Throughout the Fifth Republic, the tenants of the Elysée were characterized by a common factor: the indispensable French way of appearing and thinking. It is a typical connotation of transalpine republican politics, which for half a century has guaranteed uniqueness, independence and with respect, a certain veil of antipathy.
Even when a socialist president took office in Paris, the trend has not changed, on the contrary. The originality and the charisma of Mitterand have done nothing but re-propose the image of a country inserted in everything and for everything in the West, but however free to choose its destiny, if necessary also to jerk.
The French extraordinary is given by the transversality of this approach, which remained unchanged regardless of the President's political family. In this sense, the example of the continuity between Mitterand and Chirac is different, different in everything except in the capacity to close the doors to the "allies" when this did not fit into the interests of France. To the bad relations between Mitterand and Reagan of the '80 years, followed the all but Atlantic policy of the former mayor of Paris: Chirac's refusal to go to war against Saddam Hussein in the 2003 was the most classic proof.
All this is valid until the 2007, when Sarkozy's rise upsets the canons of President "à l'ancienne" inaugurating the image of the young rampant and decision maker, subsequently imported also in Italy.
But behind the change of look, there is some turbidity. In the 2009 a historical fact passes under the trace: Paris after 43 years is part of NATO. The exit from the Integrated Command wanted by De Gaulle in the '66 had been motivated in no uncertain terms in the name of "national sovereignty" and would have opened decades of dislikes between the Alliance and Paris, forced to collaborate anyway.
The decision to re-enter the 2009, in the absence of a common planetary enemy, has upset the French foreign policy, in fact no longer independent but compromised to Washington's strategic objectives. Little has been said about it, almost for nothing. 
Just as little (and the contrary would be absurd this time ...) there was talk of the last touch-up in the organization of the French services, which always took place under the chairmanship of Sarkozy in the 2008. Despite the merger between Directorates for the Territory Security e General informations all the transalpine Intelligence is structured under the banner of fragmentation. In addition to the Interiors there are Defense commands, on which the depends Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure , Direction Rensegnements Militaires, and the Internal Directorates of the Ministry of Economy and Finance.
If we add the creation of a General Staff for the Prevention of Terrorism (commissioned by Hollande Cazeneuve's minister) and the investigative directions within the National Police, the tangle becomes inextricable. On the same intervention dynamics in emergency situations, there are 3 units of special forces dependent on the interior (BRI, RAID and FIPN) on whose use the French themselves do not have very clear ideas.
The reasons why there is so much confusion, common to other countries that have not yet been tested as France these days, depends essentially on two aspects:
- on the one hand multiply the commands and commanders, for obvious internal political reasons
- on the other hand, avoid the vertical forms, an incurable pathology of all the European democracies from the post-war period onwards.
It seems difficult to argue that the reduction of national sovereignty combined with the entanglement of intelligence and prevention apparatuses has had a fatal effect on French national security. By virtue of what has been said about the return of Paris to NATO, we must remember the historical lines of the Quay d'Orsay dried up precisely to satisfy the will of the USA, for years away from the French "round of friendships". In this Hollande did even worse than Sarkozy.
Paris had special relations with the Slavs (Moscow and Belgrade above all) and with many Arab countries, sometimes placing itself in total antithesis with Atlantic policies. From the time of the French mandate on Syria in the '20' and '30' years, France has woven excellent relations with Damascus and in particular with Mukhabarat, the military information service directly linked to the Assad dynasty. Following the wake of Washington and changing policy in the Middle East (Hollande broke with Damascus) has created many problems in terms of preventing terrorism.
What is happening in France is unprecedented in recent history. Although the country has experienced difficult times even in periods of total independence from the Atlantic ties, it is easy to imagine coming political and geopolitical jolts. The presidential elections are at the gates: how much the pure majority goes to the rescue of theestablishment and the return of Sarkozy himself is all to be seen.
(photo: National Police)
