Ukraine-Russia: a war destined to last?

(To Antonio Li Gobbi)
09/10/22

The fighting in Ukraine continues with their baggage of death and destruction. At the same time, the tones of the declarations of all three belligerents who have a say, namely Putin, Biden and Zelensky, become increasingly threatening. On the other hand, what I would define as the "co-belligerents without their knowledge", that is NATO and the EU, do not seem to have so far neither ideas of their own about the conflict nor, if they had them, the real capacity to express them.

Xi Jinping, in the best Chinese tradition, waits calmly on the banks of the river, confident that events will allow him acquisitions at clearance prices in Russia, Europe and perhaps other continents as well.

The fact that the tones of the official statements follow a threatening escalation is obvious sign of insecurity leadership and should not be construed as a manifestation of force.

This is very worrying because all three leaders I have mentioned are aware of how the outcome of the conflict depends not only on their respective national interests but also on their personal future and that of their closest circle of loyalists. For Biden it is about the political future, not so much about him, for obvious age reasons, as about the US Democrats. For Putin it is also the same life as him, as in case of defeat the opponents would hardly leave him alive and, in any case, certainly not free. Even Zelensky could perhaps take risks similar to those of Putin in case of defeat, because the internal opposition so far silenced could be reluctant to forgive him a defeat.

On the ground, reporters who follow the day-to-day fighting tell us that things are bad for the Russian forces. The key point, however, is not how many thousands of square kilometers either side has gained or lost control. Yes, an important factor, but not a determining factor in itself. The current one is about to be a long conflict regarding the outcome of which it could be risky to make predictions, unless a level leap, which will be mentioned later, which could bring it to a rapid conclusion.

Offensive bets and retreats of tens and tens of kilometers in a very few days are relatively normal when confronting mechanized and armored forces on essentially flat terrain, such as the Ukrainian ones, where the only real obstacle seems to be the rivers, along which the Russians can anchor. a defensive maneuver and stop, until the summer, the Ukrainian attack.

More significant, however, could be a certain evident fraying of the consistency of the Russian forces. The Kremlin, in fact, had initially employed Russian regular forces to a decidedly reduced extent (among other things, often sending units with recruitment to Asian Russia). Moscow has therefore integrated the regular units with irregular militias (Chechens, “Wagners”, Syrians) precisely to avoid burdening the ethnically Russian citizens in consideration of the need to maintain their favor.

The difference in treatment between departments of Russian and other ethnic groups was also evident during the decade-long intervention of the USSR in Afghanistan (1979-89), generating quite a few recriminations from other ethnic groups (photo).

The decision to resort to irregular militias is also a choice probably imposed on a political level because from a military point of view it makes no sense. Inevitably, such a mix of forces (regular and otherwise) involves coordination difficulties on the field, fragmentation of the command line (these militias do not recognize the authority of regular chains of command but only the individual charisma of their leaders), modalities and tactics of use that cannot be reconciled. Obviously, in case of criticality or failure it is inevitable that there will be a series of reciprocal accusations between “regular” military hierarchies and militias, blaming each other for the failures. We also see this in recent days with the obviously interested accusations of Yevgeny Proigozhin (owner and founder of the Wagner Group) and Ramzan Kadyrov (political and military leader of the Chechens) against the "regular" military hierarchies and, above all, the minister of the defense of the Federation Sergej Sojgu.

In fact, in Moscow it is probably time for recriminations. It is clear that Putin must safeguard his credibility and to do so he will have to drop the heads of a couple of scapegoats. In short, it's time to "Mors your vita mea".

An absolutely not negligible factor, also for the impact it has on Western public opinion, is that the various militias that roam in Ukraine have no respect for the law of armed conflicts and indulge in crimes and atrocities, even as their peculiar technique of combat. Which, moreover, is regularly reported to us from the areas of which Kiev regains control.

It is evident, however, that Russian planners have underestimated some aspects of the so-called "special military operation". Regardless of what Moscow's initial objectives may have been, the operation is proving to be far more expensive in terms of time and forces required to achieve the objectives than was evidently planned.

Only in this way can we explain the repeatedly reported Russian difficulties in guaranteeing adequate logistical support for adherence to the fighting troops and in replacing destroyed or inefficient vehicles with non-obsolete materials. The same goes for the partial mobilization which was called at the end of September.

The mobilized forces cannot make a real contribution in the short term. In fact, the mobilization, albeit of reservists who have left the service a few years ago, is not a simple thing if a specific and well-established organization is not available from peacetime, which provides for periodic recalls, means of equipment and stored materials, or of the already organized “framework” units whose members meet regularly to train. This is not the case with the armed forces of the Russian Federation.

In the Russian case, where it is desired to avoid sending potential stragglers and deserters into disarray, the soldiers will have to return to the recruitment and training centers to be re-equipped and the units will have to be reconstituted almost from scratch. Activity that takes time if the departments are to have even minimal operational capacity.

It is true that videos of reservists circulate who would tend to suggest that these basic rules have not been followed either. Such videos (frame) could testify to some serious inefficiencies of the Russian military apparatus or be instruments of the no-holds-barred competition between regular armed forces and militias (Group Wagner and / or Chechens in primis) tending to discredit each other, which has already been mentioned. Competition that has already been mentioned and which will become increasingly heated in the event of a negative evolution of the situation on the pitch.

On the other hand, the army of the Russian Federation was structured to conduct high intensity classical warfare operations, but for limited periods and was evidently not predisposed to conduct high intensity operations over time. The prolongation of the operation seems to put under stress both the logistical supply of the contact units and the procedures for replacing and replacing personnel.

It is true that Russian forces have been successfully operating in Syria, Libya and the Sahel for years, however, the most demanding activities seem to have been delegated to the Group's contractors Wagner.

In this context, one cannot fail to address the issue of recourse to nuclear weapons or biological and chemical weapons. It is known that Russia has a varied arsenal not only nuclear, but also chemical and biological. Moreover, the USA also has them. Having them does not necessarily mean wanting to use them, as over half a century of nuclear deterrence demonstrates. However, it would be one thing to use these weapons against an opponent who does not have them, very different is when you know that a spiral of actions and reactions would start with an opponent who also has them in abundance (in this case the US which would react to nuclear, biological or chemical attacks against Ukrainian targets).

Let us immediately leave aside the distinction between a tactical nuclear device and a strategic one. The distinction is certainly related to the potential in kilotons or megatons, but perhaps this is not the aspect that would make the difference today. The distinction according to the objective, tactical or strategic, to be pursued appears much more relevant than the potential.

In the three-way conflict, that is, between Russia, USA and Ukraine, the effect would be of a strategic nature even if Moscow decided to launch a bomb of limited potential on a purely military target in Ukraine. Probably not in the disputed areas, all inhabited, wanting to subsequently acquire control. This factor alone would not categorize its use as a tactician. But it is the political and psychological impact that would automatically raise the level to an event of strategic importance, even if it were, absurdly, a single kiloton device used, for example, to prohibit the use of the port of Odessa (which by now the Russians could hardly acquire) and close the main access to the Ukrainian sea.

A strategic level impact that would inevitably entail the direct and explicit involvement of Washington.

In this regard, it may be useful to recall that NATO certainly has a "nuclear policy" that all the allies have contributed to the elaboration, but this, in fact, represents only a purely formal form of respect towards the allies. In fact, as it naturally is, the real authority over nuclear weapons rests solely with the nation that owns them. Therefore, the possible response to a Russian nuclear attack would in fact be decided exclusively in the “oval study”, informing the allies after the fact. Nor could it be otherwise given the extreme delicacy and urgency of these decisions.

Nor could the US fail to respond with the same weapon if the Russians use a nuclear device. Since the retaliation cannot take place on the occupied Ukrainian territory that one would like to liberate, the softer option could be the use of a nuclear device of limited potential on uninhabited areas of Asian Russia with the aim essentially the destruction of Russian energy resources, limiting as much as human losses are possible, but it would still be a fatal blow to Moscow's sovereignty ..

The Kremlin cannot fail to imagine these developments and, personally, I do not believe that the use of nuclear weapons will be reached. However, it must be kept in mind that groped to put an autocratic regime in a corner is never a wise choice.

Hitler committed suicide in the bunker, but if he had had the atomic weapon at his disposal, can we be sure that he would not have used it? Let us also remember that both Putin and his close entourage in the event of defeat would lose not only their power, but also their freedom and probably their lives.

It is natural and perfectly understandable that Ukraine, on whose territory and among whose people there is a terrible and bloody civil war as well as a conventional war, is not willing to compromise. And even if he were, he couldn't afford to declare it right now. Less understandable is an equally uncompromising stance on the part of the EU and the US.

The nuclear option is likely to remain a threat that will not be implemented, unless one seeks even understandable revenge rather than a stable peace, in contempt of the experiences of past centuries and the basic rules of international negotiation.

Having discarded the nuclear option, the Russians need time to resolve their organizational problems and the winter could offer them the opportunity for an operational pause to allow such reorganization. Furthermore, Moscow expects the gas and expensive energy war over the next few months to lead to a breakdown of the European front. European front which seems unable to influence the course of the conflict and which has apparently flattened itself uncritically on the wishes of Washington and Eastern European countries, without however claiming compensation for the damages to which this loyalty exposes him.

European front which, for the moment, reminds the writer of the followers of Pietro d'Amiens, known as the Hermit, that is that hodgepodge of people of different origins and with different interests (religious and secular, peasants and small nobility) passed to history like the "Crusade of the beggars". Crusade which then arrived in Constantinople fell apart in a very not very honorable way. Let us hope that the tested EU turns out to be a little better than "Beggars" by Pietro the Hermit.

Photo: MoD Russian Federation / RIA Novosti / YouTube / US Air Force