The offensive in Kursk: military art and less analytical analyses

The Ukrainian offensive, undertaken on 6 August last, due to its suddenness, determination and effectiveness, has aroused, despite some isolated strategic perplexities and some fears for an always possible uncontrolled escalation Russian reaction, the almost unanimous enthusiasm of the Western media and the "technical" praise of most analysts and commentators, which multiplied with the war, both in geopolitics and in strictly military strategic and tactical issues.

The Ukrainian initiative was presented as the result of a sudden stroke of military genius, attributed, at least formally, without knowing whether and, if so, which "advice" he took advantage of, to General Oleksandr Syrs'kyj. A leadership genius attested by the full correspondence of the action to the correct implementation of those read and general principles considered the application pillars of the art of war, of that war which in its classic form many "experts", before the present conflict, had already relegated to the legacy of history books¹. Laws and general principles universally accepted, despite the explanatory differentiation relating to the heterogeneity of current schools of thought²

Through the sudden and agile offensive move of the Ukrainian brigades, these principles seemed to have finally found, in a complex and simultaneous system, a perfect and effective application on the contingent terrain of the ongoing conflict, in full compliance with the ongoing political-military situation . First of all, the one relating to having been able to take theinitiative, conquering a flood freedom of action in carrying theoffensive (attack), the latter in turn characterized by the required aggression and decision. Where initiative - freedom of action - offensive, constitute that perfect triad which the much mentioned but little known Clausewitz, in the exegesis of Fuller, his authoritative scholar, identifies at the basis of the so-called use of forces.

The success of the attack added to these principles those of the mass/concentration of forces, of maneuver (combined use of forces and fire in time and space) and of surprise. The latter, still proving possible on the battlefield, cannot be attributed to just one failings of the Russian information branch but, evidently, also to an indispensable and sophisticated umbrella cyber which certainly made the maneuver less transparent, making the massing of the forces necessary to conduct the attack with a clear local superiority go unnoticed or underestimated. This supposed, but more than conceivable, technological coverage makes direct foreign involvement not only plausible but certainly not credible a surprise on the US side.

In any case, the concealment plan materialized in having managed to deceive the enemy, as a necessary prerequisite for the success of the subsequent surprise maneuver. All factors, always according to the parameters of the art of war, considered, and rightly so, multipliers of resources (o power factors).

But is what has been described enough to justify the expressed enthusiasm of Ukraine and Western analysts so amplified by the media? The penetration into Russian territory has allowed or will allow the achievement of strategic objectives such as to justify not only the risks incurred, the wear and tear of the forces, especially in terms of human losses and losses of equipment as well as ammunition, but above all the exposure to subsequent initiatives Russian forces, also aided in other sectors of the front by the subtraction of the forces used to conduct the attack?

Most Western analysts seem to stop at only part of the application of the principles of war related to the conduct of the Ukrainian offensive. The majority seems to have forgotten that, if all the elements at play are not considered, the respect for all the principles of military art and not just one part, the final product of the action, despite the appearance of the moment for the initial success in the tactical field, will result null or even fatal, particularly in the strategic one.

There is no need for a complex analysis to identify that in reality several elementary principles have been forgotten. First of all the security, since an attack in depth, conducted with limited forces on such extensive and open terrain, if it does not reach its tactical but above all strategic objectives in a short time, exposes its own forces, especially when faced with a potentially stronger opponent equipped with a versatile offensive capacity, to catastrophe, both in relation to use in combat and for the easy provocation of a logistical crisis. A security that is lacking, due to the subtraction of forces used, even in other sectors, depriving itself, in the global economy of conflict, of a vital mobile reserve to be used, where most necessary, precisely at a time when, in other sectors, progress Russians are undeniably obvious. In this way, that principle indicated in military sectoral language as was also sacrificed economy of forces.

At the moment the objectives of the Ukrainian advance are still unclear, and at this point it seems that they are not clear for the attackers themselves either. The impression is that the offensive was simply directed where the Russian defenses were weakest. The only ones who can be boasted are those in the propaganda field, for the symbolic value connected with the violation of enemy territory and for having demonstrated to the Western allies that the relative psychological obstacle, determined by the Russian threat to use its own tactical nuclear arsenal, can all in all be overcome .

In reality, and it is possible, and a serious analysis must also consider this possibility, that the purpose of this offensive could have been precisely the cynically pragmatic one of provoking a disproportionate reaction from Moscow, to induce, or justify, a reaction and even direct Western involvement. If this were the case, the attempt was frustrated by the composed Russian reaction, which in this case it should be read not as a symptom of weakness but of shrewd calculation, referring to the proven doctrine, which has been successfully resorted to several times throughout history, every time an invading army has entered Russian territory, of absorbing the penetration into depth of the enemy offensive, to the point of making it operationally, tactically and logistically counterproductive, pitting it against the depressing and disabling vastness of its own territories devoid of strategic objectives and even tactical footholds.

The transfer of national areas is psychologically difficult for Western analysts to understand, since for most of Europe the transfer of just 50 km could mean the abandonment of precious infrastructures and inhabited centers of significant historical and moral value. and the exposure of hundreds of thousands of civilians to the enemy.

Bankruptcies the other objectives indicated are also there, from having wanted to divert Moscow's forces from Donbass, to having a bargaining power at the negotiating table, both of which have been undermined by the progress of the Russian advance aimed at full control of Donetsk and Lugansk.

Finally, the declared aim of wanting to create a buffer zone, due to its limitations, It makes no practical sense.

Ultimately, everything seems to indicate that the Ukrainian operation in Kursk, in neglecting some basic principles of military art, ended up becoming a counterproductive event, opening a further front where precious resources, useful elsewhere, could be burned to face a very hostile enemy. more equipped in every military aspect, while even the moral enthusiasm, initially achieved among the Ukrainian troops and on the home front, is rapidly evaporating due to the losses suffered and under the foreseeable massive Russian bombings that began on August 26.

To put it in the words of Bovio, an important Italian soldier and historian of our recent past, “The application of the principles of military art is linked to circumstances of time, place, the characteristics of the terrain, the balance of forces and the relationship with the overall plan of the supreme command. Even in the interpretation of war events the principles must be used with great caution. They are not rules, like those that apply in a game, nor are they scientific or infallible norms that alone ensure success³". But if their application always finds different forms based on contingent parameters, neglecting them exposes one to failure. “They […] derive not so much from the recognition of the goodness of their positive application, but rather from the observation of the harmful consequences that from time to time have arisen from their non-observance⁴"

The aim here is not to give a lesson on the art of war but simply to remind, in the face of the spread of hasty and enthusiastic comments disguised as analysis, that none of its principles can be left out of the examination. Furthermore, analysis, in the military field, at a tactical and strategic level, in order to best carry out its service, must be courageously aseptic, without being misled by ideological desires, because denials on the battlefield always arrive, sometimes even immediately, without possibility of appeal.