The Maritime Power of a country is a global concept, created by the very being of a country and its strategic objectives and it is exercised (and defended) for the development and permanent protection of its interests, both in peace and in war, wherever it is needed.
There is no doubt that it is always necessary to refer to the founding elements - postulated by the commander1 Alfred T. Mahan over a century ago in his book The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783 (whose principles are still the basis of the American maritime strategy) - of the Maritime Power:
• geographic location;
• physical conformation, resources and climate of the territory;
• territorial, coastal and continental extension;
• demographic intensity and density;
• character of the population;
• form and nature of government.
From a first analysis of these elements it is immediately evident that Commander Mahan does not mention any military component, while the importance of geopolitics and economics clearly emerges, which need to be homogenized in order to achieve, for a nation, the strategic objectives.
Obviously the elements postulated by Mahan, over time, have been adapted to changing international needs. In fact today we could assert that the Maritime Power of a nation depends on the nature and character of its population (understood as the number of people residing in a given territory), on the form and quality of its government, on the conditions of its economy, on the 'external set of interests, from an advantageous international alignment and insertion, from its industrial efficiency and the rate of its technological development, from its geographical location with respect to the maritime communication and supply routes (about 90% of world trade flows by sea), the number and quality of its ports and the extent of its coasts, an active and prosperous maritime traffic, a merchant navy suited to its needs and strategic interests2.
It is therefore one conditio sine qua non that Maritime Power derives from the efficiency and international credibility of the “country system”, as well as from the health of its economy and industrial apparatus.
Having examined these elements, it is certainly not surprising that Italy has lost a large part of its Maritime Power in the Mediterranean basin. The European energy situation, and beyond, has brought the Mediterranean Sea and the North African coastal countries back to the center of the strategic interests of those who have the will and the possibilities to exploit their rich natural gas fields.
At the beginning of the 90s of the last century the definition of "Wide Mediterranean" was coined by the Navy, in order to indicate a geographical (and geostrategic) area whose control would have been fundamental for Italian strategic interests. This definition goes beyond the Mediterranean basin and includes continental Europe, Maghreb Africa, the Sahel, East Africa up to the Indian Ocean, the Near East, the Caucasus regions, the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.
Over the next thirty years, the Navy tried to pursue this strategic orientation despite having to deal with the limitations due to the funds allocated for Defense and the reduction of personnel on board. Unfortunately, the Armed Force was not supported by an adequate foreign policy, more aimed at internal disputes than planning a strategy to protect national energy supplies..
The Libya case is the most striking example of this.
In recent days, Turkish President Erdoğan and Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh (following photo) have signed an agreement on the exploitation of Libya's energy resources. This agreement allows Ankara to carry out oil and natural gas explorations on the Libyan territory (Tripolitania) but also in the Libyan EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) in the Mediterranean, already agreed in 2019 with the then Prime Minister al-Sarraj.
The EEZ in question starts from the Libyan coasts and reaches the Turkish ones, thus overlapping the Greek, Egyptian and Cypriot areas, in open violation of international treaties (in the Turkish maps the island of Crete has been deleted).
The meeting that took place yesterday between Erdoğan and Putin is also aimed at transforming Turkey into an energy hub but the Turks' intention to do the same with Libya has been muted, which provides that the Turks will be able to exploit any new field discovered and install new extraction and refining plants. But more significantly, the Turks will have the opportunity to build oil and gas pipelines that will connect Libya directly to the Anatolian peninsula (but also to other countries).
In such a geostrategic situation, Italy sees its energy interests in Libya in great danger, given the design of a mega gas pipeline, the East-Med, between Egypt and Israel and Greece and which would therefore cross the immense Exclusive Economic Zone. now illegally claimed by Turkey and Libya. As well as Greece itself, which would be faced with a heavy situation of competition and denial (also manu militar) Turkey's legitimate rights to prospect for energy.
The new natural gas field discovered last month in south east Cyprus, by ENI and Total, is now highly at risk. Already in February 2018, the ENI vessel Saipem 12000 was removed from the Cypriot EEZ by naval units from Ankara.
If the same situation were to be repeated this time, would Saipem come back escorted by two Navy frigates? The answer to the incoming government.
In the meantime, the Navy should focus more on a "restricted" Mediterranean, as of the elements postulated by Commander Mahan we only have the geographic location.
1 He will be promoted to Rear Admiral with retirement
2 Giorgio Giorgerini. Talking about Naval Strategy and Maritime Power.
Photo: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force / Government / presidency of the republic of Turkey
