As head of the Geopolitics Group, I enjoyed reading the short but very interesting article "France, Germany and the Atomic"Written by Giovanni de Paolis. That the idea of a "nuclearized" Germany generates mixed feelings, even among the Germans, is a fact. That NATO was the main guarantee of security in Europe during the Cold War years, this is debatable. Apart from the fact that the Soviet Union made ... demand to join the Atlantic Pact ... seriously and persistently, at least before the advent at the summit of Khrushchev, in reality the so-called "collective defense"1 according to the Washington Treaty it was invoked for the first time only in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the United States, on the 11th of September 2001.
The real guarantee has been represented, for at least thirty years, by the physical presence of American military and civilian personnel in air and naval bases made available to the USA in location strategic in Italy and Germany: the extermination of hundreds of American citizens would, automatically, be the casus belli capable of triggering the intervention in US forces. The comparison with the presence of forces from other Alliance countries is, to say the least, unbalanced: to give a current example, the Belgian and German troops, deployed in Lithuania to "protect" the country against an enemy ... not better officially identified, despite under the NATO hat, in the event of a serious international crisis that would cause Moscow to become aggressive towards the Baltic countries, they would represent a very poor obstacle to possible invasion plans. In short, does anyone seriously believe that the risk of causing the death of several hundred soldiers from these two allied nations would be taken in Moscow as a serious danger of dragging the United States of America to war?
Even in the hypothesis in which Germany was "nuclearized", how seriously would this danger be taken by the Russian leaders?
If they did not give up before the crisis, reduced to corpses these soldiers would be at best the cause of a "strange war" like that between Hitler's Germany and the Anglo-French allies between the 1939 and 1940. Thus, the displacement of French troops, vehicles and nuclear missiles in German territory would be a ridiculous obstacle in a post-NATO scenario: those who seriously think, given the historical precedents, that - in the hypothesis for the absurd moment of a Russia's invasion of Germany - France would not be limited, like the British Empire in June 1940, to a hasty retreat, perhaps after rendering such missiles useless, in order to get stuck in the "French fortress"? Among other things, placing nuclear missiles in Germany would be an admission of renunciation of defending the true eastern border of the European Union, namely Poland and Romania. From the parts of Warsaw and the other Visegrad countries2, mindful of the Soviet invasions of the 1956 and the 1968, the move to defend Europe along the Oder-Neiße Line would be taken as a new betrayal, after those of the 1938-39 and, for Hungary, of the 1956. Strongly marking the intention of defending these former Warsaw Pact countries is strategic for the Union, as long as the Russian Federation remains a nuclear emirate and also in light of Russian attempts to ... seduce some ancient allies. If they do not understand it in Paris and Berlin, we are sure that Warsaw, Prague, Bratislava and Budapest will remind you of it.
From the point of view of Italy, an exclusive "atomic" politico-military axis between France and Germany would be yet another demonstration of our second-level downgrading, just behind Berlin and Paris, at most on the same level of Madrid, Warsaw and Bucharest, while throughout the course of the Cold War the border the Americans had placed their outposts in the most strategic positions of the Bundes Republik, of Turkey and, indeed, of Italy, beware of leaving us in a no man's land.
Perhaps it would not be bad for the Italian government to take an interest in this story at the highest levels, looking for the countries of Visegrad and Romania to create a block group, also considering the fact, highlighted by De Paolis, that there are several treaties - still in force - hostage to a "nuclearization" of Germany.
Moreover, in a logic of non-proliferation supported by Washington (and - we believe - in this case also from Moscow), the deployment not already of conventional weapons systems but even of missiles with or without the nuclear warhead already mounted would constitute a devastating change of the strategic scenario in Europe, likely to provoke per se reactions of Russia in former Soviet countries and, why not, of the USA in the Middle East and North Africa. The case of a transfer of the case would be different Strike force for the Union; frankly, there is no doubt that Paris intends to take such a step, at least in the medium term.
The case of Turkey is different, we believe, if deprived of the American nuclear umbrella, it could almost certainly try to have one of its own, having the strength to resist the adverse pressures of Russia, Europe and the United States. But this is a borderline case, which deserves separate analysis.
In conclusion, we believe it is very likely that, unless an increase in Russian aggression in Europe following the withdrawal of US forces, all of these voices of an "atomic" aid of France to Germany will remain so.
1 In the sense that an attack on a member of the Alliance is considered an attack on everyone.
2 In addition to Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Rep. And Hungary.
(photo: Bundesarchiv)
