11/06/2015 - The rapid expansion of the network and the transition from an almost predictable one-way threat to a series of multilateral and asymmetrical challenges have made the current geopolitical framework liquid and unstable.

Given that the traditional method ofhard power and the concept of containment based on the cd. "Zero-sum game" are no longer applicable, the need to put information, ie intelligence, emerges overwhelmingly, as primary means of contrast. Although it is undisputed that intelligence is in itself an effective tool, the variety of inputs which must be contextualised and correlated within complex scenarios suggests to articulate an effective and efficient system of intelligence sharing as an effect multiplier. The optimization of this methodology must be based on the balance between the concept of need to know, which provides access to information only for those who, with appropriate permissions, need it to perform their duties properly, and that of need to share, according to which the sharing of information within the intelligence community It is crucial for an adequate contrast to existing threats.

Given the growing commonality of interests in strategic areas and on the basis of experiences deriving from the most recent international missions, organizations such as NATO and the EU have decided to adopt an operational doctrine based on the comprehensive approach, consisting of a crisis management modality that involves all the characteristic aspects of the operational theater: political, military, social, religious, economic. Such a system requires the presence, upstream, of a intelligence sharing enviroment functional to a rapid and reliable information exchange at different levels between the various subjects involved. In NATO, in addition to being projects such as Network Centric Warfare (NCW), with the purpose of increasing the shared situational awareness of the commanders through a more efficient sharing of the information acquired by each unit within the operating environment, there are several bodies dedicated to carrying out activities intelligence sharing:

• THEIntelligence Division, placed inside theInternational Military Staff (IMS), which produces intelligence assessments of an operational / strategic nature destined in the field Military Commitee in which the representatives of the member countries participate;

• NATO SitCen (Situation Center) which collects the intelligence products originated by the designated NATO bodies and disseminates them within NATO HQ to all representatives of the countries participating in NATO;

• THEIntelligence Unit (IU), which replaces the 2007 Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU), realizes a greater sharing of intelligence among the various NATO recipients in terms of risks and terrorist threat;

• theIntelligence Fusion Center which has the task of supporting theAllied Command Operation (ACO) by sharing intelligence products that predict potential crises, as well as support for planning NATO-led operations.

The versatility and unconventionality of the threat has placed the information exchange as fundamental even in the policies adopted by the European Union in the field of law enforcement and security. The Council 2006 / 960 / JHA Framework Decision on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between Member States' authorities has established the fundamental importance ofintelligence sharing within the EU, placing the will to standardize and speed up the exchange of information, basing this cooperation on the "principle of availability" by virtue of which the relevant data can circulate freely in the European territory without being affected by the limits of national borders and differences in regulations. A potential operational line for greater police cooperation is certainly to strengthen the content established by the Treaty on the functioning of the EU which provides, inter alia, the possibility to dispose of measures aimed at strengthening the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of information of interest. In this context, EUROPOL is the European reference point in this area, with particular reference to the coordination of the various police operations between the Member States relating to the most serious criminal events.

In addition to this, the Lisbon Treaty has envisaged a reinforcement of cooperation between the Member States in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy which, in this case too, involves an obvious strengthening of the intelligence apparatus. The main body dedicated to this type of activity is EUIntCen (Intelligence Center) placed inside theEuropean External Action Service (EEAS). Taking advantage of the collaboration of experts coming from the Information Services of the various countries, its task is to provide, on the basis of Open Source Informations, intelligence analysis and situation reports on terrorism and other threats to the High Representative and to all EU political leaders. Another relevant body is theEuropean Union Military Staff (EUMS) which performs early warning, situation assessment and crisis management outside the Union.

An active contribution made to the sharing of relevant information is also given by private subjects who cooperate with the Institutions in matters concerning safety. In this regard, the role of FIUs should be mentioned (Financial Intelligence Unit) on the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. Risen from the original recommendations of the FATF (International Financial Action Group), these entities have as their main task to act as a connecting element between the financial system and all the other national and foreign authorities that deal with criminal phenomena through analysis and sharing of information related to reports of suspicious financial movements from industry operators.

Despite the efforts to define a intelligence sharing enviroment effective at various levels, from inter-agency to inter-organization, there are several barriers that still exist to achieve such an ambitious project. These limits can be summarized as follows:

• Frequent lack of unitary political direction between and within International Organizations (especially EU) that should share intelligence. This implies the possibility that, if there is a fully shared system, a country uses data or information for purposes that do not coincide with those of the country that collected or processed it;

• Presence of a hierarchical and strongly bureaucratic intelligence model that prevents the horizontal flow of information. Very often there is a lack of communication even between national agencies;

• Reduced investment in the human factor and lack of a homogeneous training doctrine between the various States that allows forging operators and analysts with a wide-ranging mental culture and flexibility predisposed to the application of modern techniques and technologies for data collection and analysis;

• Resistance in trusting the analytical process followed by the originator of information deriving from possible differences in the cultural, doctrinal and technological fields;

• Presence of differences, sometimes very relevant, in the technical field in the various phases of the intelligence cycle. The actor with the greatest potential in HUMINT, Techint e SIGINT (and related articulations) will have greater negotiating power with respect to information;

• Presence of stringent constraints on secrecy classifications that can hardly be overcome except by a reorganization of the subject in the legislative or governmental area.

In order to overcome all these limitations and materialize the objective advantages deriving from intelligent information sharing, it is necessary to rethink the entire security and defense system from the basics. Within a intelligence sharing enviroment the unity of political direction that guides the work of the major international actors must be fully shared and mission oriented. It should also lead to the implementation of the tool HUMINT and the formation of a group of senior manager, operators and analysts who, while maintaining their own mental and cultural patterns, are able to work in a complementary and integrated way in all phases of the intelligence cycle, eliminating the gaps which are currently found at certain stages. This would lead to a reduction in technical time for the collection, processing and dissemination of information which would reflect on an increase in timeliness with which to address certain threats.

Among the deserving prospects for rapid implementation is that concerning classification and access to information. In this sense it would be desirable to homogenize the criteria for assigning secrecy classifications as well as more functional declassification protocols and the creation of structured, three-tier databases, strategic, operational and tactical, to which a parallel level of information processing corresponds. At strategic level, the processing of data will be placed with strategic projection, ie the interpolation of the same with other correlables and with a broad spectrum whose assessment they will determine the predictive elaboration of a strategic development; at the operational level there will be the processing of the exhaustible data, in time and validity, within the current operational context. At the tactical level there will be a database containing raw data divided by categories, threats, geographical areas.

Because the information represents one asset strategy of a country and, by extension, of an international organization that shares certain goals, it is desirable to strengthen a system of information protection articulated on three levels: access based exclusively on the principle of need to know through various steps entry into databases based on biometric surveys; technical protection to limit as far as possible the use, manipulation and transfer of sensitive data through, for example, a system of alerts in case of violation of consultation protocols and acquisition of the information that allows, at a remote control station, to intervene promptly to reject the unknown operation; procedures Auditing e Monitoring among the various operators in order to know any problems or gaps and intervene to remedy them.

The effects of such an architecture would fall on the sharing process, which would therefore be safer and more functional.

To gain the described advantages and to acquire a resolutive power in the new type of conflictuality it is therefore evident how a timely and adequate exchange of information is the way to go without further perplexity. The necessary action to follow is therefore that of implementing a political will that translates into a single and overlying device that determines the doctrines and imposes the cancellation of unnecessary duplications, the rationalization and pooling of resources, information, technologies , evaluations, while maintaining the sovereignty of each State intact.

All this while remaining constantly within a legal framework that protects fundamental human rights, privacy and the democratic principle.

Furthermore it is not enough to reach the sharing of information on the status quo ante the operation but also serves and above all communicate the results of the same. Sharing action must not end with the planning of the mission but must also include the pooling of the elements of verification and control on the results obtained in order to share satisfactorily the lessons learned among the various international actors and identify, improving them, the various aspects considered critical.

It can not be there intelligence sharing without one sharing of will.

Andrea Strippoli Lanternini