From next January, Donald Trump will take office again at the White House. This event has opened a wide debate in Europe on what the strategic lines of Trump's foreign policy could be, linked to the programs of the "limitationist" circles, and how the powers of the old continent can strengthen their defense, overcoming the "obstacle" of considering themselves guaranteed exclusively by the American umbrella. A debate that insinuates itself between the folds of the systemic competition at the industrial level between the United States and Europe; an issue on the agenda that, while not affecting the alliance mechanism, which remains particularly solid, must be addressed to consider the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic as equal.
One of the elements that is most discussed is that of Strengthening the European defence industrial base, through cooperative development and production programs of continental weapons and systems, which can be used collaboratively with those of the United States, but which do not depend on the United States in terms of licenses and components. An "autonomist" strategy for European defense can be built, however, only in the long term, when the contingencies of the moment, such as the war in Ukraine, do not dictate the line of military and industrial policy to follow.
At the moment, in fact, it must be highlighted that, net of excellent systems produced in Europe, a real strategic autonomy does not exist and that the armed forces of European countries are dependent on armaments purchased from the United States or produced under license. This is due to the fact that America's European allies have a problem of political economy in their efforts to produce weapons, linked to the market power of the United States, the result of a historical expenditure greater than Europe and with a wide margin for growth, but also to the fact that, especially the "small" countries of the Union, which have emerging defense industries, see in licensed production a safe haven from which not to detach themselves.
Last but not least, it is important to highlight the need for the European Union to equip itself as soon as possible with supranational instruments (not only the "Eurobonds for defense” which is often discussed) for the financing of both research and development and production projects of weapons systems designed by international state-industrial organizations on the model of the one recently created for the GCAP.
Already in his first term, Trump had issued the fifth version of the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy, with the aim of promoting US arms exports abroad, both among European allies and in the Indo-Pacific region. According to the CAT, arms sales were to be considered as a foreign policy tool aimed at opening preferential channels for those countries that needed to be included in Washington's security apparatus. On this issue, the Biden administration's choices have not differed much from Trump's line.
Moreover, it should not be surprising that Trump's CAT fully fits into the strategic concept of "America First", even if it cannot be framed according to the protectionist canons of MAGA economic policy. Indeed, Trump's policy on armaments is modeled to improve the "mechanics" of the export system.
However, the paradox of the "limitationists", which aim to promote NATO economic and military burden-sharing among U.S. allies, is that this also entails accepting a more balanced transatlantic competition in the defense and industrial sectors.
Photo: US Army
