John Cecini
Ed. Newton Compton
pp. 538
The role of high-ranking military personnel in the twenty years has often been analyzed, but without their biographies being structured in a systematic way; Therefore, this study by a young military historian, who frames the figures of as many as 37 generals of Mussolini (of all types: politicians, leaders, bureaucrats, monarchists, fascists) in an overall frame that identifies the different personalities, is also welcome. constants, some of which still die hard.
The war was wanted by Fascism, but endorsed by generals largely loyal to the King. Because of this it is: the generation of the SM officers who had won the first GM had closed in caste, maintaining an oversized army of barracks, hindering the reforms and forging in the same mentality also the new paintings, some of which really come from the apprenticeship. The caste was delighted to join Fascism - born basically from the trenches and hostile to the politicians responsible for the Mutilated Victory - but deeply loyal to the King, who managed to liquidate the squadristi and always keep the Piedmontese generals at the top, such as Badoglio and Cavallero , and charismatic figures such as Amedeo, Duke of Aosta or Prince Umberto: the former hero and diplomat, the latter an obedient complex. Roatta and Bastico were pro-fascists, but still career officers; that the Army was of the King proves it alone on September 8: the departments that had fought on five fronts for three years broke up in a few hours because the structure had become headless.
For his part, the Duce managed the image of the FF.AA. well, but he was careful not to seriously reform or modernize them, apart from the needs imposed eg by the motorization. He did better with the Air Force, being a young weapon; otherwise the reformers did not last long; rather, on the one hand he inserted his men (Balbo, Graziani, De Bono) at the top and created a series of parallel organs and controls (old Italic vice), so that the command structure was balanced and no one could really have a complete control. But if such a system of political balances can go well in peacetime, in wartime it becomes suicide. War whose objectives were never strategic, but political, not least the competition (pathetic and / or tragic) with Hitler's Germany. But even this is a constant, given that even today, Italian foreign policy cannot precisely define national interests.
The English historian Denis Mack Smith ne The wars of the Duce (1976) noted with amazement that Fascism thought only of war, but never organized the resources to do it well.
All the generals and hierarchs were first aware of the shortcomings of the military and industrial instrument, but they hoped in the end to get away with cheap and still maintain their economic and political preferences. Binary divisions are a textbook example: going from three brigades to two for each division multiplied the number of departments and commands, increasing career opportunities and showing an image of numerical power, but in fact creating large weak units on the field because without reservations, badly integrated by the Black Shirts. But if the wars in Libya, Albania, Abyssinia and Spain were limited conflicts, after 1940 the bluff it could no longer stand, with the result of becoming vassals of the Germans rather than secondary actors, and of bringing Italy to a ruin from which it no longer rose, at least as an independent regional power. But in this disaster the Italian generals had their responsibility, accepting a modern war knowing full well that they are not prepared to fight it and feed it in realistic conditions, on fronts too large and disconnected from an overall strategy. When the situation worsened, they happily believed they could eliminate the Duce, screw the Germans and negotiate a separate peace with the Allies as equals, as if Eisenhower was willing to understand the Renaissance duplicity of Ambrosio and Badoglio or Kesselring was an idiot .
Some generals were certainly worth something on the field - Messe, Gariboldi, Baldissera - as well as some bureaucrats, I think of Grazioli and Baistrocchi or the lesser known Favagrossa. The whole, however, is bleak: if Graziani and Balbo were fascists, the others were not, but none of them ever raised their voices or slammed the door in front of the Duce; if he did, it was late. But the Italians paid the price: not only the soldiers who fell on the field or interned in Germany, but also the civilian population. Almost all generals then filled out extensive memorials to declare themselves victims of Fascism or discredit colleagues. No one has ever been extradited to countries where war crimes were committed. In addition, on 8 September 43 too many abandoned the soldiers to themselves. The army then redeemed itself, but by doing without many of its generals.
The author stops at 1945, but it is interesting to analyze long-term results too. For years the Italians would have had little respect for their military, continuing the myth of the Great War but flying over the second or exalting its glorious defeats (El Alamein!). After the war, the Allies aimed to acquire military bases, but without affecting the substance: while reforming the German army, in Italy they rebuilt the army that was there before, modernizing its material structure and adapting the training of young officers to NATO standards , but without imposing itself to change the mentality and habits of the leaders.
The post-war political parties for their part have never, except in rare cases, expressed people competent in military matters, so the leaders in uniform remained if not a caste, certainly a closed and self-referring group. Some ex-generals embarked on alternate fortune political careers and some still try. The industry continued to condition military supplies and weapon systems; promotions at the top of SM would have been affected in any case by government balances; the bureaucracy remained disproportionate, taking resources away from training but guaranteeing everyone the fixed place at zero risk, given the stall imposed by the Cold War.
Only in the late 60s would the conservative mentality of the military clash with a society far ahead of its army, destroying consolidated balances and undermining the relationship between citizens and their military institutions. This also happened elsewhere, but in Italy the problems came from afar.
Marco Pasquali
