The 6 July in a press release published by the Colombian Radio Caracol, the unit of the FARC 1 ° Frente, known as Frente Primero or as Frente Armando Ríos of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, announced that it will not participate in the demobilization provided for by the peace agreement with the Colombian government.
The resistance would have been the conviction of unity that the policies of the government and its allies would only aim at the disarmament and demobilization of the guerrillas, with probable criminalization of all the former FARC militiamen, while leaving the same economic and social model unchanged today. in force. The press release reiterates the refusal of any possible order to lay down arms.
Pointing the finger on the "concentration areas" in which the FARC fighters would be gathered for demobilization following the peace agreement, the 1 ° Frente states that these areas would become nothing more than large outdoor prisons.
Il 1 ° Frente it is one of the oldest FARC units and is a "military front" responsible for recruiting fighters for other divisions as well. Last year, its members had already violated the unilateral ceasefire declared in 2014, kidnapping many indigenous minors.
However, Colombian analysts would have identified other fronts as the next pitfalls for the peace agreement. In particular the 57 ° Frente on the border with Panama and the 16° on the border with Venezuela. They are two of the FARC units best known for being involved in drug trafficking and with overt links to transnational crime.
To these would be added the Daniel Aldana Column of Nariño. This training has strong links with the Sinaloa Cartel, which recently clashed with other drug trafficking organizations.
even the 36 ° Frente it is problematic: identified as one of the richest and most violent sections of the FARC, led by a rebel commander with little interest in politics, it is practically the unit most often involved in cases of violations of the ceasefire between FARC and the FARC Colombian State.
According to authoritative South American analysts, three factors are orienting the "fronts" against the agreements: the huge proceeds deriving from illicit trafficking; social exclusion in FARC-controlled areas; the middle-level commanders detach themselves from the ideological foundations of the decades-long guerrilla and are less and less politicized.
These obstacles to the country's normalization process would predict a scorching summer and autumn for the Colombian government, questioning the entire "Peace Front" so bandied about by the authorities of Bogotá, who have repeatedly been self-proclaimed winners of the war against terrorism.