The start of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, found the air forces that would participate in it in the midst of the transition from propeller to jet propulsion. Fighters that had dominated the skies, such as the P-51 Mustang (F-51 according to the new Air Force designation) or strategic bombers such as the B-29 Superfortress they had to compete with new aircraft, capable of delivering absolutely superior performance.
Early jet models, such as the F-80 Shooting Star, the F-84 Thunderjet, the F-2 Banshee and the F-9 Panther, still suffered from non-optimal characteristics, especially regarding a square-plan wing configuration which constituted a serious aerodynamic limitation.
Same United States Air Force It had been established as an autonomous armed force only in 1947, and was working on doctrines consistent between the desire to act with absolute independence (strategic employment in the heart of enemy territory) and the need to cooperate with other armed forces on the battlefield.
Technical and conceptual issues that were part of the context of demobilization following the end of the world war, with the decommissioning of entire departments and the necessary reconfiguration from a war economy to a standard industrial one.
At the time of the North Korean invasion, there were several hundred aircraft of all types in Japan belonging to the Far East Air Force, framed to ensure the air defense of the archipelago and not to intervene in a war on the Korean peninsula. While the South Korean air force was virtually non-existent, Pyongyang's was based on old but effective Soviet models Yakovlev, Lavochkin (photo) and Ilyushin, capable of cooperating in the successful initial phase of the offensive.
The first phase of the conflict saw the collapse of the South Korean army and government, pushed to the southernmost tip of the peninsula and besieged within the perimeter of Pusan together with the very few US forces present. In the air, however, from the first weeks the United Nations Command (formal definition of what were in fact the American armed forces supported by a series of allied contingents) regained air superiority which, however, faced with the collapse on the field, could not reverse the outcome of the conflict.
The Air Force from bases in Japan, the Navy and Marine Corps from aircraft carriers, as well as British, Australian and other Commonwealth aircraft, worked tirelessly to destroy lines of communication, railways, bridges, any infrastructure along which the North Koreans could move men and equipment toward Pusan.
The turning point of the conflict, in September, was the landing desired by General Douglas MacArthur in the port of Inchon (photo), near Seoul, with the few forces that had been possible to gather in the time available.
Winning a very dangerous gamble, the North Korean army was routed and chased north, completely reversing the outcome of the war to the point that it became certain that everything would be over by Christmas.
With no more paying targets available, the FEAF attempted to mount several airborne assaults to trap the fleeing North Korean divisions, but with little success.
Meanwhile, Communist China and the Soviet Union were planning their intervention to rescue the failing Communist regime. In late November, after a concentration of forces that had been culpably ignored by the United Nations Command, three hundred thousand Chinese overwhelmed the UN forces in what remains the most serious defeat of an American army on the battlefield.
Even on the air front, the Sino-Soviet intervention was decisive, with the introduction of what would be the undisputed protagonist of the war, the MiG-15 swept-wing jet fighter (opening photo). Derived from the studies recovered in occupied Germany on the best modern aerodynamic achievements, the real strong point of this interceptor was the engine Klimoff VK-1 (photo below), a Soviet derivation of the British Rolls-Royce Nene engine. A few dozen examples of the Nene had been requested from London by an industrial delegation in 1946.
Incredibly, despite the firm opposition of the security services, the agreement was finalized with the generic assurance that the technical studies would not have a military aspect. The devastated economy of the crumbling Empire could not risk starting a trade war with the Soviet Union, which on the other hand was not yet a recognized adversary.
Powered by one of the best engines available, configured with a swept wing that provided flying characteristics far superior to the square planform, and armed with three heavy guns specially installed to shoot down American bombers, the MiG-15 became the nightmare of the Allied air forces in Korea and instantly rendered virtually all enemy aircraft useless on the front lines.
Officially flown only by Chinese and North Korean crews, in reality also by numerous Soviet pilots belonging to the 64th Fighter Air Corps detached by Stalin to Manchuria, the new fighter gained immediate air superiority in the border region, which was nicknamed MiG Alley. Almost overnight, the FEAF lost its freedom of maneuver along the Sino-Korean border through which reinforcements and supplies continued to pass for the forces on the front.
The only clear advantage the Americans had was the experience of their pilots, all veterans of the Pacific War, while only many of the Soviets had a combat background; the Chinese and North Koreans were just weeks into training.
To counterbalance the entry of the MiGs, the difficult decision was made to deploy to Korea the most advanced fighter available on the Western front of the Cold War, the North American F-86. Sabre (photo). The only other fighter with a swept wing, with less powerful armament than the MiG-15 but equipped with technological aids superior to its opponent, such as assisted RADAR aiming and a pressurized cabin, the duel between the MiG-15 and the Sabre became the hallmark of the Korean War between 1951 and 1953.
The American fighter (very) slowly gained the upper hand, mainly thanks to the excellent training of the crews. Crews who often fell prey to what became known as “MiG madness”, the obsession with chasing and shooting down a MiG at any cost. Even violating the obligation not to cross the border into China, where the communist air units were based and in whose skies daily battles took place at the end of which the downings were not recorded.
The MiG-15 remained a lethal adversary for the UN air force throughout the conflict, inflicting heavy losses especially on the slow and vulnerable B-29 bomber formations flying over North Korea.
On April 12, 1951, the FEAF attempted to strike the Sinuiju Bridge between China and Korea with several dozen B-29s escorted by F-84 fighters; intercepted by MiGs with Soviet crews, 3 bombers were lost and several others were damaged, a quarter of the bombing force, with the escorts unable to do anything.
As a result of “Black Thursday,” no more daytime bombing operations were attempted in areas patrolled by MiGs. Even close support missions for ground forces, engaged in continuous advances and retreats along the peninsula near the Thirty-eighth parallel, suffered continuous incursions by Chinese and Soviet fighters. The particular configuration of the battlefield added to the dangers posed by the enemy.
The operation strangle, with which the FEAF attempted to cut North Korean lines of communication, did not achieve the hoped-for success because the Chinese and North Koreans did not require any particular logistics and, for what was necessary, they limited themselves to repairing the affected roads as best they could.
The strategy of hitting critical infrastructure in North Korea such as dams and power plants proved to be of little use, because such targets in Korea were very few and those in China and the USSR were unattainable for political reasons.
Soviet air units were repeatedly sent to Korea, wearing Chinese or Korean uniforms, and fought against UN forces throughout the conflict.
The Korean air war marked a major turning point in the evolution of air combat. It saw the end of the propeller-driven fighter as a top-flight interceptor, outclassed by new jet fighters and relegated (with some effectiveness) to the role of close-in support for ground forces.
Even the bombing with the giant four-engined aircraft that had dominated World War II was no longer possible. The extremely high rate of losses of the B-29s in the skies of North Korea (photo) definitively closed this page of aviation history, replaced by less flashy formations of jet fighter-bombers that would later fight in Vietnam and beyond, such as the F-105 Thunderchief.
The duel between the Sabre and the MiG-15s were also the last major battle dogfight, fought between pilots who tried to get into the ideal position to shoot down their opponent before he could do the same. From this point of view it was an extraordinarily old-fashioned war, not unlike the dogfights of the First World War.
Within a few years, air-to-air missiles would come online that would outclass cannon-based combat. A technological advantage often sterilized by absurd rules of engagement, such as the one imposed on F-4 pilots in Vietnam. Phantom not to fire before having identified the target by sight, at a distance at which missile engagement became impossible and it was necessary to return to dogfight.
The political rules of engagement were a theme introduced in Korea, with the obligation to ignore the Chinese territory from which the communist offensive thrust was continually regenerated, continued in Vietnam and in various aspects also in the wars on terrorism of the twenty-first century. Another record of the Korean War, where the military clash to be won took second place to the political problem to be managed. With the obvious loss of relevance of any possible technological superiority.
The 1950s saw the introduction of dozens of models of jet aircraft, developed on theories still conceived during the world conflict. Some did not pass the fire test and were decommissioned within a few years, others like the Sabre They remained in service in subsequent versions and in various countries until the 1970s.
In general, it was the testing ground for developing those concepts, tactics and lines of command that would later characterise the air front of the Cold War, making it a fundamental part of the – often sclerotic – way in which subsequent conflicts were faced.
Photo: USAF/web
