The fifth edition of ended on March 28th Aster X, the military space exercise organized by the French Space Command al center national d'etudes spatiales (CNES) of Toulouse.1 The event involved over 170 participants from the French and international civil and military world, with the aim of training sector operators from allied countries for the possible planning and conduct of military space operations in a complex scenario interconnected with other operational domains.
Among the 12 partner nations2 Italy also participated, represented by space operations command of Defence (COS) which operates under the authority of the operational command of interforce forces (COVI).3
The object of Strengthening interoperability with international partners It was developed by articulating a specific two-phase program. Specifically, a first part focused on building a French national response to specific threats in a competitive context, and a second stage of intensifying cooperation with the Allies in a direct confrontation scenario.
Among the space operations covered by the training, a context of restriction of freedom of action in traditional domains, as well as a series of technical and tactical challenges in outer space. The latter include the release of hostile nano-satellites, direct attacks on friendly satellite constellations, and threats to ground-based air defense systems.4
Central to Aster X 2025 was themulti-domain approach which has seen the integration in a peculiar way of officers belonging to the air, land, maritime and especially cyber domains. In particular, such a strategy is aimed at maintaining the space support capabilities for the operations of the other domains, not only taking into account the needs of individual domains but also coordinating tactical actions.
From this perspective, France has given fundamental importance to the exercise as a moment of clear demonstration of its role as leader in the military space sector. Even more so if we consider the inclusion, in Aster X, of the institutional partners of the French Space Command (the CNES and ONERA (in primis)5) as well as its associates from the industrial world, among which AGENIUM, Safran Data System, Arianegroup stand out,6 MBDA and Crisotech. As a nation on the podium among the financiers of theEuropean Space Agency and with a pioneering past in space operations, France has once again shown with Aster X his firm commitment to maintain and expand the relationship of trust and collaboration with the private sector Frenchman who operates in the extra-atmospheric field.7
But why is it necessary to hold military exercises in space?
Historically speaking, alongside the paradigm shift in the ways of conducting war operations that took hold in the post-World War II period and in particular after the events of Pearl Harbor, the exploration of space as a form of “top-down” control of potential threats, operations and opposing military bases has accelerated a sort of hybridization between space and war, with a tendency to use extra-atmospheric space as a terrain through which to direct and conduct war operations on Earth.8
From this perspective, the operation Desert Storm in Iraq it has again become a watershed, altering the structure of the war thanks to the involvement of the spatial dimension. What changed the course of events was the introduction of precision weapons or precision-guided-ammunition, which inevitably required a dramatic change in war calculations.
Traditional intelligence was no longer sufficient to provide the data needed for precision missiles: hence the leap into space, which has become indispensable for obtaining a new type of information essential to every war. And even more recent conflicts such as the current one between Russia and Ukraine have not escaped the need to resort to information at those altitudes, just as possible future wars that are maturing more or less slowly in the new centre of gravity of geopolitics, theIndo-Pacific.
In the first case, Never before have space technologies become such an essential component for the conduct of military operations in Ukraine, both at the communication and intelligence levels. Already in the months preceding the Russian invasion, satellite espionage systems and GPS images collected by private companies based in the United States were able to show suspicious massing of Russian troops on the border with Ukraine, a sign of an imminent invasion of the country which then materialized on February 24, 2022. Furthermore, private companies such as Space X of the gigacapitalist Elon Musk have also made an essential contribution to the survival of the Ukrainian army on the battlefield, thanks to a system of satellites positioned in low Earth orbit and terminals installed on Ukrainian territory that have enabled both the exchange of military information in different theaters of combat, as well as President Volodymyr Zelensky's communications to the nation and constant posts on social media in support of the Ukrainian cause.9
In the second case, the question of Taiwan could have all the characteristics to be a candidate to be the next space war of our century: it is in fact clear to the military decision makers in Beijing that it is unlikely that the People's Republic will be able to become a space power without first completing the transition towards building a strong maritime force capable of asserting its sovereignty first and foremost over the East and South China Seas. However, to make this transition, the use of space is essential, just as it is of primary importance to equip oneself with a technological apparatus and satellites placed in low Earth orbits, under penalty of a profound disadvantage in future military operations directed against Taiwan, the linchpin of the competition with Washington.10
It is no coincidence that for Chinese strategists the zhi xinxi quan, the “space domain” is both closely connected to and an integral part of the information domain, which allows the collection and analysis of data through increasingly sophisticated communication systems.
In this context, the Member States of the NATO have recently recognized the defense and security implications of rapid technological advances in space, both by undertaking the adaptation of their armed forces through space commands and new military services, both by implementing a collective space policy to guide the actions of allies in low Earth orbit and in space.11
In particular, during the meeting of Defence Ministers held in June 2019 and subsequently in December in the presence of NATO leaders in London, space has been recognized as a new operational domain parallel to air, land, sea and cyberspace. The space policy adopted on that occasion aims to ensure proper support for the operations and missions of the Allies in sectors such as communication, navigation and intelligence, which are heavily dependent on space support and therefore require greater consideration than in the past.
More precisely, the space policy NATO's 2019 Strategic Plan identifies a number of critical areas where strengthening defense structures is strongly required. These include positioning and navigation, which enable force tracking and rescue missions; early warning, to gather information about missile launches; environmental monitoring, for mission planning; satellite communications; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.12
In light of this, on 22 October 2020, NATO Defence Ministers agreed to establish a space centre at the Allied air command in Ramstein, Germany, to serve as a focal point to support NATO activities, missions and operations. Of even greater importance is the Brussels Summit Declaration of June 2021, in which an unprecedented emphasis on Article 5 of the Washington Treaty extended the possibility of invoking the said article in the event of aggression originating from the space environment..13
1 Ministère des Armées français, Aster X 2025: defending space together, available at the link: https://www.defense.gouv.fr/en/cde_1/news/asterx-2025-defending-space-together.
2 As reported by the French Ministry of Defense, the exercise was attended by, in order, Australia, Canada, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, South Korea, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.
3 Defence General Staff, Defence Space Operations Command (COS) participates in the military space exercise Aster X 2025, 10 April 2025, available at the link: https://www.difesa.it/smd/news-italia/comando-operazioni-spaziali-cos-difesa-partecipa-esercitazione-spaziale-militare-asterx-2025/68947.html.
4 France prepares for space wars in 'AsterX' European exercise, C4ISRNet, 8 March 2025.
5 Aster X 2025: ONERA Tests European Space Defense in a Unique Simulation, Air contact, 1 April 2025.
6 See Asterx x Arianegroup at the link: https://ariane.group/en/news/arianegroup-at-asterx-2025-with-helix/.
7 Aster The Independent Opinion, 27 March 2025.
8 V. Chabert, the great powers are preparing to wage war in space, Opinio Juris – Law and Politics Review, Crisis Arches, 2024.
9 V. Chabert, The war in Ukraine is also being fought in space orbits, Opinio Juris - Law and Politics Review, no. 1, 2023.
10 G.Cuscito, To Aspire to the Cosmos Beijing Must Control the China Seas, Limes, n. 12, 2021.
11 NATO space domain, a new frontier of security, 30 January 2025, available at: https://ac.nato.int/archive/2025-2/nato-space-domain--a-new-frontier-of-security.
12 NATO, NATO's overarching space policy, 2022. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_190862.htm.
13 NATO, Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, 2021.
Photo: OpenAI / Armée de l'Air et de l'Espace / China MoD
