From Earth to the Moon (security and defense aspects)

New space exploration programs are now increasingly involving the cislunar environment. This means that more and more space activity targets are included in a band that reaches the surface of our satellite, including the dark side of the moon. Musical references aside, Alongside every scientific project or economic objective, there are always geopolitical and, consequently, military motivations. From this last point of view, the expansion of the area of ​​interest requires us to also consider the space beyond low Earth orbit.ⁱ (Low Earth Orbit – LEO) and up to the lunar surface as a possible theater of operations.

With the existence of a growing number of countries that have significant space capabilities and nearly a hundred that operate satellites in LEO, space has thus become both a critical infrastructure and a strategic security frontier. In short, by increasing the "human" presence in those areas, the possibilities of threats to the security of this or that country on the Earth's surface or to its interests in space also increase. It is for this reason that, when examining the security issues of the space domain, we now speak of the Earth-Moon system (Earth-Moon System – EMSys).

In the context of increased geopolitical competition also in space, capabilities that will allow to detect, track and identify any threats will prove vital to achieve that strategic advantage that allows to make deterrence credible. The set of these capabilities are commonly known in the civil sector as Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and, in the military sector as Space Domain Awareness (SDA), until yesterday substantially contained within the limits of low orbit.

The overall theatre of operations is consequently no longer limited to the traditional boundaries of LEO, but space operations could be conducted throughout the new environment which, given the geopolitical interests at stake, in the coming decades it will most likely become increasingly congested, contested and competitive, even from a military perspective. This will require the development of new and unique capabilities, such as space traffic management, positive control of lunar space and EMSys, surveillance of Lagrange points, space weather observation and Planetary Defense (read article “Geopolitics and Space Exploration").

Furthermore, due to the acceleration of the current strategic competition and the muscular approach highlighted by some countries, there is a concrete possibility that rivalries will be extended to space and that countries capable of doing so will move from the militarization of space to its arsenalization.ⁱⁱ.

The Militarization of Space in LEO and GEO

The traditional fields of strategic interest in which military space capabilities have been developed are Earth observation (mainly for intelligence gathering, support of operations and development of geographic reference data), listening, warning, telecommunications, surveillance and positioning (read article “Space: Geopolitics, Economics and Defense”). To do this, very high-performance means (optical, infrared, hyperspectral, radar, etc.) are needed, specifically designed for military use.

The images collected from space are the main source of data for the collection of information useful for an assessment of the current situation. These are very useful, in addition to the information collected with other means available in the theater, such as drones, to support operations in non-permissive environments both in the preparation of the mission and in the targeting both in the assessment of damages.

Then there is the ability to listen to electromagnetic emissions resulting from activities on the Earth's surface. The ability to collect this data from sources in a given area constitutes, in fact, an undeniable added value for monitoring the activity of a potential adversary and provides, in most cases, the alert and the first information on an event. Today there are space systems capable of precisely identifying electromagnetic emissions, tracking them and analyzing them effectively, providing essential data for planning and carrying out operations.

There are also the now well-known PNT systems (Positioning-Navigation-Timing) such as the American GPS, the European GALILEO, the Russian GLONASS, the Chinese BEIDOU and the Indian regional system IRNSS. Systems whose strategic and tactical importance is no longer in question.

In parallel with the development of all these capabilities, finally, capabilities to deceive or interfere with adversary satellite systems have been developed, such as spoofing and jamming, thus degrading its performance.

Using all this knowledge, high-precision ballistic missile warning and space surveillance systems have been developed. It is thus possible to immediately detect the location of a possible launch, identify the system and its characteristics, issue the alarm and prepare possible defenses and responses.

The space domain in LEO, however, is neither isolated nor inaccessible, within certain parameters, to weaponry. cross-domain based on land, sea and air. Already today the USA, Russia, China and India have, for example, developed kinetic anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) to strike enemy satellites in orbit from the ground. Not only that, the experience gained in the last century with the docking of shuttles in space has allowed the creation of anti-satellite satellites capable of carrying out orbital interception maneuvers of the target (Rendezvous and Proximity Operations - RPO) and disturb it, steal information or disable it.

The event that, in September 2018, saw the Russian satellite “Luch” attempt to intercept the communications of the Italian-French military satellite “Athena-Fidus” is famous. This is not an isolated event. In June 2024, the Russian satellite “Luch 2” in fact carried out suspicious maneuvers next to some Intelsat communications satellites (which provide services to the Pentagon), in what appeared to be an information gathering mission. Before it, it was the “turn” of the satellite “Luch Olymp-K-1”, which carried out similar activities against other European, US and African satellites. There is (obviously) no evidence, but it seems conceivable that similar behavior would also be on the part of Western satellites, in a sort of space stealing game, which takes place at ever greater distances from the surface of our planet.

Geostationary satellites, which operate at an altitude of approximately 36.000 km (Geostationary Earth Orbit – GEO) and whose functions are strategic for the military, until yesterday were unreachable but today they too have become vulnerable. To try to prevent such operations, "guardian" satellites have therefore been created (Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness), which control the opponent's maneuvers in space.

Arsenalization beyond LEO

Space measures and countermeasures at “close range” mean that one seeks both to bring one’s own capabilities to a level superior to those of potential adversaries and to move one’s tactical centre of gravity further and further away from Earth, in order to make it less accessible to others, and to create a credible deterrence with regard to “terrestrial” issues.

This is a goal consistent with the space programs of the main global players, such as the construction of space stations in lunar orbit and permanent lunar bases, hypothesized for the next 15-20 years. This would allow to maximize to their advantage the economic and strategic returns of the space competition but, it must be said, it brings with it the possibility of a strong militarization of the Moon and, almost certainly, its arsenalization, officially to protect the resources, the crews and the infrastructures on site.

A military enhancement that could see the use of new generation microwave or laser weapons (but not only) that, leaving behind science fiction films, could become a widespread reality with the graceful acronym DEW (dew), an acronym for Direct Energy Weapon (read article "Directed Energy Weapons, DEW: Introduction and Classification”). The advantage of such weapons would be the lack of production of space debris. The kinetic ASAT weapon, on the contrary, by impacting the target destroys it and causes debris that wanders in orbit, with the possibility of causing damage also to “friendly” infrastructures.

The programme relating to the project must also be read with a view to possible military use. Lunar Orbital Platform Getaway (LOP-G), which I have already talked about in a previous article. A small space station (unarmed in the plans) that should ensure a permanent presence in lunar orbit, potentially protected from attacks from the Earth's surface. In the future, such (armed) space stations could find further locations in space, perhaps in correspondence with the EMSys Lagrange points, in order to form an effective deterrent network.

The possible arsenalization of space would lead consequences also on combat and deterrence tactics and strategies on Earth. The possibility of hitting targets on the Earth's surface with weapons (kinetic and otherwise) positioned beyond the atmosphere will reduce, for example, the deterrent capacity of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads placed in silos. The need to move them to more "protected" places, that is, hidden from space eyes, could accentuate the already existing tendency to place them in underwater environments, further increasing the importance of underwater vehicles and the indispensability of navies to enhance their combat capabilities in the particular domain.

As far as international law is concerned, it must be said that the current legal framework is rather permissive as it does not place limits on the militarization of space, which in fact began immediately after the launch of the first Sputnik. It should be emphasized that the United Nations, with the Outer Space Treaty (October 10, 1967), prohibits placing weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons in Earth orbit, on the Moon or on other celestial bodies or, in any case, positioning them in outer space. Paradoxically, the Treaty does not mention other armament - kinetic or otherwise - which, consequently, is completely legal, essentially leaving the door open to the arsenalization of space.

However, for an effective deterrence it is not only necessary to possess adequate satellite technologies, but it is essential to have autonomous means to position the instruments (and any armaments) that technology offers us, whether they are in orbit or on the lunar soil.

Not only autonomous launch capability and operational launchers, therefore, but also the ability to rapidly replace out-of-use systems, as well as the availability of reusable instruments such as space drones, for example. In this sector, the USA has developed the X-37B vehicle, an experimental unmanned spaceplane from Boeing capable, once brought into orbit, of operating, flying and landing autonomously on a given runway. Essentially a small automated Shuttle equipped with robotic arms and a cargo hold for the payload. One's imagination allows one to imagine the possible uses, military and otherwise, and the strategic role that an instrument of this type could play, once fully operational.

It is therefore understandable why the key capability that a sovereign country, or a coalition, must possess is that of autonomous access to space.

In this context, it should be emphasized that only seven nations in the world have an operational launcher (United States, Russia, China, European Union, Japan, India and Israel).

The stay on the Moon

Although decades have passed since the first astronaut set foot on the lunar surface, only eleven others have had, in relatively quick succession, the privilege of following Neil Alden Armstrong in his experience, walking on a world that is not ours. Since December 1972, when Eugene Andrew Cernan left the Moon with Apollo 17, nothing, only robots and probes have ventured beyond LEO, where the International Space Station (ISS), the human presence furthest from the Earth's surface to date. The two pioneers have now left us, but the knowledge they passed on, combined with the skills of those who worked on the ISS, are the basis of the current effort to return to the Moon... and stay there.

In addition to the systems and mechanisms for space travel and the transportation of significant loads into outer space, devices and structures are also being developed that can support astronauts staying on the lunar surface, even for weeks at a time.

However, we must not ignore the enormous difficulties, not only technological, of an epochal project like this. Starting from the human body, which suffers a certain amount of damage after a prolonged stay in a gravity much lower than that of Earth (on the Moon it is about a sixth), ending with the problem of radiation absorption (from 100 to 200 times more than on Earth) in the case of prolonged stays over time, the quantity of which could exceed the limits considered reasonable. In space, in fact, there are not the very efficient shields that we have on Earth (atmosphere and magnetic field). It is, therefore, essential to provide suitable shielding so that, at least inside fixed structures, the absorption of radiation is drastically reduced. Plastic or metal shielding is being studied, as well as the creation of magnetic fields that are able to protect from harmful particles. At the moment, however, the physical barriers still have masses that are too large to be used and the magnetic fields required would be so intense that they would create more problems than they could solve, from interference with scientific instruments to high energy consumption.

Then there is the on-site extraction of oxygen and other elements that are essential for both human survival and rocket propulsion. Water can be split into hydrogen and oxygen, but doing so will only be profitable if the Moon hosts a space base.

Always with a view to permanent infrastructures on the lunar soil (or in orbit), experimentation continues on the cultivation of plants using the hydroponic method, providing water and the necessary nutrients from the outside and avoiding that the roots of the plants go looking for them in the soil where, moreover, on the Moon, they would obtain nothing. Some of the devices mentioned are the result of entirely Italian projects, a sign of significant intellectual vivacity and a vision of the future that goes beyond the immediate.

If everyone maintains their space programs, in the next 20-25 years the surface of the Moon could also experience an epochal crowding, especially in the South Pole area, where it seems there is also water in the solid state, in the shadowed areas. To reduce the risk of accidents, and the imaginable difficulties in filling out the CID form, some proposals are finally being evaluated to establish a wi-fi network on our natural satellite that puts the foreseeable high number of vehicles and rovers in communication.

Conclusions

Humankind has always ventured beyond the boundaries of the known world out of a desire to know, but above all to expand its territorial limits, to increase its trade and to achieve political and military superiority. We can therefore say that space today is the field where human competition finds its natural continuation in commercial, technological, political and military terms (read article “Space, the new frontier").

A geopolitical race that started on October 4, 1957, when the Soviet Union put Sputnik into orbit around the Earth. An event that changed everything. Since then, many nations and commercial entities have found their way into space, from probes that explore the solar and interstellar systems to satellites that photograph our planet or that allow us to know, with a simple click, our position on the globe.

Alongside research and exploration, which are certainly objectives of the highest moral and cultural level, in the medium term space will also be (or increasingly?) a question of geopolitics and supremacy and, therefore, could represent the new dimension of future conflicts.

Today the world is, in fact, characterized by great instability and uncertainty in the relations between States and by a very rapid evolution of geostrategic balances. In this context the EMSys is, at the same time, a symbol, a stake and a vector of the many planetary rivalries and Every crisis on Earth will predictably be an opportunity to use space capabilities to reduce the adversary's operational capability (interference with telecommunications, blindness of observation satellites, deception of PNT systems) and, therefore, its ability to analyze the situation and act autonomously.

Even in today's globalized world the exercise of maritime power remains a geopolitical imperative, essential to ensure – as far as possible – the prosperity of peaceful peoplesⁱⁱⁱ, it is quite predictable that, as in other traditional terrestrial, air and cyber, Outer space will become, in the medium term, the new field of armed struggle to safeguard the strategic interests of space powers.

The nations that have the skills, therefore, will not be able to avoid developing autonomous and ambitious programs to equip themselves with the means of knowledge and analysis of the space situation and for the creation of increasingly advanced systems to protect their own assets in outer space and to inhibit any attacks by potential adversaries.

In this context, the new US course, which seems to promote unilateral decisions and power relations rather than constructive dialogue, especially with traditional Partner Europeans, does not fail to cause uneasiness and concern. Many are now wondering whether, with the Artemis program, the USA does not intend to position itself as an inviolable stronghold, so as to be freer to "coo" with Russia and China, instead of continuing to exercise geopolitical balancing functions. In essence, the question is whether Washington's space assets will only serve its interests and whether they will be exploited to impose its hegemony on the rest of the world, perhaps in friendly cohabitation with Moscow and Beijing. In that case, the apprehension would be more than justified, as we would be faced with the anomalous situation in which a single Partner (the USA), to increase its own security, would endanger that of all the others Partner, including Europe, leaving them at the mercy of the other two powers. From guests at the table, we would become the menu. An unexciting prospect.

Europe must therefore take seriously the new approach and, alongside the attempts to re-establish dialogue between the two sides of the Atlantic (but to have dialogue, two people need to want it), must prepare to develop its own systems and procedures that can enable it to be an authoritative presence in the space domain, so as to manage the different needs autonomously. In the specific sector, Rome, Berlin and Paris should therefore push the EU to create European industrial initiatives and to establish the principle of European preference in all public contracts.

It has become indispensable Accelerate and reclaim a European path to space, shaking off the now anachronistic inclination to think of defense and deterrence policies as reasons for ethical and moral degradation and not as potential drivers of innovation and development. A cultural formation that has caused the current strategic delay and has led for too long to delegate our security to others. Italy, with its advanced skills, can give added value to Europe in the space sector. There is nothing more damaging than (not) acting as if we were living through normal times, while our adversaries have forcefully decided that they are no longer normal. This is all the more true at a time when the US is implementing a certain strategic disengagement from an area (the Old Continent) in which Russian aggression has led to (so far) three years of devastating war against Ukraine.

No one has a crystal ball to predict what will happen. However, as always happens in human affairs, between a rather utopian scenario in which peace and cooperation reign, and a seriously pessimistic context of open conflict, reality, at least in the medium term, will probably see the ability to use credible force from space more as a deterrent than as a means of confrontation. Space, therefore, will predictably return to being an additional field of comparison of terrestrial ambitions, as it was during the Cold War, with low or very low intensity “demonstrative” actions that give the possibility of making people understand that any aggression would not have a positive outcome, bringing adversaries back to the political, diplomatic and negotiating table. Military space must, therefore, evolve accordingly. From a primary function of support for security and defense activities on Earth, it must now acquire operational capabilities. In addition to the eyes and ears, in space we will also add arms, preferably sturdy ones.. The history of the twentieth century teaches us that the fear of Mutual assured destruction (MAD) has helped avoid a global war, with imaginable and apocalyptic consequences.

The difference, however, will always be made by the human being. It remains to be seen whether the risk of MAD^iv (an evocative term), whether it is “limited” to the nearby theatre or extended to the entire solar system, will succeed in the future in curbing the ardour of the most bellicose actors.