Naval Policies of the Second Half of the 19th Century: The Royal Navy

(To Francesco Sisto)
24/02/25

In the second half of the 19th century, navies experienced significant technological development, which materialized in five directions: the affirmation of mechanical propeller propulsion, iron constructions, the application of armor, the introduction of new weapons (breech-loading rifled guns, grenades, underwater mines, the first steam submarines and the first torpedoes) and the "arrangement of the main armament guns in revolving armored turrets".1

By the mid-19th century, Britain produced nearly two-thirds of the world's coal, nearly half of its iron, five-sevenths of its steel, two-fifths of its machinery, and nearly half of its cotton cloth. Steam propulsion for warships was also beginning to have an effect at this time.

Later, when steamships became established, Britain's industrial weight gave her the opportunity to "take back" the temporary superiority that had been taken away from her. The Great Nation (France) in the design of individual vessels. In fact, the ability to build more ships than anyone else, apparently exclusive on the coals with the highest calorific value, and the considerable financial resources were the solid foundations of the maritime power of Great Britain. In addition to all this there was the great competence and professionalism of the crews (definitely superior to those of other navies).2

In 1859 the French Navy was the first in the world to launch a “true” ironclad ship: the Glory (photo). The latter, equipped with steel armour and a wooden skeleton, was later outclassed by the HMS Warrior (launched in 1860 - opening photo) of the Royal Navy. The British battleship was characterized by a steel hull and armor.

Subsequently, a major program was set up for the construction of battleships. These were undoubtedly superior in firepower to those of the French Navy. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Britain's rapidly evolving industrial strength, together with its large coal reserves and extensive network of loading ports, was virtually unmatched by The Great Nation.

Overall, until the early 1880s the Royal Navy had no rivals; all this, in fact, led to a reduction in spending on the fleet. It is worth noting that the reductions occurred – also – due to the theory of “Brick and mortar school”. This “thinking” (consisting of representatives of the British Army, who agreed with the French school), essentially, called for the need to reduce the expenses for a blue-water fleet and urged a defensive strategy (building coastal fortifications). However, this theory found little success in Great Britain.

The British Admiralty, in 1889, in view of the gradual and fearful diplomatic understanding between France and the Russian Empire, decided to maintain a large fighting fleet of at least XNUMX nautical miles in size. equal to the combined fleets of the second and third largest navies at the time. Accordingly, the British Parliament on 31 May 1889 passed the Naval Defense Act 1889; London gave the go-ahead to “Two-power standard”.

This doctrine formed the architecture of British naval policy for the next two decades.

Britain was later forced to abandon this policy because a new threat was on the horizon: the Imperial German Navy.

It can be said that by now the Pax Britannica was coming to an end…

1 A. Santoni, History and naval policy of the contemporary age, HISTORICAL OFFICE OF THE NAVY, Rome, 2005, p. 15

2 P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Power, Garzanti, Milan, 2010, p. 245