Exactly one year ago (March 2020) the United States Marine Corps announced the disposal of its armored component (composed of three active battalions, plus one in reserve, all equipped with the MBT M-1A1 Abrams Books), in order to invest more resources in the missile and UAV component.
In August 2020, the British Army was also considering the possibility of retiring its armored units, the 12ͭ ͪ and 20ͭ ͪ brigades, equipped with MBTs. Challenger 2 (each brigade has an armored regiment on 58 wagons), in place of the brigades strike (which according to the British strategy will have to have a depth of maneuvering capacity of 120 km).
In the latter case it was only a hypothesis, which then fell on deaf ears.
However, both in the (real) case of the Marines and in the (hypothetical) one of the British Army, the discussion about armored vehicles is not aimed at questioning their usefulness in current operational scenarios. The firepower and mobility of modern MBTs remain valuable assets, in the hands of a commander, on the battlefields, even those to come.
The question to ask is how much the financial resources to train, equip and support an armored component affect the defense budgets, compared to other capabilities such as UAVs, missile systems, cyber warfare.
The recent conflict in Nagorno Karabakh, between Armenians and Azeris, has highlighted the effectiveness of UAVs (including those in support of artillery fire) against armored vehicles in the open. In the Operation Lead Fuso 2006 in Lebanon, the Israeli Armored Corps suffered numerous losses due to the IEDs and counter-tank systems of the Hezbollah militias.
It is also true, however, that the loss of even a substantial number of MBTs, in particular tactical contexts, does not automatically constitute an operational decline of the armored units.
MBTs played an important role in the Syrian war, where government T-90As, for example, offered a good operational yield. As well as in the conflict in Donbass in 2014 tanks were used by both sides, especially the Russians demonstrated the effectiveness of their tactics, using the MBT T-72B3 and T-90A. In this last operational theater it is worth recalling the fact that the Russian forces could have superior capabilities in terms of artillery, UAVs and cyber warfare, all integrated with the armored component.
The hypothesis of decommissioning the tanks, by the British Army, was born from the operational concept that the United Kingdom would hardly ever find itself fighting, alone, against an enemy with its own - or superior - military capabilities, but if this should this happen, it is appropriate to ask what role the armored component could play. Hence the analysis on the capabilities of the battle chariot Challenger 2 (opening photo), supplied to the British armored brigades, compared to others that could be acquired with different weapon systems.
Russian capabilities in the field of MBT cannon-launching ATGMs have gained significant momentum in recent years. The 3UMK21 counter-tank missile Sprinter, launchable from the 2 mm 82A1-125M cannon - which equips the new MBT T-14 Armata - has a maximum range of 12.000 meters and is capable of piercing nearly 1000mm of composite armor. It would also appear that Chinese wagons too Type 99 (photo), in the future, will be able to launch this missile model.
So both the protection and the firepower of the Challenger 2 (even with the 120/55 mm Rheinmetall piece) they are insufficient in the face of opponents who can field similar skills (and many others).
Considering the continuing cuts in defense resources, will there be enough funds to continue investing in the armored component? On the other hand, divesting in tanks would make it possible to free up funds for missile systems stand-off, or in GPS-guided rockets such as the 227mm GMLRS-ER.
Basically that's what the Marine Corps is doing (v.articolo), by channeling the funds to more performing systems - such as anti-ship missiles /country attack NSM (Naval Strike Missile) - to face an opponent of the same level (or almost) in the South Pacific theater.
The Marines' renunciation of tanks is therefore due to a change of strategy (in a very specific operational context) which sees the use of rotated vehicles - missile launchers and reconnaissance, even without crews - rather than tracked vehicles, reserving the use of the latter, unlike what has happened in the last 70 years, to the armored units of the US Army.
Photo: UK MoD / IDF / People's Republic of China MoD / US Marine Corps
