Hamas, Short for Ḥarakat al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement), born at the time of the first Intifada as the Palestinian operational arm of the Jamaʿat al-Iḫwān al-muslimīn, (Muslim Brotherhood), today has become the hegemonic Palestinian organization in the Gaza Strip. From the territories of the Strip it has been waging a war of attrition against Israel for years, made up of suicide attacks, rocket launches, incendiary balloons and infiltrations into Israeli territory via tunnels. The European Union, the USA and several other states consider Hamas aterrorist organization, Russia, Türkiye, Iran and Qatar diverge from this position. The UK considers only the Brigades to be a terrorist organisation Izz al-Din al-Qassam, the military wing of Hamas.

In consideration of the type of fighters and armaments at its disposal Hamas it is quite clear that in a direct clash on the ground it can only apply hybrid warfare procedures, which are also strongly characterized by the asymmetric dimension towards its traditional adversary: ​​the state of Israel. And in this hybrid dimension, the component of info-oops, especially in cleverly crafted propaganda, has had a dominant role to date. I quote the scholar Massimiliano Frenza Maxia who, in an illuminating essay on the subject, has clearly highlighted what type of operations Hamas has carried out (and carries out) within the communication strategy:

“By contrasting guided missiles and drones, and therefore Israeli technological superiority, with the narrative of the young Palestinian fighter armed with slingshots and stones, i.e. the rhetoric of the First Intifada, Hamas places itself on an asymmetric war level and, from the point of view of communication , in an advantageous position. We witness in fact the reversal of a founding myth of Israel, namely the myth of David against Goliath. The organisation, however, is the creator of truly 'hybrid' actions, as emerges from a deliberately contradictory narrative: the one which places the stone-throwing boy alongside the demonstrations of military power of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades, in which they Nice display of the Quassam rockets. Hamas has an interest in showing itself weak, but also strong and if it then combines this strategy with an effective use of new technologies (social networks), the ability to determine the flows of strategic communication ends up becoming even more incisive and viral. Here, then, is the effectiveness of the image of what appears to be little more than a child, targeting a Merkava chariot with a stone throw. The image could be recent or old, it could have been taken in Gaza or the West Bank, it could even be the result of skillful photomontage. It does not matter. The point is that it is a recurring image, used by the mainstream media, together with hundreds of other very similar ones, to describe short news articles on events that have been going on since 1948. So what's special about it? It's simply viral. Viral because it speaks to the gut of left-wing Israelis and because it does so by recalling the myth of David against Goliath, overturning it. In short, it colonizes the collective imagination.”¹

I said until today, because on October 7, 2023, apparently, the Palestinian "David" decided to face the enemy face to face. No more a few rockets and lots of proclamations; on the contrary, many rockets (5.000 in one day) and proclamations in the right quantity, in search of moral support and justification for the ethics of the rockets. As I said, the asymmetrical dimension evoked in itself by the similarity with the biblical clash between David and Goliath is evident and, therefore, it is indisputable that Hamas acted with the external support of someone bigger and stronger. The suspicion that this someone is the Iran of the ayatollah that they hate Israel is more than a suspicion. And this support goes far beyond the proclamations and invectives of propaganda. Let's see, then, in what way Tehran is there longa manus that pushes Hamas.

Iran's support for proxy groups acting in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen is one of its most effective tools for achieving its national interests, fighting in the “grey zone”. L'Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the famous ones Pasdaran, is the paramilitary organization executing Iranian proxy policies, with close ties to groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi in Yemen, the National Defense Force Militia in Syria and the Badr Corps in Iraq, among others.²

Making use of his special forces unit known as Force Quds, the IRGC is capable of training and advising its auxiliary forces – estimated at 250.000 fighters – and, therefore, poses a significant threat to Tehran's adversaries across much of the Middle East.

La Force Quds was established in the early 90s to enable the regime of ayatollah to operate covertly outside Iranian borders. The goal was to build an operational mechanism that would bring the Islamic Revolution out of Iran.³ As part of its ongoing fight against Israel, Iran's strategy uses proxy organizations for two main reasons. First, because of the considerable distance between Israel and Iran: the over one thousand kilometers that separate the two states constitute an objective operational difficulty for Iran for a direct attack on Israeli territory. Secondly, Iran is very concerned about the Israeli response, should it attack Israel directly. Therefore, the use of proxy organizations eliminates the difficulties associated with the distance between Iran and Israel, effectively engaging the latter on two fronts of struggle, one to the north against Hezbollah in Lebanon and the other in the south against Hamas and Jihad Islamic in the Gaza Strip. This strategy also allows Iran not to be directly involved in the confrontation with Israel.⁴ To achieve this goal, Tehran continues to support paramilitary formations under its control in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip and supply them with various weapons systems, including rockets and missiles.⁵

According to Israeli military intelligence, the precision missile launch program was designed for two purposes. The first was to reduce the firing range towards Israel. While, as mentioned, the distance between Iran and Israel is thousands of kilometers, southern Lebanon is located just a few hundred kilometers from the nerve center of the State of Israel in Tel Aviv and Gush Dan. Therefore, while Iran would need launch long-range missiles to hit Israel, Hezbollah it can reach the same objective from Lebanon with short-range rockets. The second purpose is move the battlefield away from Iran. Since firing at Israel from Syria and Lebanon may involve a logical Israeli retaliation against these countries rather than against Iran, it is better for Tehran to finance its proxy organizations and arms supplies, thus avoiding putting itself at risk on the front lines of its policy of aggression against the Jewish state.

Let's also see what the role of the best-known paramilitary organization is, Hezbollah, which began its military operations following the expulsion of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces from Lebanon in 1982 during the First Lebanon War.

Inspired by the religious justification of major Shia ideologues such asayatollah Khomeini (remember the suicide attacks against Israeli, American and French targets located in Lebanon), Hezbollah he managed to advance it status of the Shiite community in Lebanon from a persecuted and deprived community to the most powerful and dominant community in the country, while repressing the Christian community present there. In parallel, he trained and armed the members of Hezbollah transforming them into a military militia serving the IRGC.⁶ The organization has around 20.000 ready-to-use men, of which 5.000 are combat fighters.elite and between 20.000 and 50.000 are reserve fighters.⁷

Hezbollah bases its defense on the civilian population of the area in which it operates. In terms of technical-tactical procedures (TTPs), the organization establishes its own headquarters on the lower floors of ten-story residential buildings and always in residential buildings in which he hides weapons such as missiles and rockets.⁸ Hezbollah it therefore exercises a form of deterrence against possible attacks by Israel, which would be subject to harsh criticism by the International Community for the "collateral effects" of such a decision. Also Hezbollah, however, was the subject of criticism for the tactical-strategic choice made. In response to criticism, the organization stated that, in light of the weakness of the Lebanese army, it is alone in ensuring a buffer between Israel and Lebanon to protect Lebanon from any Israeli aggression.⁹

Although Hezbollah was born as a typical militia to be used with asymmetric warfare tactics, over time it has evolved into an organization capable of fighting different types of war. During the Lebanese civil war, when it was but one of the country's many militia groups, Hezbollah it has primarily launched suicide bombings and frontal attacks on Western and Israeli forces, both methods that, militarily, are neither sophisticated nor efficient.

The silent evolution of Hezbollah from a guerrilla force to a military structure capable of applying more conventional TTPs went unnoticed and only became evident during the 34-day war against Israel in 2006. The organization demonstrated tactics and capabilities far beyond what was expected, from fully fit into the typology of hybrid warfare.

After the Israeli invasion, Hezbollah it took full advantage of Lebanon's rocky terrain, ideal for ground movements but impractical for armored maneuvers. He focused on his own battle-positions on easily defensible hill villages, which offer excellent observation and shooting fields and are inhabited by populations sympathetic to his cause. Despite being numerically inferior, his units proved to be cohesive, well trained, disciplined and experienced in how to control the territory.

Equipped with an effective chain of command and control, thanks to a complex communication system, Hezbollah successfully employed “hedgehog” defense tactics, setting up strongholds in fortified bunkers, like a regular force. During the conflict, it continued to launch rockets at Israel using hidden launchers, even behind enemy lines.

None of these tactics are characteristic of guerrilla forces, which usually rely on population-centered methods to hide. In essence, Hezbollah it took Israel by surprise because it acted in a way not strictly attributable to an irregular combatant, nor to the regular army of a state.

It appears clear, however, that Iran is still far from wanting to engage in a direct armed confrontation with Israel and, therefore, the model of "proximity wars" which has been widespread for decades is now being applied by the regime of ayatollah who, between historical enemies, coalitions of opportunity or consolidated alliances and internal social unrest, believed that "the time to act" had arrived.

In the chaos of geopolitics which in the delirium of various leaders would like to herald a "new world order" (we are now projected into the dystopian future predicted by Aldous Huxley!), an alliance which, for now, holds is that ofMoscow-Tehran axis, Axis Forces of the XNUMXst century.

So one wonders what game Moscow is playing, if he is not the great puppeteer who holds the strings of Iran which, in turn, holds those of Hamas.

While Israeli and Western intelligence services were deceived by the "crudeness" of the procedures adopted to conceal the preparation of the attack - the dear, old, humint, once again, has been marginalized in favor of a technology that has proven useless - it is difficult to believe that Russian intelligence, in particular the GRU, was not aware of such a complex plan as that of the attack on Israeli territory.

The simultaneous entry along multiple routes, the occupation of villages and kibbutz scattered throughout the so-called "occupied territories" and, above all, such an intense rain of rockets, could not be ignored at least by those who had every interest in significantly destabilizing the area. All this requires acareful planning and the means to carry it out. Certainly the resources were not enough Hamas and Iran may also have acted in concert with the Kremlin.

Beyond the close link between Russia and Iran, there is also a direct one between Moscow and the Palestinian people. We cannot overlook the fact that Russia, making use of the PMC Vega Strategic Services (or more simply Vega) would have provided advice and training to the militiamen of the Palestinian Sunni militia (brigade) Liwa al-Quds, deployed in Syria with hundreds of fighters and to support connections with the forces of elite Syrians and with the Ba'th party.¹⁰

Having failed to make the "take it all and pay for 2" offer to conquer the whole of Ukraine in a week after a triumphal and rapid welcome in the provinces of Donetsk and Luhans'k, Putin found himself entangled in a war quagmire which, at the strategic, pushed him to have to opt for "plan B".

“Plan B” is manifesting itself as a series of initiatives aimed at destabilizing the planet, essentially to “distract” the Western world from the conflict that continues in the meantime and to create problems of a social, political and economic nature where non-democratic governmental entities and non-democratic societies do not exist. monolithic or, at least, “controllable” with relatively little effort. We go, then, from coups d'état like the recent one that occurred in Niger, where the omnipresent Wagner Group had a say in the matter, due to the constant presence in numerous African states with mercenary troops sent to "deal with" the Moscow government to protect its interests in terms of consensus and precious resources to be grabbed, until the current trigger of a new war on the traditional Middle Eastern battlefield, to fuel global chaos and problems. The “effect boomerang” which, in this case, resulted in a rapprochement between Biden and Netanyahu, but for Putin this is not a problem.

In recent months we have learned that the Russian president, in his apparently senseless or improvisational decisions, actually plays all the cards that the hand offers him and his bluff is based on the principle of Resilience that characterizes the Russian people. While we consider it unacceptable not only the continuation of the conflict in Ukraine, but above all the suffering this implies for everyone, The Russian people's level of tolerance for sacrifice is decidedly higher than ours. Nowadays we are amazed that we can accept that a family member or friend dies in a war; for the Russians (at least for a large part of them) it is still an honor, if this happens for the Great Mother Russia. This happens also thanks to the effectiveness of that propaganda whose contents for us are mystifications of reality, while for the Russians they still manage to give meaning to their existence, based on the sense of belonging to something great and superior. Not to mention the ability to tolerate the consequences of economic crises: after all, they are just cycles that repeat themselves, whether there was the "mustachioed" tsar, Yeltsin, or Putin. There are still too many who are resigned to the “we were born to suffer…”.

I suggest reading the essay Russki Mir: War or peace? by Mikhail Shishkin to understand the foundations of this behavior. And this is in Putin's mind Resilience it still has room for more wars and more suffering, only that, at this point, it must largely concern others too.