It is fate that empires, when they are middle, reach out to the - apparently - most unthinkable points; they are entities genetically imperial, even though the names have now changed according to more politically correct but practically untrue remodulations.
The Chinese economic-political wave in recent years has pushed itself so quickly and so far as to create strong instability undertow in fundamentally vulnerable institutions unable to manage and understand risks of particular and not immediately detectable entity: the Dragon is like a rainman which offers false alternatives and solutions to those in difficulty, an investor ready to exalt macroeconomic and governance deficiencies, undermining political-economic stability and the ability to consolidate consensus1.
The central southern and eastern European quadrants have therefore become entry point ideal for the Belt and Road Initiative, thanks to ideological and financial breaches not present on the western walls. Considering that the Chinese objectives are substantiated in the increase in exports, in investments, in the exercise of political influence functional to the first two targets by promoting a positive image of Beijing, the model imperial of business finds fertile ground where institutions and regulatory contexts are weak, risking a sort of trickle down effect, the dripping associated with Ronald Reagan's policies, whereby global trafficking leaves limited benefits in the local economy. There heavenly politics cultivates bilateral relations, seeks regional political impacts on a broader spectrum in order to influence both the European and the transatlantic sphere.
Covid has further fueled a mellifluous soft power with the supply of pharmaceutical equipment and products, targeting directly the financial, political, academic elites; It is a pity that, especially in Asia, after the 2008 crisis it was impossible to keep the promises made, and fear was associated with a model that, over time, has shown the real authoritarian structure of the Chinese system. BRI maritimeity, based on efficiency, political will and constant accessibility of Chinese coastal and port structures, has become the keystone of the Beijing expansion strategy, based on transport, energy and communication infrastructures.
The Dutch think tank Clingendael highlighted the strategic influence of the Dragon in recent years: in coordination with the government, the maritime component has covered the sectors of shipbuilding, navigation, logistics, construction and management of port infrastructures; Greece, with the port of Piraeus, has become the best possible laboratory for experimenting with Chinese penetration techniques. It is no coincidence that one of the main shipping companies and container ships in the world, the COSCO shipping, is Chinese; first investor in the Mediterranean, behind only Maersk and MSC2, as well as a leader in integrated logistics and procurement services, its majority shares are distributed between the Communist Party and Sasac3, the supervisory board of Chinese public companies, which effectively makes COSCO a public company4.
After the invasion of Ukraine, COSCO did not interrupt deliveries to and from Russia and crude oil to China, continuing to play an essential role in the logistics system of the military-civil merger5: it is true that the Chinese navy abroad is stationed only in Djibouti, but supplies and logistic support are available wherever COSCO is.
COSCO's political objective is therefore not limited to Piraeus, but also guides container traffic in the Mediterranean, an aspect that leads to Italy and several of its hubs, and on the possibility of implementing a strategy that extends to rail transport6, while the EU is developing TEN-T (Trans European Transport Network), a multimodal transport network, which China would like to enter, but where it finds a barrier in the Community system for monitoring foreign investments.
Chinese expansionism, which invests mainly in medium-sized ports and then transforms them into main hubs, intends to widen the trade routes by joining the Eurasian railway to European ports by making the Silk Road Economic Belt according to a broader infrastructure strategy that should also include land transport.
China's rise since joining the WTO has been fueled by strong increases in exports; given that 80% of global trade takes place by sea, the control of maritime networks has been fundamental in Beijing's strategy which has focused its interest on multiple Italian ports: Trieste, in which Germany could be seen as a Chinese Trojan horse, GenoVa, Vado Ligure7, Palermo8, Venezia, Ravenna, Gioia Tauro9. The port of Taranto, an intermodal and logistic center that looks to Suez falls within the range of action of the BRI, and has attracted the interest of the CCCC group (China Communication Construction Company) together with Genoa.
The Chinese economic penetration on the national territory has shown constant growth rates, and has increased both with the increase in investment flows from China, and with the increase in the percentage of revenues from Italian companies under Chinese control.10; acquisitions are systematic, at every level, in every sector with the highest or most strategic added value11; it should also be considered that investments are often made thanks to actors who cover the identity of the real lender.
Everything easy? No, even state capitalism is subject to surprises: Covid, debt and default risk jeopardize the growth of GDP set by the Plenum at at least 6%. The contraction in consumption is intimidating, small and medium-sized enterprises are suffering, real estate sales fall along with interest rates first installments12: the hundreds of billions of dollars of debt from the real estate bubble Evergrande, a technically bankrupt company, are ready to explode; considering that the crisis was triggered by the credit crunch and the introduction of the three red lines policy13, some doubts about the creditworthiness of the BIS arise, justifying the formation of a highly critical risk.
If there was European revisionism, Italy in 2019 was immune from it by signing a Memorandum of Understanding which, although not binding from a bond point of view, has sent an alarming political signal14; a memorandum which was immediately deemed unreliable by the Turin World Affairs Institute.
If on the one hand the Italian executive has adventurously aimed at the Chinese market, at the increase in investments of the Dragon, and at the commitment to purchase Italian public debt, on the other hand it has deepened the Atlantic fault by preventing the taking of a position common in Europe, weakening Washington and Brussels in relations with Xi, and above all, with a spectacular own goal, Italy itself in the international forum.
Confusing the political plan with the economic one was an unpardonable and unforgivable mistake: Italy looked gracefully at trade while China did not detach itself from geostrategic evaluations.
The emperor however it is not "good"; the Chinese regime has constantly pursued a policy of reprisals against the vulnerable commercial points of those who have affected its interests in any way, as happened with Norway, South Korea, Canada, Australia; and also with Italy, scolded and limited in its sovereignty by the embassy in Rome, for the press conference of dissident Joshua Wong. The Chinese principle of not meddling it is therefore to be considered as having an exclusive variable geometry according to the circumstances and the presence of the Gong (Government-organized non-governmental organization) such as the Chinese Culture Promotion Society (CCPS) and the Yan Huang Chinese Culture Research Association (Ayhcc), both under the leadership of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and Confucius Institutes, which at various universities aim to promote Chinese language and culture without ever dealing with topics such as human rights, religious freedom, Hong Kong and Tibet15. It is no coincidence that France and Sweden have closed the Institutes, a project financed by the Chinese government.
The BIS, in this context, plays a role as game changer for those who join it, according to the roles covered, the results achieved, the impact on the political equilibrium determined by the pre-existing alliances; the Italian strategic utility lies in the port infrastructures useful to allow access avoiding countries outside the Schengen area by landing on the Adriatic side, in the center of the Mediterranean, halfway between Western and Eastern Europe, saving days of navigation.
The Chinese problem is the transformation of Italian politics, so it matters little that in just over 2 years very little has been done, and that some ministers of particular importance have preserved the cadreghino but not the strategic vision, evidently at the time the prerogative of a select few, little interested in the definitions that characterize the country: soft underbelly, perfect prey, all oleographs that bring to mind the merciless but truthful images produced by Churchill's concrete imagination. The cognitive asymmetry that has emerged between the organs of the Chinese Communist Party and the Italian objectives has become an effective vulnerability that has made political institutions static targets.
The arrival of the Draghi executive has reversed the Chinese approach in a broad sense, not surprisingly by repeatedly resorting to the protection of golden power in terms of semiconductors, agricultural production, starting investigations on attempts to take control of a drone manufacturer, setting up 5G stakes, giving up the construction of components for the new Chinese space station.
It is almost immediate to ask what happened immediately before, with the clumsy attempt to create an incoherent front unable to distinguish between alliances, interests, history and eager to play Levantin at the same time on two tables.
The problem lies in understanding whether the country is currently still able to inspire the trust that has been painstakingly rebuilt and just as quickly compromised; after all, it does not take long to conclude that Brussels fears that the PNRR funds could take the silky road to Beijing, hampered in the Pacific by the Build Back Better World American, or from global gateway European.
Let's face it all: very few are able to crack their diplomatic relations in a multilevel version. Proof of this are the German investments in the port of Trieste which could see Chinese holdings in the future, the attenuation of the collaboration with Huawei, the alert for the Chinese aims on Taranto and the attention of the security apparatuses for the Chinese aims in Taranto.16, however, a square penalized by a profound economic and social crisis.
Moreover, it must be said that just a month after the agreement with China, the government in office proceeded with the approval of the Japanese project for a free and open Indo-Pacific region, thus affixing the seal to two competing and incompatible projects. .
Diplomatic versatility, unreliability or simple but dangerous incompetence according to a historically usual trend that brings to mind the fluid politics of Chancellor von Bülow's waltz? It is true that, over the years, the Chinese charm has struck many of the leading Italian politicians, starting with Prodi, passing through D'Alema, Renzi, Gentiloni, up to Conte, evidently little attentive to the difference in meaning between partners and competitor.
On closer inspection, today's results can only be the product of yesterday's mistakes; I am not sure of today the foreign infiltrations in the Italian commercial and productive fabric which, to a large extent, retains only the brand name; the pervasiveness of China has done nothing but aggravate a picture that is in itself bankrupt. The country was already in a bottle: it had to reach the neck, since even Copasir could not do anything but report infiltrations in the economic, scientific and financial fields, among others, by Russia, France, Turkey, Iran, not only China; this without counting industrial espionage: according to FBI and MI517, Chinese spies represent an increasingly significant threat.
In short, the exercise of golden power on the part of President Draghi it is only the tip of a very deep iceberg of a broader problem, which the apparently easy exit from a MoU politically does not reduce, given the Chinese forays into Australian politics. The current Chinese economic crisis slows down the terms of the problem, but certainly does not solve them, even in light of the overt friendship sino Russian, which completes the picture of an embarrassing situation for the only Western country that has signed agreements on the Silk Road.
It should also be noted that the Memorandum did not generate any economic benefits, so much so that in 2020 the trade balance between China and Italy worsened, and the value of imported Chinese goods increased.
So what to do in 2024? Will Italy confirm its adherence to the Silk Roads or not? Given that China has become a strategic adversary, to put it to Churchill, who will explain in the mouth of which tiger the head was put? And above all, who will say clearly, without wasting any more time, who has put Italy in a position to put almost 60 million heads in such dangerous jaws?
1 Greece joined the 16 + 1 Platform aimed at diplomatic and economic exchanges between China and Central-Eastern European countries. The platform brings together 17 Central and Eastern European nations, 12 of which are EU members, and supports BRI initiatives in Europe.
2 Mediterranean Shipping Company
3 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council
4 Cosco controls 100% of Piraeus, manages 2 of the 3 terminals through the subsidiary Piraeus Container Terminal (PCT), with Cosco Pacific holding 40%; operationally controls the third terminal thanks to the majority share of the Port Authority of Athens, which in 1999 took on a corporate form and in 2003 was listed on the stock exchange. Note the acquisition of the Long Beach Port in California through the subsidiary Cosco of Hong Kong
5 Definition of Jane's
6 Since 2013, China has acquired shares in 14 European ports in France, Belgium, Greece, Malta, Turkey, Spain, Italy, in the North Sea.
7 Cosco is present in the port of Vado Ligure as a 49% partner of Maersk. The Port Authority of Singapore controls the port of Voltri - Prà
8 According to Alberto Pagani, deputy of the Democratic Party and member of the Defense Committee of the Chamber and of the parliamentary delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, a case like that of Piraeus in Italy "could not be realized", unless a "change in the nature of the public authorities, which are a regulatory entity.
9 Until 2016 COSCO was a 50% shareholder of the Conateco terminal in Naples
10 Copasir data
11 Report Volpi, Borghi, Castiello
12 Preferred interest rate applied by banks on unsecured current account lending transactions to their strongest customers with large deposits
13 forced reduction of the level of indebtedness of financial institutions to improve the finance of the real estate sector
14 Previously Italy took other decisions perceived as favorable to China, such as the opinion against the Chinese investment control mechanism to be approved at the EU level, and the ambiguity regarding the reaction to the Chinese repression in Hong Kong, touching on the vote for the Chinese candidate to lead the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), against the opinion of the allies.
15 See Antonio Selvatici, journalist and lecturer at the Master of Economic Intelligence at the University of Tor Vergata
16 The Turkish Yilport Holding was entrusted with the management of the Taranto container terminal for 49 years. The problem arose when it became known that the Turkish company is in business with Cosco.
17 Financial Times
Photo: Xinhua / presidency of the council of ministers
