2018-2020 multi-year program document for Defense for the three-year period

(To Giovanni de Paolis)
19/11/18

The dossier n ° 29 - Reading sheets of 29 October 2018 - of the study service of the Chamber of Deputies, analyzes the multi-year program document (DPP) of Defense for the three-year period 2018-2020, sent to the House the 15 October (v.link).

Without wanting to think of doing a detailed analysis, out of curiosity let's see some macroscopic data.

The main thing that strikes me is the insistence of wanting to reach the limit of 150.000 men within the 2024. What's the reason?

We always talk about reducing expenses, as if lowering the number of people is the solution. But are we sure?

The tables on the 15 and 16 pages, which I report below, give an idea of ​​the current situation and the future situation.

Still, if you look at the 15 table, which illustrates variations by category in the 2017 / 2018 year, you can not help but think about how the result of -1578 units is achieved.

I come to explain better: first, the number of officers in decline, 242 units, in line with what can be expected from the normal retirement rate (in various capacities) with additionally a part of officers placed in the position of ARQ. The balance between marshals and sergeants is almost nil, as the real number of the outgoing is mainly in the category of marshals while the sergeants from this year fall into the category marshals. The true outputs are in correspondence with the volunteers, or young people. The question to ask is: why? Why is the largest number of outings among young people?

The answer deserves further study, but it is important for what we will say shortly on the second table. From this we can see that between the 2017 and the 2020 the young staff is always decreasing (83287 in 2017, 80662 in 2020) which probably reflects the lack of attractiveness of the military profession, and then inexplicably pass to 91030 units in the 2024 . What will happen in these years to justify such a progression?

How do you think to convince young people to enlist?

There is no mention of this in the document.

The civilians of the Defense are considered separate, as for the military, however they will suffer sharp cuts.

Interesting also the analysis of the funds of the Ministry of Economic Development (for the financing of investments and infrastructure development of the country) made available by the budget law 2017, art.1 co. 140.

As it is easy to notice, in fact most of the funds are allocated starting from 2025 and up to 2032 according to a progression worthy of the best draftsman but which makes us understand how little we take to the real needs of the Defense sector. The 2018 budget law under Article 1 co.1072 has planned to refinance the funds with some variations in the annual breakdowns which, albeit with reductions, make distribution over the years more realistic.

From the reading of the document, the imbalance between personnel expenses, investment and exercise emerges on several occasions.

It is not immediate to understand what the percentages are reserved for the investment and which ones to the exercise, but it is clear that they make the part of the cinderella when compared to the expenses for the personnel. In practice it can be noted that the investment is higher than the year, probably for the actions supported by the defense industry that are more interested in new projects than in the maintenance of obsolete structures or platforms. This means that the means, materials and infrastructure used continue to age and not having the availability of funds for maintenance after a few years are to be replaced.

A few words deserves the speech of the 2% of GDP for the Defense. The nations taking part in NATO have in fact committed to achieving the percentage of 2024% of GDP in the defense sector by the 2. From this point of view Italy is considered as a black shirt. The protests presented in the various international fora have only a little, what counts is 2% and in 2018 we are at 1.15%, far from other NATO countries. Security is paid and in this sense also the frequent declarations of the President of the United States Donald Trump. If then someone thinks that changing "part" can cost less ...

Basically this is the analysis of the study service of the Chamber of Deputies.

But having the DPP available we try to go further.

Among the most rapidly growing sectors in the world there is Space and Cyber. Let's try to understand what Defense expects in these two sectors for the next few years.

In the introduction we quote, in my opinion correctly, the necessity of "Having a spatial component (in the areas of lmagery and Signal lnelligence, Position Navigation and timing, telecommunications) or a guaranteed access to the necessary skills, such as to assure the support to the interests in all areas where national armed forces operate; in this regard, develop a strategic, intersectoral and multi-institutional reflection on the theme of space; this in the face of a pervasive spatial instrument, not always replaceable with other capacities. "

There is no doubt about the necessity of the instrument, perhaps one could argue that there are also other possible uses or different interpretations of space as a separate domain, but the need is certainly felt by everyone and the development of programs in the sector could be support for the national industry. In the Table 7 of the DPP it is possible to note the item "Defense spatial plan - space to support operations" to be funded with 180 million euros, which compared to the "Modernization of the Aries" program, 387 million euro program, it makes us understand what the role of Italian Defense in the space sector could be in the years to come.

Even the cyber threat is well identified in its essential elements, in fact in the DPP it is stated that "it will be of fundamental importance to ensure the resilience in the cybernetic domain in order to preserve the IT and telematic sector, key element and enabling for the exercise of its functions , from an increasingly looming cybernetic threat (cyber), which is transversal, pervasive and asymmetric. The rapid technological development and the constant increase in dependence on automated and computerized processes, which is increasingly difficult to match a proportional increase in the level of security, makes networks, computers, data and info-structure vulnerable to cyber threats (so-called cyberthreats and cyber weapons), also relatively simple and low-cost, easily accessible and cost-effective, especially in relation to the potential damage they can cause ". Also in this case, in fact, the reading of the DPP shows that the "transversality" of the cyber sector must be considered a priority for the Defense. In this context, the necessary strengthening of the CIOC, the Cyber ​​Defense Command, and the reconnected capacities starting from training is mentioned. The Defense will have to proceed with the "consolidation and strengthening of the Interforces Command for Cyber ​​Operations (CIOC) - capable of directing, coordinating and conducting CNO (Computer Network Operations) on a broad spectrum, in close coordination with the competent national Authorities and other supranational organizations, in particular with NATO and the EU - represents one of the main guidelines for the development of the military instrument's skills in the cyber domain ". From the analysis of the DPP it appears that for this capacity are necessary about 400 millions of euro distributed over the years up to 2033 (sum of the main projects in the tables) even if one can imagine that some of the funds of other projects are destined for cyber not explicit.

Also in this case it is observed that the figure is nothing short of ridiculous if compared to the investment programs in progress in other European countries that are proceeding, generally, to the creation of an Armed Force specialized in the sector and to the recruitment of young people to be employed. in the field.

Ultimately, while considering positive attempts to "draw" the Armed Forces in the coming years, it is believed that there is still a long way to go to reach our neighboring countries in some sectors correctly identified as critical for the Defense but then undersized, perhaps because of the chronic lack of funding or, worse, for the inability to fully understand the real strategic implications.