Let's hypothesize a possible inspection operation in the Southern Mediterranean, by a unit of the Navy, perhaps the missile destroyer Doria, aimed at ensuring that a civilian cargo, bound for the port of Misurata, does not transport war material.
Let's also assume that the aforementioned cargo is escorted by a frigate of the Turkish Navy, perhaps a unit of the class Barbaros (Meko 200) and that upon request for inspection by the Doria the Turkish frigate informs the Italian ship to leave and to allow the cargo to proceed on its route.
If the situation were to precipitate and there was a clash between the two units (we are always in the field of hypotheses), which of the two would be the winner?
While obviously not being able to evaluate some factors that are beyond the control of man, we can still focus on other aspects, especially technical ones, regarding the two ships in question.
The destroyer Andrea Doria, Together with Caio Duilio, the result of the Italian-French project Horizon, launched in 2005, entered service in the Navy in 2007. The Doria has a displacement of 7.050 tons and is armed, according to the official website of the Navy, with three SUPER RAPIDO 76/62 mm guns, 48 vertical VLS A50 cells for ASTER-15/30 surface-to-air missiles, two 25/80 mm (25x137) point defense machine guns and two twin launchers for MU-90 antisom torpedoes; also embarks an SH-101 helicopter.
Already from this list a discrepancy emerges: how come a missile fighter does not carry anti-ship missiles? Yet the project Horizon provided for the Italian units (therefore also for the twin Duilio) the installation on board, up to a maximum of 8 containers / launchers, of anti-ship TESEO Mk-2 / A (Block IV) missiles, a transitory solution waiting (who knows when) to be able to install new missiles directly in the VLS cells generation (TESEO Mk-2 / E).
Apparently, at least to date, the Navy has designed, built and launched a class of destroyer, theAndrea Doria, without effective anti-ship capabilities (being without the 127/64 mm LW piece), except for the three 76/62 which, obviously, could only engage small boats (the same could also apply to the eight FREMM, class Bergamini, which would have, for the four multirole, the only 127/64 LW piece as anti-ship armament).
In recent years, attempts have been made to remedy this serious deficiency by trying to install TESEO on the Duilio but, after some unsuccessful attempts, the technicians of MBDA / Leonardo (supplier of the weapon system) had to give up focusing their efforts on Doria who, last month (after two weeks of preparation), was able to launch a missile, without a warhead, 95 km away (for the record, the target was hit) in the Sardinian shooting range of Salto di Quirra.
Following this success, thirteen years after entering service (better late than never), hunting Doria has been enabled to launch anti-ship missiles.
The anti-aircraft defense is ensured by the ASTER 15/30 surface-to-air missiles, contained in the 48 vertical launch cells VLS A50 however, in the last mission carried out by the Doria, only 12 bombs were transported and it seems that they are the standard numbers of each sea trip.
You probably can't fill all 48 cells with missiles because otherwise the other units - the twin Duilio and 8 FREMMs - they wouldn't have any.
As for the structural conditions of the ship, on the other hand, Difesa Online became aware of the presence of cracks between the two forward towers from 76/62: through these openings, when it rains, water enters the Doria and, apparently, there are others as well. Some of which have undergone a superficial patch using sheet metal taken from the remaining units of the class Mistral, now disused frigates and of no operational utility (they had to be canceled last year but the sale of the two FREMMs to Egypt blew up the Navy's planning).
Conversely a Turkish class unit Barbaros (photo), despite having a lower displacement (just over 3.000 tons), and a suite of technologically non-comparable electronic equipment, compared to the Doria it is heavily armed. In fact, unlike the Italian unit, it has been carrying RGM-84 anti-ship missiles for some time now Harpoon (8 in number); as far as artillery is concerned, the class Barbaros it is armed with a 45/127 mm American Mk-54 piece and a 25 mm square CIWS system (25x184).
Given the shortness of the distance, a hypothetical clash between the two units could only take place using their respective artillery.
Having finished examining the respective armaments, it is good to evaluate another equally important element (if not more), namely the crews.
The personnel of the Navy, currently, is composed of less than 28.000 units, it is the numerically smaller Armed Force of the four.
In the hearing at the Defense Commission of the Chamber last October 28, the Chief of Staff Cavo Dragone highlighted that these numbers are beginning to be unsustainable for the maintenance of the Navy's operational capabilities, hoping for a significant increase in personnel in the near future.
The chief of staff, however, could not mention what constitutes the greatest limitation to the action of the naval units of the Navy. Indeed. once he has taken command of a ship, the Italian officer will find himself under the watchful eye of the Italian judiciary, which will judge - and possibly sanction - the work (if an Italian ship on an anti-piracy mission offshore of the Somali coast opened fire on a small boat, shooting at him, with a 25 mm machine gun, a magistrate in Italy would open a file on the commander of the aforementioned ship for excess of self-defense).
In this regard, I think the case of the patrol boat is preparatory Sibilla, whose commander was condemned for having simply done his duty, obeying the provisions of the then Prodi government which, as per Italian tradition, discharged all the responsibilities on him (on 28 March 1997 a boat loaded with Albanian illegal immigrants tried to avoid the Sibilla on a patrol mission in the Canale d'Otranto, the escape attempt caused the collision between the two boats with the consequent sinking of the boat and the death of about 80 people crammed on board).
Turkish warship officers, on the other hand, can count on the support of their government and the nation, without the civil judiciary being able to interfere with operational decisions.
If the orders of the commander of a class unit Barbaros are those of leading a cargo to its destination (perhaps the port of Misurata), without undergoing checks, it is certain that the officer will use all means at his disposal to respect the delivery received.
The mission of the Turkish Navy is clear: to project power into the Mediterranean and protect Ankara's interests.
Having analyzed all the elements, therefore, we believe that, most likely, no collision would occur as the Italian ship would be forced to retreat.
Photo: Navy / Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri / Chamber of Deputies
