Speaking about the launch of a missile on Ben Gurion International Airport in Tel Aviv by Houthi militants, Major General (aus) Giuseppe Santomartino wrote that the tactical successes of US air strikes in Yemen cannot, by themselves, achieve a political-strategic victory in the ongoing confrontation in the Red Sea. With the attack against Israel, which “pierced” the defensive shield consisting of the Patriot, Arrow, Iron Dome batteries and the Thaad system, the Houthis wanted to demonstrate that they still have a broad and deep-rooted offensive capacity, despite the fact that the Americans have conducted more than 300 strikes and hit 800 targets in Yemen.
Journalist Guido Olimpio reported data on the use of weapons by the Houthis over the last six weeks, that is, since the beginning of Operation “Rough Rider”: 77 kamikaze drones, 30 cruise, 24 ballistic missiles, 20 anti-aircraft missiles; clearly, not all aimed at countering the Anglo-American air and naval device, but also at continuing the “fight against trafficking” in the Red Sea.
If “Rough Rider” – just like “Poseidon Arcer”, “Prosperity Guardian” and “Aspides” – had, until now, been criticized for its high operating costs, the attack on Tel Aviv airport confirmed the impossibility of reducing an enemy offensive device to inefficiency with air power alone. Even if it implies a lower degree of political involvement for the power that carries it out, a strategy based only on aerial bombardments cannot succeed.
In particular, General Santomartino explained, in an asymmetric conflict scenario, such as that of the Red Sea, obtaining a significant political-strategic result through “targeted raids” is impossible. Just as in conventional air combat, factors that level the concept of “air superiority” are emerging, so in asymmetric conflicts the problem arises in the face of the fluidity of the enemy’s tactical and operational structure.
The difference between the power of the device used and the results achieved also emerged in the Israeli Operation “Long Arm” of July-September 2024, when, despite inflicting very heavy blows to the Houthi infrastructure, Tel Aviv was unable to impose strategic damage. So much so that today, if on the US side it is thought of having to finance and arm government forces for a proxy intervention by land; on the Israeli side, there is reflection on the possibility of sending special forces squads to Yemen with the function of acquiring targets and destroying enemy radar and anti-aircraft devices, then leaving the field free for the air force to hit the missile sites. As explained by General Ivan Caruso, “The marriage of air power and special forces would be the heart of the strategy, a model of joint and integrated operations that could redefine military operations in the Red Sea.”
