Bombs and diplomacy. Moscow's credit in the Syrian crisis

(To Giampiero Venturi)
29/11/15

The cards of the poker game that is played in Syria are less and less covered. The events of the last week have meant a significant step forward in identifying the scenarios that we will witness in the near future.

Starting with the macroscopic event of the shooting down of the Russian Sukhoi on the Turkish-Syrian border, the thing to think about is the lack of military reaction from Moscow. The feared risk of military escalation between Russia and a NATO member country has not materialized.

It was to be expected for at least two reasons:

  • there were no minimum prerequisites for extended involvement

  • Russia would have achieved much more from a failed response than from any military retaliation.

With regard to the first point we start from the fact that based on the art. 4 of the Treaty, the Alliance provides for an immediate consultation in the event of a territorial threat to a Member State. There was the consultation but the threat, even when looking for it, there was no shadow. Even a possible Russian response against Turkish military installations would not automatically have meant aggression (and thus the involvement of other NATO countries under Article 5) for the simple fact that Turkey opened fire first on the basis of an encroachment to prove.

In this regard, it should be emphasized that the dispute over the actual violation of Russian Sukhoi airspace, as well as embarrassing the allies, backfires against Turkey itself. The issue that makes Ankara's position uncomfortable is the choice of priorities with respect to the stated objective of combating terrorism. Even if the Russian air force operates on its own without sharing objectives and flight plans with other subjects present in the area, armed defense against an operator not intended to offend does not seem consistent with official declarations. Probably therefore that Turkey fights terrorism (the Kurds of the PKK) but not the Islamist one.

We have already spoken several times in this column on Turkey's real intentions and ambiguous positioning. What is worth pointing out are the diplomatic repercussions that give Russia a huge political victory.

Putin's failure to retaliate diminishes public opinion's idea of ​​a war-torn Russia as depicted by the US media drum, especially after the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis. It makes it clear or at least shifts attention to the actual role played by Turkey in the war against the Islamic State and by extension obliges the United States to a clearer convergence. Above all, the methods of killing the fighter-bomber pilot oblige all those involved in the Syrian theater to take a less cryptic position regarding supplies to militias and local armed groups.

However, the biggest result achieved by the Kremlin is essentially diplomatic. The lack of Russian military retaliation guarantees Putin a credit to be collected on other fronts, in particular that of sanctions linked to the crisis in Ukraine. If the United States set itself the strategic goal of coalescing Europe against the Russian bear, all this goes in exactly the opposite direction. As argued by the political scientist Luttwack (far from being an admirer of President Putin), the willingness shown by Russia and its effective military commitment in the Middle East will make it very difficult to continue to demonize it. The military flirtation taking place with France over the bombing in Syria in this regard already represents an important revolution for the traditional military assets of the West.

In other words, the "Turkish question" is an excellent opportunity for the Kremlin and not a major problem. All the inherent acts have a more symbolic than strategic value.

It is valid for Putin's refusal to meet Erdogan, for the convocation of the ambassador, for the tightening of the customs and commercial regime, for the call of the naval officer in Istanbul. Also applies to Moscow's retreat from Blackseafor as announced by Admiral Komoyedov. The naval cooperation group established in the 2001 among the countries bordering the Black Sea, given Moscow's relations with Georgia and Ukraine, already had a very relative value.

The figure that emerges most from the current game in Syria is the jolt to the balance between nations as we are used to considering them. We do not know the timing of the reorganization or the actual repositioning.

However, the real geopolitical lesson that is drawn from it is that after the Syrian crisis, especially in Europe, nothing will be as before.

(photo: Tass / Türk Hava Kuvvetleri)