The meeting between the military theory of revolution in military affairs and the historiographical one of the "military revolution", brought the technological factor to the centre of reflections and analyses on the evolution of armies and wars.
The primacy of technology and the Faustian drive to gain absolute advantage – both in terms of deterrence and on the battlefield – over the enemy through the employment of more advanced weapons systems are two of the central elements in modern Western military thinking.
Il Professor Nicola Zotti a few years ago he wrote that "technology means too much to us, we are used to attributing to it so much value, strength and problem-solving capacity" to determine its primacy also on military issues but that, in fact, it was nothing more than a "infinite illusion" on the ability to govern the unpredictability of and in war.
This because "even when a military technology is available in abundance, employed by specially trained units, and supported by the doctrine most consistent with it, we have no guarantee of success"In fact, the unfolding of events is determined by: "the chaotic unpredictability of events, the enemy's reactive capacity and the unavoidable toll to be paid to attrition", which can erase any technological advantage, even in a very short period of time.
A military theorist of the caliber of George Francis Robert Henderson wrote, regarding the American Civil War, that the friction and tactical stalemate had not been determined by the massive use of the newest available technologies (as, on the contrary, many of today's theorists of "dronization" in the Ukrainian War claim) but by the organizational and leadership deficiencies caused by the organic and staffing problem of mass conscript armies once the resources of professional armies had been exhausted.
Comparing himself with Henderson's thought, Marco Mostarda wrote that "as has already happened to the Ukrainian and Russian forces since 2022, the peacetime professionals will bear the brunt of the first 9-10 months of operations; the remnants, drained of blood, will then have to dissolve into the larger reservoir provided by some conscription system, giving this mass any framework". The organic problem emerges clearly, breaking down the wall of illusions that the "primacy of technology" has built around the real question of building a credible Western deterrence.
Despite the radical and deep-rooted diffusion of new technologies, the soldier in the trenches cannot yet be replaced by a drone and the organic deficit – which is the problem of a high-intensity conventional war, which always takes the form of Material schlacht, where man himself is a “consumable material” – cannot be compensated by the massive use of weapons and systems considered “game changers” such as, for example, those unmanned.
From here, it becomes evident that the organic problem is as important as the one on the technological advancement of the military instrument as a whole. Even more so since the ones who have to resolve the intricate tangle are armed forces that have fought for twenty years. small wars conceptually distant from the high-intensity war being fought in Ukraine.
This is why, in light of recent developments, addressing the issue of the "human factor" of the armed forces of the old continent has become necessary and urgent. The organic one is, in fact, a problem on the agenda, particularly in Western European countries, especially in a phase in which the economic-productivist vision that animates the ReArm Europe plan could "distort" the interpretation of real problems.
The conventional war in Ukraine has shown how much the capability of armies, an element that in Europe was thought to be overcome and which pushed numerous countries - including Italy - to suspend or abolish compulsory military service.
Not that the return to conscription - which, for example in Germany, is being discussed anyway - could constitute the natural response to this emergency phase; but the issue is much deeper and requires accelerating the projects in the field for the creation of reserve forces that can be promptly mobilized in case of need.
The impact of new technologies on the Ukrainian and Middle Eastern battlefields, with the consequent expansion of their use, alongside “classic” military tactics and strategies, are factors that contribute to accelerating projects for a reform of the national military instrument that also affects the knowledge and readiness of personnel, not only in permanent service, but also in reserve.
To take the example of Italy, to date, the Completion Forces, as structured, they cannot guarantee the organic pool necessary to deal with emergencies that precede high-intensity warfare. This is why even the incomplete reform of the State Auxiliary Reserve - in truth born already "lame" - must be overcome in favor of one modular tool.
Photo: X (ministry of Defense of Ukraine)
