has induced both Baku and Moscow on the convergent path of a convenience paid by Azerbaijan with the temporary (and felt) sacrifice of relations with the West, and by Russia with the (felt?) Sacrifice of those with Armenia, dependent country in the economic, energy and security fields. It is therefore difficult to frame Azerbaijani compatibility and availability for the needs of Rome which, too, places Baku among the privileged suppliers of gas.

Il scene shot however, it came thanks to the Russian Defense Ministry, which accused Azerbaijan of having launched several attacks, also here with Turkish drones Bayraktar, in the area under the control of the Russian mission of peacekeeping against the army of Nagorno Karabakh, an enclave internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, but close to Armenia; it is therefore the the first time since the end of hostilities in which Moscow has accused one of the two sides of a violation of the ceasefire, in a crescendo of denials and rebounds of responsibility, and with the Azerbaijani request to Russia to withdraw remaining Armenian troops and illegal armed units from the territory recognized as Azerbaijani.

While Kharkiv and Kiev are under siege, Russia therefore runs the risk of finding itself engaged on a double front, while Armenia considers it necessary to activate a specific deterrence to prevent a new escalation.

While the meetings between the Russian and Ukrainian delegations are taking place, Nagorno-Karabakh, in which uncontrolled spirals could get to involve the infrastructures of the Southern Gas Corridor and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyh oil pipeline, could damage relations between Moscow and Ankara , which has always had solid political and economic relations with the Turkic and Shiite Azerbaijan, in competition with Iran, which assesses Baku as a potential irredentist risk promoting the idea of ​​a union with the north-western Iranian Azerbaijani region, so much so as to induce Tehran to guarantee both support for rival Armenia and to try to induce secular Baku to reconsider its relations with Israel⁷ which provides advanced equipment.

Currently, the invasion of Ukraine has forced Russia to leave several operational areas uncovered, starting with the one in cooperation with Armenia, without forgetting Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Libya and Mali, areas where competitors could benefit from the need of Moscow of an immediate strengthening in Ukraine, where the military campaign is in difficulty: the downsizing of the Kremlin's objectives can therefore be linked to the risk of not being able to conquer Ukraine while losing the tactical and strategic advantages acquired elsewhere.

Beyond the agreements made previously, one cannot but hypothesize, neither in consideration of the tones used towards countries in search of energy alternatives nor in the light of the accusations preventive moved against Baku, a new front in the southern area that turns to the area responsible for controlling energy supplies to Europe, without neglecting Georgia, a coveted and already dismembered destination. We broaden the conceptual area by interpreting the Russian strategic vision; according to the Kremlin, more or less as always, the Russian destiny is at stake, and one of the decisive theaters is in the Caucasus, an area that for centuries has created and creates problems for the tsars, general secretaries and federal presidents, all intent on making it an integral part of their own political space and power. The Kremlin, in fact, conceives the southern Caucasian territory⁸ as a strategic area useful for the preservation of security in the Russian southern regions, shaken by periodic and latent demands for independence.

Il panturchism supported by Ankara, which intends to expand its area of ​​influence across the border, will also contribute to destabilizing the balance of the area, an aspect already stigmatized by Turkey which has not failed to provide military support to Azerbaijan, with which it has committed itself with an anti-Armenian mutual defense treaty.

The escalation of the clashes goes beyond the simple friction of an ethnic matrix, given that various hegemons, such as Russia and Turkey, tread the scene; actors who, over time, have clashed repeatedly precisely for the affirmation of their regional hegemony.

The areal interests are multiple and extensive, given that the South Caucasus has become an essential hub for the hydrocarbon market, where Russian interests, for the moment, have turned to pursue negotiating solutions that allow the implementation of an imperial policy suitable for both to allow the sale of arms to every single contender, and to maintain the agreements with Yerevan and - perhaps - with Baku, the strategic ally - but reluctant - essential for maintaining the balance.

There are two elements not to be overlooked: the first is the Western absence; taking into account the belated American responses, the political voids that have arisen have otherwise been filled but with all the problems resulting from conflicts that have nothing to do with cold or frozen.

The second concerns the increasingly evident contrast between Turkey and Russia, animators by proxy of the Syrian and Libyan wars, but with non-collimating visions on Crimea, Black Sea, Cyprus, exploitation of gas resources of the eastern Mediterranean, Balkans, Egypt, Israel, Kurdistan and Muslim Brotherhood.

The waged war in Nagorno-Karabakh creates on the one hand a further dynamic fault point between Ankara and Moscow, and on the other translates into a geostrategic problem that, starting from the North Caucasus, touches the Middle East including also the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. .

If for Moscow what matters is not so much the protection of Yerevan but the maintenance of a profitable and mutual balance of power from realpolitik with Ankara⁹, warning recently delivered to Baku can open up new scenarios, also in light of the fact that the ongoing conflicts between the Caucasus, MO and the Black Sea have been moving against the backdrop of Cold War 2.0 between Russia and the West since 2008.

As mentioned, the frictions in the Caucasus are to be associated with a systemic vacuum of power, once coupled with Soviet collapse, now with Western gaps. It is not clear who is really ready to fill them.