There are alarming reports that ISIS, advancing in Syria, could take over "unconventional" material, namely nuclear, chemical or biological (NBC). News almost always read or commented with skepticism by most readers, including some institutional bodies.
An incredulity that derives in large part from the absolutely erroneous belief that the nuclear threat is represented only by the atomic bomb, the chemical one from projectiles or aircraft bombs loaded with aggressive chemicals instead of explosives and the biological one based on the dissemination of powerful and lethal viruses such as Ebola, for example.
This is not exactly the case. Unconventional attacks in particular conducted through terrorist acts against the population by detonating explosive devices contaminated with NBC material, are absolutely possible by having the specific substances, however, at this time quite easily available in the deposits and laboratories of countries in disarray like Syria, Libya and Iraq.
Carrying out an unconventional terrorist attack is much easier than you might think. For example, it is sufficient to have radioactive material used in hospitals or private medical centers for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes. Waste not of high radiological emission but able to constitute a serious contamination if dispersed in the environment.
In any case, particularly in the areas of the theater world of recent and important conflicts, it is not difficult to recover NBC substances.
Surely in Libya there are deposits now abandoned and accessible by everyone in which Gaddafi kept his chemical armament. They are reported in a south-eastern area of the country (Ruwagha) and probably there are also factories abandoned in a hurry immediately located close to the border with the Tchiad.
Similarly in Syria where some of the available chemical aggressors may have escaped the UN confiscation action, along with uranium or other derivatives if the recent information provided by US and Israeli intelligence responds to reality.
Even in Iraq, old military depots of aggressive chemicals abandoned by Saddam's army could be accessed and escaped from controls, and tons of depleted or unexploded or crushed uranium ammunition could also be available, scattered across the desert, especially on the border with Kuwait. and around Basra.
A drop of liquid SARIN nerve gas can kill a person, a few grams of radioactive material pollute a large area. Therefore, it is not necessary to have a large arsenal to be able to represent a threat in the context of a "global terrorist blackmail".
Little is known about organic farming and it is difficult to express oneself on the basis of concrete data. Some old laboratories in Iraq during Saddam's management, others perhaps in Libya, but certain data is difficult to configure. Biological threats are present in any case. For the time being, Ebola concentrated in Africa could, for example, be "conveyed" to possible targets of terrorist interest.
Lethal material that represents the raw material to be added to a normal IED (Improvised Explosive Device) made with conventional explosive to increase the level of damage at the explosion of the device.
"Dirty" IEDs, which can be easily built or assembled in the basement of a home or in a modest mechanical repair shop, make the threat of "dirty" terrorist acts all the more real especially if carried out by terrorist organizations such as ISIS , organized and militarily prepared, with great availability of economic resources.
Some technical notation to better understand the problem, referring in particular to the IEDs with the addition of radioactive material of more simple retrieval and management by the terrorist cells than the chemical and biological ones.
The Dirty Bomb (in English according to the technical terminology Radiological Dispersal Device - RDD) is a normal device made with dynamite and / or TNT, to which radioactive waste is added in order to significantly pollute the environment at the time of the explosion. It is possible to realize it with modest scientific knowledge and having a normal technological level.
Among the possible radioactive substances, depleted uranium (DU) could be of recurrent use since it is a slag of nuclear power plants and a basic component of some armaments. Moreover, at the time of the conventional explosion the DU in addition to causing environmental pollution of a radiological nature saturates the environment with uranium oxides, very fine powders that if ingested or inhaled can cause significant medical conditions in the medium term.
In addition to depleted uranium, Strontium 90 Cesium 137, Americium 241 and Cobalt 60 can also be used in the "Dirty Bombs", which can also be recovered quite easily.
The explosion of a "Dirty Bomb" summarizes the destructive effects of any explosion to the radiological damage caused by the ingestion and / or inhalation of the nuclear toxic agents contained in the device. Damage that may be immediate by compromising the lung cells and the gastrointestinal tract or delayed in the short term once the material is metabolized by the body. Very damaging in the long term if they come into contact with groundwater and the animal and vegetable food chain.
If "the dirty attack" is carried out using lethal chemicals, these could be dispersed in the environment even without resorting to explosives obtaining, especially in closed environments, an immediate lethal effect with devastating results and deferred over time depending on the type of aggressive chemical used.
Finally, in the organic sector, the terrorist effects could be achieved by using viruses and toxins to pollute the aqueducts and foodstuffs or by vaporizing pathogens into the environment.
To exclude a priori the threat of terrorist actions with the use of "dirty" devices is, therefore, a luxury that analysts can not afford in a historical moment in which it is evident how the subversive formations effectively exploit modern technology to bring in all the houses a mass communication in real time to simply incite terror. An attack with "dirty devices" could therefore represent an international spotlight of certain effectiveness.
It is not hazardous to assume that ISIS is capable of carrying out a "dirty" attack. The Islamic State has the possibility of recovering the necessary material also by purchasing it through an underground market and certainly has personnel capable of setting up and managing such an IED.
Mujaheddin from Afghanistan or former fighters in the Balkans or even from the ranks of Al Qaeda have been trained to carry out complex and large-scale terrorist acts.
Surely the risk exists and the media value that ISIS could obtain with a "dirty attack" would give the organization prestige in the areas of enlistment and among the fanatical extremists living in the West.
Not just hangman or fighters destined for extreme sacrifice but also experienced professionals able to enhance the effects of Dirty Bombs. People willing to make available the expertise gained in the nuclear, chemical and medical fields in western universities or laboratories in favor of the cause of the Caliphate.
Underestimating this danger could represent a serious error on the part of Western intelligence, with consequences that are difficult to quantify but certainly very serious for international security.
Fernando Termentini
