In the US military environment it is said "amateurs speak tactics, professionals speak logistics". An expression that tends to indicate that it is usually those who have no real knowledge of military issues who dedicate themselves to discussions relating to tactical aspects, without however considering the context, perhaps less evident, but at the same time more important for the purposes of a military operation, such as the logistics.
Looking at the political debate taking place these days in Europe regarding military support to Ukraine after the Trumpian peace, this US saying could be paraphrased as “Amateurs talk about ‘boots on the ground’, professionals talk about strategic objectives to pursue”.
Unfortunately, however, for a certain policy It seems easier to discuss how many soldiers to send to Ukraine or anywhere else on the globe rather than seriously ask ourselves what those soldiers are supposed to be used for, whether the task we intend to assign them makes sense or not, and whether those soldiers would be in a position to carry it out anyway..
“be able to carry out the task” without presuming to be exhaustive, I refer, among other things, to:
- clarity of political-strategic directives that are given before the operation,
- efficiency of the multinational chain of command responsible for employing them,
- correspondence of the rules of engagement to the real situation on the ground (I repeat, "real" and not the "ideal" one perhaps hypothesized in some radical-chic salon),
- number of soldiers to be employed (a number that must be calculated in relation to the task assigned and not only to how much one is willing to spend),
- availability of armaments, armored vehicles, fire support,
- ability to rapidly reinforce with additional units in the event of an unexpected deterioration in the situation.
In short, sending a military contingent cannot be considered by politics as the simple presence of guys in uniform who act as scarecrows (or in the worst case scenario from targets) in this rather than that zone of instability. Above all, however, the mission must be politically clear and militarily realistic.
The impression, instead, is that often some political exponents of various European countries talk at length about military interventions (entering, like good "amateurs" even into "tactical" details, such as the numbers of the contingent) just to cover the vacuum of a lack of political idea of what, through that military intervention, one would like to achieve.
In recent days, for example, some European capitals have been relaunching impressive figures regarding thousands of soldiers to be sent to Ukraine, so much so that it seems like we are witnessing a heated auction at Sotheby's or Christie's where some neo-billionaires from China are competing for some masterpieces of Caravaggio's painting.
Optimal, But what would be the mission and which supranational organization or leading nation should manage such massive forces? It doesn't seem quite as clear.
I would not want the political leaders who flaunt these generous offers to believe that if and when a possible military mission departs they might no longer be in government and would not have to account for the promises they made. Such could also be the mental attitude of the NATO heads of state and government who in Cardiff in 2014 committed their nations to reach the not very popular target of 2024% of GDP dedicated to defense ten years later (in 2)..
Given that, despite the promises of help to Ukraine, none of the European leaders seem willing to send their own soldiers to "fight" alongside the Ukrainians (an intervention that would take place not as NATO or as the EU, but as a single nation), it is clear that the aforementioned offers can only have value once the fighting has stopped. This can happen with a ceasefire or a truce (therefore without reaching an at least official end to the conflict) or with a peace agreement or armistice (which imply the official end of the conflict)
It's not just a question of duration1, But say mutual recognition between the belligerent parties and formal acceptance of the peace agreements by both Russia and Ukraine in this case. Europe, in fact, being neither a belligerent (on the ground) nor the negotiator of the agreement will inevitably have little weight..
The possible role and connotation of a multinational military force will depend on the agreements that will be reached at the negotiating table and on whether it is a truce or an armistice. Ignoring the outcome of the negotiations (which have not yet formally begun) and what territorial conditions and constraints the agreement may impose on Russia and Ukraine, it seems decidedly premature to speak of a so-called "peace keeping" intervention.
Many speak of an "interposition force". If an interposition force is needed, it is clear that a peace agreement has not been reached, but only a temporary interruption of the fighting. An interruption that could take the form of a "ceasefire" or a "truce". Without going into the differences in international law between the two, let's see what this could entail in order to define at least the command, structure and composition of this phantom "interposition force".
Since there is no "formally" loser, the supranational organization (or at most the nation) that assumes political and military command of the interposition force must be accepted by all parties involved (Russia, the USA and, hopefully, Ukraine). This from a “formal” point of view.
From a “substantial” point of viewRussia, on the other hand, although it has not remotely achieved the strategic objectives it seemed to have three years ago, comes out of it in a stronger condition than Ukraine. This precludes a priori any role for NATO and the EU (understandably not perceived as impartial by Moscow) in the command of such an “interposition force”. The command of such a force can only be traced back to the United Nations.. An organization that could be recognized as non-hostile by both Moscow and Washington (both of which also have their own veto power in the Security Council).
The fact that it cannot be a NATO or EU mission does not in itself imply that no NATO/EU nation can send its own contingent to this force. But it will still be contingents from nations that can be accepted by Moscow. That is, for the participation of the UK, France, Germany, Poland, the Baltic and Scandinavian countries and Italy itself, I would anticipate a strong and clear “no”.
Things could be different for the 4 non-NATO EU countries (Austria, Ireland, Malta and Cyprus) and for the NATO countries that have been more cautious in positioning themselves (Turkey, Hungary and Slovakia). The lion's share could go to Asian, African or Latin American countries (including perhaps China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia). However, these are once again speculations that are completely premature at this stage. The UN force will in fact have to be perceived as impartial by both Russia and Ukraine and this would be reflected not only in the nationalities of the contingents but also in their tasks and the characteristics of their deployment.
I would like to point out that an interposition force along the contact line does not seem to me to be a realistically practicable option.. Moreover, if we want to hypothesize it and want to pursue a credible solution, How many forces would be needed to act as an interposition on the entire border/line of contact between Russian and Ukrainian forces? This would be a front of between 1.500 and 2.000 km, which would be manned by the UN force, with a separation area of a certain depth that would allow the UN forces freedom of maneuver (forces which, let us remember, by virtue of the foreseeable UN mandate should be deployed in such a way as to be able to prevent attacks from both Russia and Ukraine). An interposition force that, in order to carry out its task seriously, should also make use of air and naval components.
I therefore believe it is quite useless at this stage to try to hypothesize how many tens or hundreds of thousands of men, how many planes, how many ships, how many artillery and how many armored vehicles might be necessary. Also because we would not likely be considered acceptable by either side.
Let's face reality instead. First of all, apart from China which would perhaps be interested in establishing a large military presence between Russia and Europe, Who would be willing to provide such forces? Of course, having China on our doorstep and with its naval assets in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean would not be a happy option for us Europeans and should not let us sleep soundly.
It would then remain to evaluate the real capacity of the UN to manage an operation of this kind.. The UN has repeatedly failed to directly manage complex military operations. Let us recall, among others, the dramatic experiences in Congo (ONUC 1960-64), Somalia (UNOSOM I and II, 1992-95) UNPROFOR (in the former Yugoslavia 1992-95), all of which ended with undignified withdrawals, after unjustified losses among both the civilian population and the UN contingents. Unfortunately, despite the undoubted professionalism of the Italian contingent, we cannot even say that UNIFIL is a great success (Read article "UNIFIL: it is useless to invoke resolution 1701 now, we have closed our eyes for too long")
Other politicians and commentators hypothesize that it should not be an interposition force, but rather a European forces deployed since peacetime alongside the Ukrainians to visibly demonstrate European support for Kiev in the event of Moscow breaking the agreements. This would seem, at first glance, more logical and easier. I note, however, that It should be an EU-only operationTrump's USA does not seem at all inclined to even support such an operation, which would distract them from the Indo-Pacific, from the priority confrontation with China and which would compromise the relations laboriously re-established by Trump with the Kremlin.
In this case, certainly, much fewer men would be enough. In short, one could even think of a representation of all EU countries to show the cohesion of the Union with Ukraine. In practice, the concept of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) of the Cold War years. It was a multinational NATO force at the level of a division that, in the event of a Soviet attack, could be rapidly deployed from the Arctic to Anatolia to reinforce the attacked NATO country. An idea that worked at the time. Would the AMF have blocked Soviet tanks? Of course not! However, the losses that the AMF would inevitably have suffered would have been of soldiers from almost all NATO countries. These losses would have effectively sealed a blood pact that would have reinforced the dictates of Article 5 of the Atlantic Pact. In short, the citizen of Canada would not have been able to say, in the event of an attack on Turkey, "it's their business, we don't care" because in the defense of Turkey his compatriots in arms had already fallen in the first days.
From an idealistic point of view, such an intervention can be very significant. But in the case of the AMF, declared in Article 5, the entire military power of the Atlantic Alliance would have intervened, centered on US nuclear and conventional power. In this case, no Article 5, no USA and then we would have to deal with it as the EU.
Of course, we will have to acquire this ability to react autonomously. But, when it comes to the Russia-Ukraine agreements, how will we be? Will we be ready? I'm afraid the answer cannot be positive.
In conclusion, a certain policy, rather than enjoying “playing with toy soldiers”, that is, to fantasize about improbable military solutions starting from the boots (on the ground) and moving up to the head, should perhaps follow the reverse procedure. Or starting from the "head".
This involves having a clear idea of the strategic objectives that you want and can achieve. Too often, especially in Italy, the generosity in making military contingents available in various supranational contexts has served to cover the lack of a clear national vision of foreign and security policy. It was easier to offer contingents for any multinational intervention, without investigating too much about the concreteness of the mission or the adequacy of the rules of engagement. In short, it was better to continue to play with toy soldiers.
Trump on one side and Putin on the other have clearly told us that we can't afford it anymore.
1 There has been a “truce” between Israel and Syria since 1973, after the Yom Kippur War. A truce that has never evolved into an “official peace.” Moreover, that border and a very narrow demilitarized area between the two countries (which is controlled by a small UN force, UNDOF “United Nations Disengagement Observer Force”) have remained relatively calm for the last fifty years.
