In addition to representing a shocking example of institutional bullying, the statements of Vice President JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference in mid-February and the now famous ambush in front of the cameras, plotted with Trump against President Volodymyr Zelenskyy inOval Office of February 28, testify to a fundamental geopolitical passage: the United States is no longer willing to ensure the security and defense of its European partners.
It is from this assumption, symptomatic of a Copernican revolution in geopolitics and transatlantic relations, that the old continent1 should start to reopen the debate on the need to equip ourselves with a "European army". This prospect was already discussed in the early 1950s of the last century, when the Pleven Plan – named after the former French Prime Minister, René Pleven, the main supporter, together with Alcide De Gasperi, of the creation of a European Defence Community (CED) – was scuttled following France's failure to ratify the Treaty in 1954. The following year, Germany's entry into NATO ultimately resolved the issue of German rearmament that had prompted the CED proposal.
Although the European Union does not currently have its own army, several steps have been taken over the last thirty years towards greater cooperation on common defence. The first multinational force at corps level was represented by the Eurocorps2, established in 1992 on the basis of a Franco-German initiative. These were followed by the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993 and, ten years later, of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Other recent relevant initiatives include the creation of the European Defence Fund for the period 2021-2027 with a budget of 7,9 billion, as well as the joint declaratory documents related to Strategic Compass3 of 2022 and to Defense Industrial Strategy of 2024. However, the unanimity requirement For most foreign and defense policy decisions, difficulties in central coordination and a limited budget have immediately constituted concrete obstacles to the effectiveness of these policies and related supporting initiatives.
Today, conditions have changed. In the history of relations with its NATO military partners, the recent US disengagement clashes with Washington's repeated opposition to the creation of a fully integrated European defence in the name of Non-Duplication Principle4, especially in the presence of structures already integrated (and led by the USA) at NATO level. Given the need, dictated by contingent international developments, to reopen the debate on the creation of a community defense force, the main issues that the European Union should address through a structural analysis (avoiding improvised meetings in Paris, ed) can be divided into two large blocks: technical-operational aspects (micro) e aspects of political and economic sustainability (macro).
The former include technical considerations relating to enabling factors and logistics, training and operational sustainability capabilities, assessments regarding the interoperability of the armed forces and considerations regarding the leadership of command.
The latter include macroeconomic assessments relating to the available budget and the resulting budgetary priorities, internal political considerations in terms of acceptance by public opinion in individual Member States and aspects of compatibility with the current EU Treaties.
Regarding the enabling factors (enablers), meaning by these cross-cutting elements that allow the exploitation of the maximum potential of operational capabilities, some of the main factors on which the EU will have to focus are thetechnological upgrade, integrated mobility, interoperability and joint training. According to a recent survey by Defense News5, the result of the responses of 17 industry analysts, in the absence of US support, European forces would need to significantly strengthen these enablers to recover the gap with Russia (a non-random term of comparison). The results of the survey highlight how, depending on the operational capacity (capability) under examination, the gap does not exist (e.g. for the Satellite Communications6), can be reduced in 3-5 years (e.g. for the Battlefield Command and Control7) or in 5-10 years (e.g. for the Long range strike8).
For interoperability of the armed forces, this would necessarily require a greater harmonization of equipment and weapons systems ab origine (through the definition of a common industrial policy9), joint training and education and the presence of a process of procurement unique and shared.
Instead, the theme of the command leadership turns out to be the most delicate technical-operational aspect and with the greatest political implications. Although there already exists an embryonic form of a unified European command for the operations of peacekeeping (under the umbrella of the CSDP) and considering the possibility of creating an EU headquarters as not entirely far-fetched, there are obstacles of an extra-operational nature. As noted in this same online magazine by other authors10, a unified command of the armed forces of the EU member states that does not include a superordinate role for France, given the nuclear deterrent capacity of the Elysée, is simply unthinkable. However, a total submission to Paris of the military and strategic assets of the other European states seems difficult to achieve, in light of internal rivalry.
About the macroeconomic considerations, the establishment of a European army would require an increase in the current defense spending of individual European countries. Of the 32 NATO members, Only 23 have reached the threshold of 2% of GDP in defense spending in 2024, although this threshold has been defined as "obsolete" by the current Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance, the Dutchman Mark Rutte. According to recent projections, between 250 and 280 billion dollars a year should be added to the current expenditure of European countries, even if These figures could decrease with the strengthening of economies of scale and centralized, large-scale purchasing processes.11. Furthermore, some authors12They have also theorized the establishment of a European fund fueled by the issuance of new community debt to increase defense spending, but this hypothesis will have to deal with pressure from Northern Europe for a new wave of austerity tax.
However, the most delicate chapter remains the internal politics, considering the deep-rooted tendency among European peoples to consider defense spending a waste of resources. It will therefore be essential for national governments to raise awareness among citizens., in order to make people understand the essential need for a substantial economic commitment in this sense, even to the detriment of other public spending chapters.
Finally, a bureaucratic as well as political aspect will be theidentification of the legal basis within the European Treaties (TEU and TFEU) and of theacquis communautaire that legitimise the creation of a European army. Article 42,7 of the TEU, which follows and goes beyond Article 5 of NATO, could have this function, establishing the legal obligation of collective defence in the event of aggression against a member country. Eventually, a (rapid) process of updating the Treaties should be started that takes into account possible variable geometry formulas – such as “opt-out” conditions or “enhanced cooperation” modalities (Article 20 of the TEU) – that allow the most reluctant member states (think of neutral Austria or non-aligned Hungary) to free themselves from any commitments without slowing down the integration plans of others.
In summary, the path towards the creation of a European army is fraught with challenges for the EU and will involve a revisiting its own purposes: a supranational union that is not only political and economic but also defensive.
If the EU manages to overcome the operational and political obstacles of the current international scenario, so far full of uncertainties and tensions, this could become the opportunity to build a new, stronger and more united European Union, or as the English speakers would say “a blessing in disguise”.
1 This article examines the challenges and critical issues related to the creation of a European army with an exclusive focus on EU Member States. For simplicity and analytical coherence, the United Kingdom is excluded from this discussion in order to focus more on defense dynamics in the context of European integration rather than in a broader transatlantic perspective.
2 Since 2002 they have been classified as rapid reaction forces (Rapid deployable forces). They currently have just over a thousand members.
3 Of particular interest to the writer are the timing of the publication of this document of the Council of the European Union, published in March 2022, less than a month after the Russian aggression against Ukraine, demonstrating the clear direction of the causal link (if it were still necessary to reiterate it) between Russian aggression and European rearmament.
4 Traceable back to the "3 x 3 x 3 model" of the early 2000s, it is a theoretical synthesis of three different declaratory propositions that can be summarized through the triptych of 3D, 3I and 3C. Where the "3D", theorized by Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State for the Clinton administration, consisted of: No Duplication, No Discrimination and No Decoupling. The "3Is" were instead declaimed by the Secretary of NATO, Lord Robertson, to reiterate the importance of some concepts relating to the relations between allies: Improvement, Inclusion and Indivisibility. While the "3C" doctrine can be traced back to post-11/XNUMX theories: Confidence, Capabilities and Commitments (see also Fundamental principles of the sought-after balance between ESDP and NATO, Italian Center for Peace Studies, 2000).
5 Mind the gaps: Europe's to-do list for defense without the US, Ruitenberg R., DefenseNews, 2025.
6 Satellite Communications These are secure and reliable satellite communications links serving armed forces over large areas.
7 Battlefield Command and Control (C2) It refers to the set of systems and processes used by military commands to direct and coordinate forces during operations.
8 Long range strike It refers to the ability to attack at long range.
9 In this regard, see also the recommendations contained in the Report on the Future of European Competitiveness by Mario Draghi (2024), chapter 4 “Increasing security and reducing dependencies”, paragraph “Demand aggregation and integration of defense industrial assets”.
10 European army: a road leading to the Elysée?, Ciocchetti T., Online Defense, 2022.
11 Optimal Beschaffungsverträge bei asymmetrischer Informationsverteilung: Zur Erklärung des nationalsozialistischen Rüstungswunders während des Zweiten Weltkriegs, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften 118: 275–294, Streb, J. and S. Streb, 1998.
12 Guns and Growth: The Economic Consequences of Defense Buildups, Kiel Report 2, Kiel Institute, Ilzetzki, E., 2025; Identifying government spending shocks: It's all in the timing, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(1): 1–50 Ramey, V.A., 2011
