"You can’t handle the truth. … We live in a world full of walls and those walls have to be guarded by men with guns. Who does this job, you? … I have greater responsibilities than you could ever imagine. … You don’t want the truth because it’s in your deepest desires that are not mentioned in society, you want me on that wall, I serve you on top of that wall. We use words like honor, code, loyalty. We use those words as the backbone of a life spent defending something. To you they are nothing but a joke. I have neither the time nor the desire to come here and explain myself to someone who spends his life sleeping under the blanket of that freedom that I provide him and then disputes the way I provide it. I would prefer if he said thank you and went on his way. Otherwise I would suggest he take a gun and stand sentry…” - Colonel Nathan R. Jessep in the film Code of Honor.
The monologue of Colonel Jessep, played by the great Jack Nicholson, would be enough to close the discussion on the substantive logic of rearmament in a democratic system, such as the Western one. It is necessary, however, to delve a little deeper into such a delicate and controversial topic on which so many words are said, often without knowing the facts.
Rearming does not necessarily mean waging war, but demonstrating that you are prepared and, above all, ready to wage it, should some spirit animated by uncontrollable delusions of grandeur (and there are several) think that it can attack a pacified country with impunity..
If Putin attacked Poland, who would lift a finger to intervene? And the Baltics? Many don't even know what they are and where they are, so it doesn't matter. In an article of mine on Limes1, I was dealing with the topic of the German arms race, well before Ursula Von der Leyen (also German) called for another, larger one, on a European scale. In a other article2 on Difesa Online, I described how the aforementioned Poland, already in unsuspecting times, felt the need to provide for the strengthening of its armed forces on the basis of a decision taken in total autonomy, due to the fears raised by the aggressive and militaristic policy of Putin's Russia.
Let us now turn our attention to what Russia has been constantly doing since it implemented its large-scale warmongering policy, with the consequent adoption of the war economy. Let us take a banal but significant example, referring to the element with the greatest evocative power in the collective imagination when it comes to war: the tank.
It seems that in 2025 the work at the Omsktransmash3 has intensified compared to recent years. The T-80, produced in that company, is perhaps the best Russian tank when modernized in the BVM version. Gradually placed in reserve over time, it has seen a new life in the second half of the 2010s, being included in the rearmament program of the Russian armed forces deployed in the Far East and the Arctic thanks to the characteristic turbine propulsion that makes it particularly reliable in areas with a harsh climate. It must be said that its overhaul, however, requires a lot of time and diesel engines have already been modified several times in their components, as in the case of gas turbines, to create a new generation of more powerful and reliable turbines.
Overall, gas turbines do not appear to have been a worthwhile investment for the defense industry. Tanks Abrams Books, for example, have maintenance costs that are 40% higher due to this technology and emit so much heat that infantry cannot operate behind the vehicle. This digression is intended to make it clear how the much vaunted reconversion of industry from civilian to military production is neither an immediate nor simple process to implement, especially with a view to rationalising the costs to be sustained. This, then, is the attitude consolidated with the war economy in the production of Russian heavy industry.
One could argue that Germany, a supporter of rearmament, wants to do the same, to give oxygen to an asphyxiated economy, by focusing everything on military spending. Maybe, but net of the macroeconomic suppositions of the hot table, we need to ask ourselves what we Europeans and, in particular, we Italians want to do.
President Roosevelt mobilized to confront Hitler's rampant progression in Europe, not so much for humanitarian reasons, but to stem the potential spread of Bolshevism, in the event of a victory of the Soviet Union against the Italian-German forces. Today the risk of Bolshevism has been averted, but that of Putin's tsarism has taken over, even if the potential of Moscow's current armed forces, in a comparison adequately contextualized from a historical perspective, cannot even begin to bear comparison with those of Wehrmacht since then.
The three years in which Putin - undeniably thanks to American intervention - remained bogged down in the Ukrainian plains to conquer a portion of land far from his expectations and, in any case, at a cost exorbitant in terms of human lives and economics, they have served to demonstrate that currently, to use a simile, no one should be able to presume to enter the living room of a house uninvited, sit down with his feet on the table and think that the owner of the house will not give him a slap that will make his head spin and make him ask himself “…What the hell is going on?...”. Of course, not without first having invited him to get up and leave, according to the rules of a democratic education that is not a priori aggressive.
Is called “defense of the homeland” concept that does not belong to some citizens, journalists, intellectuals and comedians who forget that they can express their dissent and their opinions precisely thanks to that freedom provided by the various Jessep colonels who operate in the service of democracies. The "Homeland" is not the "country" (with a lowercase "p") mocked with fourth-rate jokes by those who should experience what it means to be a woman in Iran or in the Afghanistan of the Taliban or, again, to be a human rights activist under the offices of the Amon in St. Petersburg (just to avoid always mentioning Moscow).
The so-called "rearmament" must be interpreted in the perspective of an effective and credible defensive capacity and it is not a question of the mere production of tanks to oppose the Russian T-80s, but of something more complex, consisting of advanced technological capabilities for defense in the cyber and cognitive domain, as well as in the physical one and, above all, by a high level of training. The uselessness of parades in full uniform without adequate combat capability has been amply demonstrated by the North Korean soldiers sent into battle by another of the many enlightened leaders who are agitating the Planet. It is not a question of wanting to make war, but it is certainly a question of be able to do it and have the necessary determination to carry it out, in case of unfortunate necessity.
Unless we are psychopaths, we all want peace, but the naivety of the "pacifists" toto is to think that repudiating war magically implies not having enemies. Or if they don't think so, it's to take slaps from enemies, deluding themselves that sooner or later they will stop.
In Roosevelt's time, it was the intervention of the United States that was decisive. Later, the role that many define as 'NATO's umbrella' emerged. Today, in the current conditions, to contain on a tactical level what appears to be a new aspiring Wehrmacht pushed by a wannabe Hitler in the Kremlin, Europe still needs the firepower and the huge resources of the United States.
Putin is a “procrastinator” and may the consul Quintus Fabius Maximus forgive me for this comparison. It is clear that he has no intention of reaching the Trumpian peace because his goals are far more than settling for a few square kilometers of territory after the efforts made. And the coalition of the "Willing" has managed to irritate him, despite his usual aplomb, to the point of making him call the Europeans who oppose him "idiots", usurping the tones normally typical of Dmitry "Mutt" Medvedev in the public role he plays alongside Dmitry "Jeff" Peskov4. In this context, the problem is that the United States wants to close the above-mentioned "umbrella" and possibly leave us a K-Way, just as storm clouds gather on the horizon.
Trump, unlike Roosevelt, has other priorities. Trump is not a “pure” politician, but rather a businessman devoted to politics and called to govern, as has happened in the past in our country - all things considered - in our recent history. Trump is looking at which and how many resources to grab and, to do so, what are the convenient alliances and what are the dead weights to shake off. With these premises, Europe is a dead weight. It has nothing concrete to offer, quite the opposite. Actually, no, I correct myself: Ukraine has rare earths. The newly elected president, therefore, wants a more militarily autonomous Europe to reduce its commitment and focus on China, the great and heavy burden on the economic level..
A true European Army, however, is not easy to achieve. Political divisions, more or less widespread sovereignist currents and the cumbersome bureaucracy of the European Union would slow down any operational decision. There is no point in a synthesis of military forces without first establishing a unification of European political representation.Armed forces without a unified political leadership would be ineffective, because they would lack a clear chain of command and control (C2) and a shared strategy.
Currently, the European Union decides by consensus between the Member States. with different interests and strategic visions. This makes impossible to make quick decisions in a crisis. Unlike the United States, China or Russia, which have a centralized command, Europe would risk having a military force paralyzed by bureaucracy and national vetoes.
It is therefore, a political unification of defense is necessary, with a governance clear and decisions by relative majority, otherwise the only result risks being ineffective coordination between the individual national armed forcesThe main obstacles to a European Union defense executive, therefore, can be summarized mainly in the resistance put up by the member states, since the national governments do not want to give up military sovereignty, and in the dependence on NATO claimed by many Eastern countries, such as Poland and the Baltic countries, which prefer American protection to that of Europe, considered not yet reliable in matters of security.
Let's think, then, about the leader of Hungary, Slovakia and potentially Romania, which, taking advantage of the disappointment of their peoples over the collapse of the prospects of enrichment and well-being through the "European dream", offered instead in the last century by the "American dream", are making choices that make one perplexed about the opportunity for them to still be part of NATO and, even more so, of the European Union.
In conclusion, with the current European limits, spending 800 billion euros on "rearmament" in the next four/five years would lead to a fragmented and ineffective enhancementEach State would invest according to its own priorities, without a common strategic vision, multiplying weapons systems that are often incompatible with each other and increasing dependence on external suppliers.
The defense industry would grow, but without central coordination, there is a risk of a proliferation of competing national projects rather than an optimization of resources. The lack of a unified command and a coherent foreign policy prevents this expenditure from being transformed into a true deterrent capacity.
Strategic decisions will continue to be blocked by national vetoes, making Europe a military power only on paper. Without a reform of the governance, these billions will serve more to strengthen individual armies than to make Europe an autonomous and credible geopolitical actor.
As long as the European Union remains politically fragmented and militarily dependent on the United States under its current management, there are risks. If global adversaries sense weakness and division, the risk of some nasty surprises is even more imminent..
1 N. Cristadoro, The Rearmament of the Bundeswehr: The Splendors and Miseries of an Illustrious Armed Force, Limes n. 5-2022.
2 N. Cristadoro, G. Bonci, Return to Danzig. The wars of the past in the agenda of future conflicts, Difesa Online, 10/09/2024. https://www.difesaonline.it/mondo-militare/ritorno-danzica-le-guerre-del....
3 Large industrial enterprise for mechanical production, mainly heavy machinery, railway equipment and armaments, located in Omsk, Russia.
4 In interrogation techniques mother e Jeff identify the “bad cop” and the “good cop”.
