23/05/2015 - The Gaza Strip is crossed by numerous roads that unwind along its entire extension; more or less practicable routes traveled every day by hundreds of Palestinians. However, many do not know that another Gaza lives underground, more complicated and certainly less frequented.
A network of vital underground communication whose construction, in a few years, has absorbed a large part of the capital available to Hamas, the political faction that governs the thin strip of Palestinian territory from the 2006. From the year in which the Islamic Resistance Movement (this means Hamas) has established itself as a political force opposed to Fatah, relations with Israel have undergone a dramatic decline. The tense strategy towards Tel Aviv, implemented by the al-Qassam brigades, has involved a series of "lightning" terrorist actions towards the kibbutz communities near the border. The infiltration of terrorists into Israeli territory takes place, in fact, thanks to a dense network of tunnels dug by the men of Hamas during the period of truce with Tel Aviv; and thanks to peace and humanitarian aid to Gaza, the Palestinians quickly gathered all the material needed to make their tunnels more efficient and sophisticated.
Economy and market in tunnels
Starting from June 2007, the embargo imposed by the Israelis and Egypt to the Gaza Strip created serious problems for the population, which saw progressively weakening the already poor food and energy resources. From the moment in which the blockade of goods was sanctioned, it was the Israelis who determined how many and which food could cross the border. The situation became particularly critical in the south of the Strip where the inhabitants of the town of Rafah, seized by despair, repeatedly tried to violate the borders with Egypt. The only possible and safe steps to get food, but not only, ran underground: a network of tunnels that, starting from Rafah crossed the "corridor of Philadelphia" and then emerge in the Sinai. The so-called "economic tunnels" were already covered, in the eighties, by many smugglers who exchanged food, but also gold, drugs and above all weapons. At the time the controls were undoubtedly more bland and the goods flowed without too many obstacles. After the Oslo agreements and the fabrication of the partition wall, the work of the smugglers became more difficult, obliging them to find alternative solutions and to widen the network of passages both to Egypt and to Israel.
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Despite the risks involved, the clandestine channels of communication made the Islamic Movement sufficient revenue to pay the salaries of 75.000 employees and, overall, on the eve of Cast Lead, the tunnels yielded a monthly income of about 36 million dollars. That is why the economic tunnels, unlike the military ones, were immediately subordinated to a strict control of the Ministry of the Interior which established the Tunnel Affair Commission (TAC) with the task of regularizing and establishing the volume of business generated in the subsoil. The tunnels used for the trafficking of foodstuffs did not represent a serious threat to Israel, although in addition to food and fuel, they passed large quantities of weapons that armed the terrorists. After the "Cast Lead" operation, Hamas took advantage of the long truce to excavate new underground routes; but this time it was not a matter of transiting foodstuffs or weapons, but directly small armed groups ready to unleash the offensive beyond the Israeli borders.
The underground offensive
The revenues from the commercial tunnels, added to the entry of humanitarian goods, guaranteed the Hamas party a considerable source of survival, even if the benefits were not shared equally among the population. For example, the influx of building materials, such as cement, useful for the reconstruction of vast areas of the country, was diverted to streets that were not really legitimate.
In 2006 the abduction of the carrista Gilad Shalid and the long and exhausting negotiations for his release, were only the beginning of a practice that, since 2014, suffered a dangerous escalation. The 17 July 2014, 13 Hamas fighters infiltrated via the tunnel to the kibbutz of Sufa, close to the border. In a lucky case, the IDF managed to intercept the group before it entered the village: two Israeli soldiers lost their lives in the clash. The 21 July, 30 terrorists emerged over the border disguised as Zahal soldiers trying to attack the kibbutz of Erez and Nir-Am, four Israeli soldiers died repelling the attackers. Just seven days later, the 28 July, some guerrillas appeared at the mouth of a tunnel near the kibbutz of Nahal Oz, killing five soldiers. The succession of these attacks and the concomitant launch of Qassam rockets triggered the Israeli reaction and the "Protective Edge" operation. If the main work of interception and destruction of the rockets was entrusted to the device Iron Dome, the same tranquility did not apply to attacks conducted underground. The main problem with Israeli intelligence was to identify the location of the tunnels, their extension, but above all the access and exit points. According to Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lerner, IDF spokesperson, the intention of the Palestinians was to launch a simultaneous attack inside Israel by infiltrating, at least through 200, armed terrorists to the teeth. Also according to Lerner could be a sort of Israeli September 11 even if, it was an announced attack. In fact, the Tel Aviv government had taken the problem of cross-border Palestinian raids to their feet, even though the past was not without similar incidents.
In July of the 2014, Zahal's military advance focused mainly on the border areas where the Israelis deployed roughly 20.000 units: an armored brigade, three infantry brigades, but above all, teams of genius qualified for war in the tunnels. The General Staff estimated the existence of about 60 tunnels, at least three kilometers long and deep over 20 meters, but what the Israelis discovered on the field, far exceeded their expectations. In fact, the IDF unveiled real masterpieces of underground architecture, efficient and perfectly equipped.
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In the time interval between "Cast Lead" and the new Israeli offensive, Hamas had done its best, using more than 800.000 tons of cement, a lot of manpower and a lot of money. According to analysts, the Palestinian leaders had invested over one million dollars to perfect the underground network, making extensive use of resources for the population. In this way the cities of the Gaza Strip continued to live on the edge of human conditions, while the Hamas government wasted labor and money in order to provoke war with Israel. A conflict that for the Israelis was inevitable, since the only way to prevent aggression from the tunnels was to scour every building in Gaza. The technology, however sophisticated, did not allow us to precisely identify the position and the route of a tunnel, also because the excavation criteria of the Palestinian engineers followed some primitive but effective logics. Hamas had been taught by the Lebanese Hezbollah party which, during the Second Lebanon War, expanded the effectiveness of underground fortifications with the help of North Korean engineers and Iranian Quds Force.
The main rule to build a tunnel without arousing suspicion was the interdiction of any electrical device or that produced abnormal vibrations of the subsoil; the earth was removed with rudimentary machinery, often fed by human force alone. It is useful to remember that among the workers there were not only guerrillas, but also children who, appropriately indoctrinated on the charm of martyrdom, spent their days digging like moles. The international community and theInstitute for Palestine Studies denounced the death of about 160 children, who died due to collapse or fatigue, but above all innocent victims of Hamas. Many have compared the Palestinian underground network to the one excavated by the Vietcong during the Vietnam war, nevertheless there are very important differences. In the first place, the construction of tunnels: those built by Hamas are more sophisticated, have concrete walls, electric light and their width is such as to allow the transit of motorized vehicles. Secondly, Palestinian galleries follow a complicated design, and even more seriously, they have hidden entry into unsuspected buildings such as schools, hospitals, mosques or even UN headquarters. By itself the use of tunnels to fight, protect or move troops does not represent any violation of the Geneva Convention, however - as Jay Sekulow recalls in his Rise of ISIS - Hamas uses the population as a human shield for its installations, and then commits a serious war crime.
To weigh the conscience of Hamas with respect to its people, is the existence of a third and final category of tunnels, that is to say those set up solely to protect the party personalities and their families. The shelters, usually located in the city center, are not offensive, but they are often protected by buildings that are harmless at first sight. It is clear that the Palestinian leaders manifest a poor predisposition to martyrdom and to share the misfortunes collectively; According to some Israeli sources, Ismail Haniyeh, number one of Hamas, would own large tracts of land and pay large sums of money to have his children study in Europe and treat his family in Israeli hospitals.
Technology against tunnels
The Golan brigade and the Givati 84a brigade were the first to enter the Gaza Strip with the aim of ascertaining where the tunnel entrances were. Once the existence of an underground passage had been ascertained, the soldiers had the order to reclaim it from the various explosive traps and then destroy it; an exhausting and risky job because the research was not supported by adequate intelligence work. On this point the terrorists exploited the surprise factor to their advantage, while for Zahal the cost of human lives estimated to trace a tunnel was really too high. How to anticipate the moves of Hamas and with which instruments?
At the end of "Protective Edge" the Israelis achieved all their goals, most of the tunnels had been demolished, but the future did not bode well. As had already happened, every ceasefire that Hamas conquered meant new time and money to start digging the subsoil and find new ways to hit the eternal adversary. It was therefore essential for the Israeli government to acquire all the necessary means to prevent the construction of new tunnels. According to the opinion of the Israeli geologist Jospeh Langotsky, the threat of the tunnels had long been underestimated by the Israeli command; the war in Lebanon of the 2006 and the tunnels in which Hezbollah operated were to serve as an alarm bell, yet no one ever did anything. On the contrary, the Hamas party learned the lesson well, improving the quality of its buildings.
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When the Givati soldiers entered the tunnels, they were amazed by the accuracy with which they had been built: top-quality concrete, electric cables, iron rails, all of the best materials. But how could they have found all that material? At the end of the "Pillar of Defense" operation, in November 2012, Obama's government, to please the international community, pressured Prime Minister Netanyahu to allow all the construction equipment needed for reconstruction to enter Gaza. Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Knesset they knew, however, that this concession would have cost dear and, in the light of the facts, they were not wrong.
To date, IDF's research and development unit is working hard to find a system to intercept the construction of tunnels before they emerge in Israeli territory: the estimated cost would be around 59 million dollars. Some of the best Israeli companies have presented several projects which have as their object "listening" to the terrain. The Israeli company Magna has proposed to excavate a tunnel of 70 km - along the border with the Strip - equipped with appropriate sensors that detect the movements of the ground. According to the company's director, Haim Siboni - interviewed by the Globe - this system would transmit in real time useful data to identify where the excavation area is and how many men are working there. A well-known Canadian archaeologist, Paul Bauman, who discovered the supposed site of Atlantis, even intervened on the tunnel issue. The Canadian has been working with the IDF staff for some time, pointing out that the only effective way to find Hamas tunnels is not in one type of technology, but in a combination of them - radar, terrain tomography. and seismic measurement. In particular, said Bauman, the use of an underground radar could be the best solution: "it all depends on what kind of frequency you want to use, in fact, you can have an apparatus that sees 100 meters below the ground, but to low resolution or 10 meters at very high resolution ". In addition, the Canadian archaeologist reiterated, "the radar is particularly suitable for signaling cement constructions and metal bars, all materials used in the new generation tunnels".
Paradoxically, the technical evolution of Hamas in the construction of tunnels has become a double-edged sword. The second problem that haunts the Israeli staff is the preservation of the life of its soldiers when they run into a tunnel. A few months after "Protective Edge", the Roboteam company in Tel-Aviv presented to the Ministry of Defense the new Micro Tactical Ground Robot, a small device less than a meter wide and weighing less than 10 kilos, which can creep into the tunnels by scanning them thanks to five cameras, an internal microphone and a laser pointer. This small and agile instrument, easily transportable by the infantry, provides Israeli operators with the opportunity to see and hear in advance what is happening in a tunnel, so as to enter it, aware of the dangers they will find.
The last knot to solve is how to destroy the tunnel in its entirety because, the collapse of a part of it, is not enough to eliminate the threat. In addition to a good amount of explosives, some experts have promoted the use of the FAE (Fuel Air Explosives) whose power recalls the napalm of the war in Vietnam. The military operations of the IDF have apparently achieved all the objectives set: most of the tunnels have been demolished, but the bet remains open because many are questioning how long it will take Hamas to rearm and dig up new ones. But the new Israeli strategy has changed and, finally, aims at prevention by investing large sums of money to arrest the terrorists before they begin to creep underground. The only certainty remains Hamas and its firm intention to hit Israel anyway: against this attitude there is no technology or special weapon capable of arresting them.
Paolo Palumbo
(photo: IDF)