A little over a century has passed since the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919, which established the “Danzig Corridor” to provide an outlet to the Baltic Sea for the recently reconstituted Poland. This decision determined the separation of West Prussia from East Prussia. Prussia, a significant portion of Germany, was therefore split into two parts and it was a physical division, not a political one as would happen after the defeat in World War II, with the creation of the two state realities of East and West Germany.
From January 1945, Poland was progressively occupied by Soviet troops who, during the five-month offensive in East Prussia, expelled and, in many cases, deported the entire German population living in that area. Many of those Germans went to populate what became East Germany.
Also at the end of World War II, we recall that Poland was forced to cede the eastern territories annexed by the Soviet Union and to acquire Silesia and Prussia at the expense of Germany and, therefore, the Gdansk Corridor became an integral part of the new Polish state.
The Polish-German relationship has never been easy. The reconciliation process initiated by Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr in the 70s was slow and arduous and eventually resulted in a historic “Good Neighborly Treaty.” Germany later vigorously supported Poland’s accession to NATO and the EU, which brought Polish-German relations to a very high level. Over the past two decades, both neighbors have developed positive perceptions of each other, and the majority of citizens in both countries believe that bilateral relations are quite good. The impression was that historical animosities had been overcome once and for all. The reconciliation was so successful that some political scientists even speculated that Warsaw could replace Paris in Germany’s relationship with European politics, or at least that the Franco-German tandem could be expanded into a leadership trio.
Much has changed in Poland since 2016, when the far-right Law and Justice party entered the political arena in Warsaw (Law and Justice - PiS). The leaders of the PiS, a party characterized by ultranationalist sentiments, have forcefully fueled anti-German sentiment in a populist vein.
At the Warsaw summit of European far-right parties in December 2021, PiS President Jarosław Kaczyński presented his geopolitical perspective, warning not only against a Europe weakened by “political correctness” and institutions founded on the illusion of a demos European, but also against contemporary Germany, pointing to Berlin's alleged hegemonic aspirations to subjugate the European Union by institutional means – namely federalization – and even going so far as to use the metaphor of the German “Fourth Reich”.
Beyond the fanaticism of the extremist fringes, There are other controversial points that today undermine once again the stability of bilateral relations.
Il first It's the future of the gas pipeline Nord Stream 2. It is known that due to the financial problems for its completion and activation, and, nevertheless, those resulting from the sabotage in September 2022 that made it unusable, Poland has always considered it a strategic threat to European energy security. In this regard, in December 2021, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki called on German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to oppose the launch of the Nord Stream 2 and not to give in to pressure from Russia. During a visit to Rome, Morawiecki declared: “I will ask Chancellor Scholz not to give in to pressure from Russia and not to allow Nord Stream 2 to be used as a blackmail tool against Ukraine, a blackmail tool against Poland, a blackmail tool against the European Union.”1 On the merits, before the Russian attack on Ukraine, Poland also feared flashback historical with Berlin and Moscow making agreements behind the back of a Warsaw caught between the two lazy states and the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky himself – referring to the disputed gas pipeline – has openly defined it “a dangerous geopolitical weapon”.
Il according to is the management of EU expectations. The current Polish government has difficulty understanding and, in fact, has no intention of adhering to the demands of respecting the rule of law. Poland has recently taken up a new role, with the protection of the EU's eastern border from uncontrolled migration flows, used as a blackmail weapon by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. Moreover, further federalization of the EU is exactly the opposite of what the government in Warsaw wants at the moment. At the same time, even if there is an opportunity for constructive cooperation in this field, it seems clear that Berlin and Warsaw will push Brussels in opposite directions.
Un third aspect is linked to the aftermath of the Second World War, with the Polish intention to ask for compensation for the war damages suffered first by the German invasion and, subsequently, by the failure to compensate by the Soviets2. This demand is not only a tool for instrumentalizing history for political purposes, but also a manifestation of the geopolitical conception of Polish national-conservatives. These principles, in their theatrical externalization in various contexts inside and outside the country, actually contribute to undermining Polish-German relations.
Other issues, to a greater or lesser extent, show the growing level of estrangement between Warsaw and Berlin, such as the row over the status of Poles, the teaching of Polish in Germany, or the divergent views on climate and energy policy, with the coal phase-out and plans for new nuclear power plants at the center. It is to be expected that at the diplomatic level, the Polish-German dialogue will remain cold and reserved. And in the background, the menacing shadow of PiS always looms.
What is the purpose of this introduction of synthetic historical reminiscences? Simply to say that, if we share the theory of “courses and recurrences” enunciated by Vico, here the problems of the relations between Poland, Germany and Russia reappear. Never-quenched bitterness that has smoldered for decades under the ashes, waiting to resurface when the opportunity presents itself. And the opportunity has presented itself now, with the invasion of Ukraine by Russia and all that immediately followed. A few months ago, on these same pages, the subject of the reorganization of the Bundeswehr was discussed3, in a perspective of strengthening to be ready to face the threat represented by the aggressive foreign policy of the Kremlin. We want to turn, now, our attention to the political-military choices implemented by Warsaw, squeezed between a Germany that has always been reluctant to fraternize with its Polish neighbors and a Russia that has always been decidedly hostile to Poland.
Already in unsuspecting times – it was the beginning of 2019, therefore well before the invasion of Ukraine by Russia – the Minister of Defense Marius Błaszczak signed a document in which he underlined that the programs included in it were an expression of the challenges that the Polish Armed Forces would have to deal with in the immediate future. One of these, in particular, was identified in the need to strengthen the eastern front, to be achieved with the formation of a new, fourth division of the Polish army: “I have created a new division located east of the Vistula. As a rule, modern equipment will be channeled there. Strengthening the eastern flank is an action aimed at strengthening the capabilities of the Polish Army, but it also constitutes a significant strengthening of the entire eastern flank of NATO.”4
It was the 18th Mechanized Division “Żelazna” stationed in Siedlce, which was to support the 11th Armored Cavalry Division stationed in Żagań, the 12th Mechanized Division “Szczecin” stationed in Szczecin and the 16th Mechanized Division “Pomerania” stationed in Elblag. On the same occasion the minister declared: “Security was, is and will be a priority for us. I have just signed one of the most important planning documents: the Technical Modernization Plan until 2026. The plan envisages a modernization worth PLN 185 billion, which is PLN 45 billion more than the previous plan. This is a record plan, relative to its size. This is, of course, a great challenge, but also an opportunity to develop the defense capabilities of the Polish Army.”5
The historical assumptions indicated at the beginning represent the basis of the reasons underlying Poland's need to modernize its armed forces, in the presence of a Russia characterized by strongly hostile feelings towards NATO and manifestly aggressive in the conduct of its foreign policy and, nevertheless, they support the most current geopolitical reasons that guide the strengthening of Warsaw's military instrument.
In this perspective, the Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego (Office for National Security) has developed a concept for the retraining of the Polish Armed Forces6, which indicated the guidelines and the extent of the changes needed to have military capabilities suitable for facing the challenges that the Minister of Defense has advocated. To elaborate this concept, the government essentially asked itself some questions regarding the current situation of the armed forces, what their potential use could be in reference to current war scenarios, what measures the other countries of the Alliance are adopting (particularly Germany) and what are the factors to be considered that primarily determine the changes in the geopolitical framework of reference.
The study of achieving what was called the “new quality of the Polish Armed Forces” was therefore focused on certain parameters, such as the changing conditions for the use of Polish Armed Forces abroad, changes in the art of war (deriving both from the nature of contemporary armed conflicts and from technical progress), the growing number of threats to security on an international scale. The attention of Polish military experts was then focused on several rather complex issues.
Let's see what they are and what solutions have been proposed.
The first is aimed at a review of strategic defense that evaluates the defense capabilities of the state, taking into account in their entirety the bodies and institutions responsible for ensuring national security; a strategic defense review had already been carried out in 2005-2006, but focused solely on the review of the capabilities of the armed forces. In this context, the review of the military instrument had to take into account NATO's planning methods, set on a ten-year basis, with the possibility of updating the plans every 4 years. The transition from a medium-term planning capacity, a consolidated procedure at the General Staffs of the Polish Armed Forces, to a long-term one that constantly looks at the evolution of global challenges and threats has become fundamental. In particular, in the implementation of the national security policy, Warsaw needs to recognize and take into account the nature of the changes connected to the transformation of the military sector in the NATO member states (especially in the European ones) and the EU, for the construction of a common European and Atlanticist defense potential.
The second concerns the armaments policy, which should be primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of National Defense and not the Ministry of Economy, to which the main burden of shaping this policy has been transferred. In addition, there has been a need to develop clear and formalized relations between the armaments industry and the Ministry of National Defense. Nevertheless, the Minister of Defense should better utilize the scientific and technological potential, in the framework of adopting strategic decisions in the field of conducting operational analysis and research.
Attention is then turned to the rules for planning and conducting operations, for which the “Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces” was established.7, an independent organizational unit of the Ministry of National Defense reporting directly to the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army and dealing, among other things, with the standardization of operational procedures both at the national and Alliance levels. This Center should also ensure adequate preparation for conducting peacekeeping missions abroad and rapid intervention capacity of the Polish Armed Forces in response to crises that the country faces and that require military involvement.
Of course, these initiatives also require a revision of the national legal and regulatory framework that defines the basic conditions, priorities, objectives and financial conditions for the transformation and modernization of the Polish Armed Forces. It was therefore necessary to enact a new National Security Act, the draft of which was prepared by theOffice of Homeland Security and submitted to the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland. The final version was ratified in April 2022, in the light of the events following the invasion of Ukraine. This law regulates the issues related to the national security strategy and the strategic defense review, and to understand its meaning, it is enough to read Article 1 of the text:
“Art. 1. In order to counter the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, against persons and entities included in the list referred to in Art. 2, the following shall apply:
1) the measures referred to in Article 2 sec. 1-3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and Belarus' participation in Russia's aggression against Ukraine …
2) the measures referred to in Article 2 and Article 9 of Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures against actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine ...;
3) exclusion from the public procurement procedure or tender conducted pursuant to the law of 11 September 2019 - Public Procurement Law...;
4) entry in the list of foreigners whose stay on the territory of the Republic of Poland is undesirable, referred to in Article 434 of the Act of 12 December 2013 on foreigners ...”8
More efficient armed forces also require a reform of higher military education, a need that had already led to the creation of the "Association of Military Universities of the Armed Forces" in 2007.9, on the basis of the existing Naval Academy, Air Force Academy and Higher School of Land Forces Officers. According to this principle, the National Defence University should be transformed into a modern centre for studies and training, capable of conducting long-term research in the field of security, providing continuous analysis and strategic studies for the President of the Republic of Poland, the Council of Ministers and other state bodies.
Another aspect that Warsaw cannot ignore in its choice of renewal concerns the financial aspects that, of course, have a significant impact on the entire operation. The intention is to proceed with a substantial increase in spending on Defense, in compliance with the 2% of GDP established within NATO. In total, for 2023, it will be around 127-137 billion złoty, a record never achieved before in Poland. If this program is respected, it is an expenditure that is double that incurred in 2022 and more than triple that of 2015.10. In particular, a plan has been developed for the technical modernization of the armed forces, which provides for a progressive increase in military spending over a period of time starting in 2017 and extending to 2026; the established quotas are as follows (in złoty): 2017 - approximately 8,8 billion; 2018 - approximately 12,5 billion; 2019 - approximately 11 billion; 2020 - approximately 14 billion; 2021 - approximately 17,6 billion; 2022 - approximately 19,2 billion; 2023 - approximately 20,3 billion; 2024 - approximately 25 billion; 2025 - approximately 25,9 billion11.
The capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces in the future will be predominantly oriented towards the criteria of technological advantage over potential adversaries, the ability to operate in a network-centric environment, to achieve information advantage, to develop rapid and adequate decision-making processes, in addition to effectiveness in the systems of command and control, projection of forces over long distances, high level of force protection (operational and counterintelligence), identification of elements present on the battlefield (own and foreign), availability of a widespread and integrated air defense system, precision targeting, interoperability that allows units to act efficiently in joint operations conducted within the Alliance or multinational coalitions, organization of troops according to the task force criterion, having adequate forces and means available in a short time to fulfill the assigned missions. In addition, the challenge for the Polish Armed Forces is a new philosophy of approach to planning, organization and conduct of operations, based on their effects (Effects Based Approach to Operations – EBAO). In this context, it is necessary to thoroughly analyze the essence of conducting an Effects Based Operation (EBAO) and develop its own concept in harmony with those implemented by the Alliance, EU and coalition partners.
It remains to be seen what are, in concrete terms, the operational areas and types of armament on which the Polish government and the general staffs have concentrated their efforts and interests. The common belief is to definitively and effectively change the face of the Polish army, both by aiming for a more numerous instrument and by equipping it with modern equipment, mostly intended to equip the new – above-mentioned – division, stationed in the east of the country. The strengthening of Poland's eastern border is in fact an action aimed at strengthening both national security and the entire eastern flank of NATO, as underlined by Minister Błaszczak. The guidelines for achieving this goal are defined in the document "Detailed indications for the reconstruction and technical modernization of the armed forces for 2017-2026", definitively approved by the Government in 2018, in which the most important military programs are presented.
Among these is the one called Harpy (Arpia) which provides for the purchase of 32 fifth-generation aircraft. The new aircraft are necessary tools for the modernization of the Polish Air Force's fighter line, which will thus be capable of operating in a net-centric environment and cooperating effectively with allied air components. Therefore, their purchase is certainly a priority.
Still in the aeronautical field, the programs are noteworthy Gryf-Grifo (medium-range tactical unmanned aircraft) and Wisła (named after the main Polish river). The latter will be one of the main elements that will form the country's medium-range air and missile defense system against threats from short-range tactical and cruise missiles. On 28 March 2018, Defence Minister Błaszczak signed a contract for the launch of its first phase. The panorama of aircraft modernizations is completed by the projects Płomykówka (Barn Owl) – a modern reconnaissance aircraft – and Ważka (Dragonfly) which will involve the acquisition of unmanned aircraft, equipped with an optoelectronic warhead – allowing observation during the day and night – and intended for use mainly in urban areas.
The modernization plan also includes the program Narew (which includes the acquisition of short-range anti-aircraft missile batteries, suitable for countering unmanned aircraft and missiles, developed by the national war industry), Kruk-Corvo (which provides for the procurement of modern attack helicopters for the Army Aviation) and Orca-Orca (which defines the introduction into service of a new type of submarine with the ability to destroy surface and underwater targets. A vessel that will increase the ability to make the best use of naval armament already in service and the Navy's strike potential against surface targets).
According to Minister Błaszczak himself, the Navy is at the centre of the national military programmes, both through some bridging solutions that will allow for the expansion and modernisation of the underwater component before the introduction of the new vessel into service, and with the programme Miecznik (Swordfish) which will introduce into service a new coastal defense vessel that will replace decommissioned or obsolete units and increase the ability to cooperate within allied task forces and the Atlantic coalition.
Another area that will be modernized under the military modernization plan is cybersecurity. “In the technical modernization plan, we have also placed emphasis on the purchase of modern cryptographic equipment and Information Technology (IT) for the national cyberspace defense forces. These costs have been estimated at approximately PLN 3 billion.” Minister Błaszczak said. The project – called Cyber.Mil – includes the introduction of national tools and software that will enable modern and effective operations in cyberspace through the most innovative cryptographic technologies, mainly using the IT capabilities of the national companies Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa and Exatel.
Of course, the Army will also play a leading role in this broad program of renewal and transformation of the Armed Forces. In particular, under the Regina program, artillery units will be equipped with new 155 mm guns that will significantly increase their ability to provide fire support at the tactical level. The new acquisition was contracted to the Huta Stalowa Wola company. The new 120 mm self-propelled mortars are also an integral part of the plan for the technical modernization of fire support capabilities. Straight (Crab), as well as further projects for the modernization of the missile forces which will be accompanied by the crucial program homar (Lobster) thanks to which the Polish army will be equipped with multiple rocket launchers capable of hitting targets positioned between 70 and 300 km away.
From a land perspective, the current conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated – beyond reasonable doubt – the crucial importance of modern and technologically advanced armored forces countered by equally advanced anti-tank systems. The choice of the Polish Army General Staff to foresee the development of the program should also be interpreted from this perspective Hermit (Hermit) through which to equip oneself with light anti-tank guided missile launchers, equipped with different warheads and which can be used effectively even without specific training.
As far as the crucial battlefield mobility capability is concerned, the backbone of the modernization is the program Borsuk (Rate) which will lead to the introduction of a new combat vehicle, based on a universal modular tracked chassis, developed and produced by the domestic war industry. This modern combat vehicle will replace the worn-out Soviet-designed Bwp-1 and will also be equipped with amphibious capabilities. Finally, with the program Mustang (Wild Horse), the land military instrument will introduce into service a modern line of transport trucks characterized by extremely high mobility.
In addition to these innovative projects, there are numerous other purchases of military equipment which, through contracts signed in 2022, include supplies from Korea (e.g. K2 tanks - opening photo -, K9 howitzers, FA-50 light combat aircraft) and from the United States, with orders aimed at supplying tanks Abrams Books, F-35 multirole fighter and lightweight multiple rocket launchers Himars, recently also delivered to Ukraine to support its war effort against the Russian invasion. In addition, the General Staff in Warsaw plans to expand the Armed Forces with a recruitment of over 20.000 more soldiers in 2023 alone, not counting the soldiers of the Territorial Defence Forces, who will reinforce the 90.000 men already in service in the Army (65.000), Air Force (15.000), Navy (7.000) and Special Forces (3.000). For the first time in 30 years, the number of soldiers and civilian employees will grow significantly. Over the next eight years, the total number of Polish Armed Forces is set to increase progressively up to over 200.000 soldiers, including the Territorial Defense Forces.
This significant increase in men, together with the growing complexity of the modern battlefield, will also lead to greater attention to the quality of training and doctrine of the Armed Forces. Soldiers' training will be intensified at all levels and priority will be given to joint exercises in which the initiative of commanders and the correct understanding of the operational situation, through the use of modern systems of Command and Control (C2), will constitute the core of the new training approach. Particular attention will also be paid to the training of NCOs, who remain a fundamental category, especially for the executive aspects and for those of troop control.
The aforementioned C2 systems will be improved, without upsetting the currently existing orderly structure. The divisions will finally be elevated to real combat units and will no longer be mere administrative expressions. Furthermore, by 2032, autonomous systems of command and control which will enable commanders to understand the complete operational picture and thus make the relevant decisions more quickly and consistently. The flow of data between all levels of command will thus be significantly improved, while information sharing will be adapted to the conditions of an electronically degraded battlefield.
The operational intelligence function will be implemented through sophisticated operational platforms that will operate directly from units at lower command levels, also including – at a strategic level – national satellite capabilities.
All these complex reforms also concern the top levels of the Polish military instrument. The role of commander-in-chief will be performed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, who will have under his command the new commands of the individual Armed Forces: Army, Air Force, Navy, Special Forces and Territorial Defence Forces. The Chief of the General Staff will therefore be responsible for the command of the Armed Forces for operations at home and abroad, as well as for planning their strategic use. Due to the continued and ever-increasing importance of logistics, the Logistics Inspectorate of the Armed Forces will be raised to the strategic-operational level.
Finally, at the political-military level, an essential element for national security will be the strengthening of military cooperation in the region, particularly in the Baltic Sea, between the members of the Visegrad Group, with Romania and all other countries belonging to the eastern flank of NATO. This cooperation should manifest itself in the intensification of exercises, the creation of joint commands and units and, if possible, in the joint acquisition of military equipment. As a means of coordinating these new policies, it is intended to establish an additional command in Krakow whose task will be to facilitate regional cooperation, including in the framework of European Union missions.
The future Polish Armed Forces will therefore be prepared to cooperate with other government agencies and services in crisis management operations, both on the territory of Poland and in other allied states. This objective becomes particularly important also in light of the current situation in Ukraine.
In conclusion, the procurement policies and the transformation programs of the Polish Armed Forces seem to be leading Warsaw towards an increasingly leading role, both politically and militarily, at least at the regional level, at the dawn of this Third Millennium. Reforms that are indispensable for Poland both in the traditional anti-Russian perspective and in order to be able to assert itself as a constant and decisive point of reference for the security of the eastern flank of the Atlantic Alliance.
1 Polish PM tells Germany's Scholz not to 'give in' over Nord Stream 2, Metro, 09/12/2021. https://www.metro.us/polish-pm-tells-germanys/.
2 R. Casadei, Why Poland wants Germany to pay for the damages of Nazism now, Tempi, 07/10/2022. https://www.tempi.it/polonia-germania-risarcimento-danni-guerra/.
3 N.Cristadoro, The rearmament of the Bundeswehr. Splendors and miseries of an illustrious armed force, Limes n. 5, 2022.
4 Technical Modernization Plan – Roadmap for the Development of the Polish Army, Ministry of National Defence, 28/02/2019. https://www.gov.pl/web/obrona-narodowa/plan-modernizacji-technicznej-map....
5 Ibid.
6 Nowa jakość Sił Zbrojnych RP (New Quality of the Polish Armed Forces), https://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/1116,Nowa-jakosc-Sil-Zbrojnych-RP.html.
7 Centrum Doktryn i Szkolenia Sił Zbrojnych, https://cdissz.wp.mil.pl/pl/pages/zadania-2017-01-16-4/.
8 Ustawa z dnia 13 kwiethnicity 2022 r. o szczególnych rozwiązaniach w zakresie przeciwdziałania wspieraniu agresji na Ukrainę oraz służących ochronie bezpieczeństwa narodowego (Law of 13 April 2022 on special solutions to counter support for aggression against Ukraine and for the protection of national security).
9 UCHWAŁA Nr 47/2007, Senatu Akademii Marynarki Wojennej im. Bohaterów Westerplatte z dnia 25 października 2007 roku. w sprawie: utworzenia Związku Uczelni Wojskowych Rodzajów Sił Zbrojnych (RESOLUTION No. 47/2007, Senate of the Naval Academy of Heroes at Westerplatte dated 25 October 2007. On the establishment of the Association of Military Universities of the Armed Forces).
10 J. Ciślak, Polska planuje gigantyczne wydatki na obronność w 2023 roku (Poland is planning gigantic defense spending in 2023), Defense 24, 30/08/2022. https://defence24.pl/polityka-obronna/polska-planuje-gigantyczne-wydatki...
11 K.Ł. Mazurek, Plan Modernizacji Technicznej Sił Zbrojnych RP (Technical Modernization Plan – Roadmap for the Development of the Polish Army), ZbiAM, 28/02/2019. https://zbiam.pl/artykuly/plan-modernizacji-technicznej-sil-zbrojnych-rp-2/
Photo: Hyundai Rotem
