The Thin Blue Line: The Reasons and Methods of the Israeli Attack in South Lebanon and the Risks for UNIFIL Forces

(To Nicola Cristadoro)
15/10/24

On October 1, 2024, Israel announced that ground forces had entered southern Lebanon, initially with commando units, followed by armored units and infantry units. The units involved are the 98th Paratrooper Division Ha-Esh, with its special forces of the 89th Commando Brigade Oz; the 36th Armored Division Gaash and the 91st Combined Division Galil. These were later joined by the 146th Reserve Infantry Division HaMapatz.

These are the units that, moving from their starting bases in northern Israel, have the task of physically occupying southern Lebanon, after the preparatory action carried out by intense bombings on the positions occupied by Hezbollah militias.

The point is that many of the IDF's objectives in Operation Northern Arrows They are located in the sector under the control of the United Nations UNIFIL mission, to which Italy contributes significantly with a contingent of approximately 1200 men.

Recall that theArea of ​​Responsibility UNIFIL is the strip of land bordered to the south by the so-called "blue line" close to the border with Israel and to the north by the Litani River.

The Area, in turn, is divided into two sectors: Western and Eastern. Below we report the main contingents deployed there, due to the greater contribution by the respective governments.

In Western sector we find the contingents of: Italy, Ghana, South Korea, Ireland, Poland, Malaysia. In Eastern sector contingents supplied by: Spain, India, Indonesia, Nepal operate. Then we find France (with a Finnish infantry company under its command), which constitutes the Force Commander Reserve and has expertise in both sectors.

So far nothing new. Let's see if we can add some details of interest to understand how the fighting is developing, in a decidedly controversial operational scenario, given the direct involvement suffered by the UN units with the known consequences of the wounding of some of their soldiers.

First of all, it must be said that UNIFIL operates with a security standard based on two types of procedures: passive e active.

Passive procedures involve the use of individual protection, consisting of the standard equipment consisting of a splinter vest and helmet. If necessary, personnel find refuge in bunker prepared at the bases where it is located.

The active procedures, on the other hand, materialize in the essential activity carried out by the liaison branch by UNIFIL:

Peacekeepers working in the UNIFIL Liaison Branch act as the Mission’s first responders. They are actively deployed in sensitive areas along the Blue Line. By being on the scene, they are able to stop violations of the Blue Line, prevent misunderstandings and de-escalate tensions. Communication is key. The unit is in regular contact with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) throughout the day. The Liaison Branch reports directly to the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander and keeps senior leadership informed of any potential issues. … “The liaison teams consist of two liaison officers from different countries and a liaison assistant. We have 34 peacekeepers in our branch and they come from 18 different countries. Local language assistants are a key element in our teams.”1

Due to the limited resources they have, the LAF does not have much relevance as a military instrument and, however, in southern Lebanon they are the only institution that enjoys a certain authority because they are inter-confessional and act as credible interlocutors with all the parties in conflict. Their weapon is the soft power; it could be said that in the various meetings between the parties the rule that applies to each participant is “come, but come with the LAF!”. In fact, they are the “guarantors” of objectivity in the comparison.

The situation, in fact, sees the exploitation of UNIFIL both by the IDF, which accuses the mission of not adequately protecting Israel's interests, and by Hezbollah which, on the contrary, accuses the UN military of being spies at the service of the Israelis.

In the framework of the “dialogue of the deaf” that normally takes place in the above-mentioned area, however, the “collaboration” offered by the IDF to the liaison branch in communicating their intentions, which determine the adoption of three different levels of procedures by UNIFIL:

  • level 1: we proceed with routine activities, as no type of risk is envisaged in relation to the activities conducted by the IDF;

  • level 2: we operate with the protective devices worn and the patrols are called back inside the bases;

  • level 3: we retreat to the shelter of the bunkers.

In particular, as a result of the terrorist attack conducted by Hamas on 7 October 2023, this latter level has been procedurally refined starting from 8 October 2023.

Generally speaking, these procedures are adopted according to two criteria:

  • when Hezbollah is launching rockets toward Israel, there is little point in getting agitated. It is important to observe the launches and the aggression they represent, but in fact, they do not pose a threat to the relative position of UNIIFIL bases;

  • It is a different matter if the IDF reacts in response to the attacks they suffer. It happens that the shock wave generated by the explosions of Israeli grenades can involve the UNIFIL device, as in the case of a Ghanaian base seriously damaged in January of this year by the explosion of a bomb that exploded 250 meters from its position).

Nevertheless, Hezbollah also "takes care" to inform the contingents' commands about whether or not to operate at certain times and places, to guarantee their safety.

La force protection UNIFIL also makes use of a series of ISR devices2, essentially radar and video surveillance cameras, which have caused quite a few problems, once again, due to the mutual accusations of espionage contested against UNIFIL by both sides. In reality, everything revolves around a climate in which disinformation by the parties in conflict is a weapon to be used on all fronts, especially that aimed at public opinion and, in this context, it is not easy to orient oneself in the information gathering for the security apparatus established within UNIFIL.

Let us see, then, what are the reasons and the related risks with respect to the problems that have arisen in the relations between the IDF and UNIFIL. It must be said, first of all, that the episodes that have seen the wounding of soldiers of the contingent, have actually already occurred in the past, as in the case of the wounding of three Ghanaian "blue helmets", to report the most recent before those following the penetration of the IDF into Lebanese territory:

Three UN peacekeepers were slightly injured when an explosion occurred near their "clearly marked UN vehicle" during a patrol near Yarine in southern Lebanon's Sour district, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) said on Sunday. …This is not the first time that UN peacekeeping forces have been targeted in southern Lebanon. In early March, a joint UNIFIL and Lebanese army patrol was hit near Aita al-Shaab (Bint Jbeil district).3

Now, however, we are witnessing a change of pace, where the randomness and the wounding of the peacekeepers takes on a whole new meaning.

The Naqura base, which hosts the UNIFIL command, is located on the border between the two countries and, in particular, its proximity to the Coastal Road, the coastal road that represents the main axis of traffic within Lebanon and that winds along the entire coast. The Lebanese coast is about 225 km long and on it there are the five famous cities of Beirut, Byblos, Sidon, Tripoli and Tyre. The road artery develops along a direction that runs through a flat sector of the Lebanese territory (see physical map of Lebanon) and, therefore, suitable for the movement and maneuver of the armored units of the IDF and, nevertheless, also facilitates the movement of Hezbollah groups in their guerrilla tactics that they implement against the IDF4.

The Western sector, where, let us remember, our contingent also operates from the Shama base, is the most suitable for the progression of the armoured units, both because it is partly flat and because it is less compartmentalised by the wadi and from the mountainous asperities that are present throughout the Eastern sector. Here, then, is one of the tactical aspects that have induced Israel to act with (excessive) unscrupulousness, to the point of involving in its battles also the contingent bases and not only the pre-designated objectives of Hezbollah.

It is likely that the IDF has a mapping of all the high value targets (HVTs) of interest and the difference between what happened in the past and what is happening today consists precisely in the less attention paid to avoiding "side effects", even at the cost of increasing their unpopularity day after day. If they identify a profitable target, the IDF strikes. It is the "Black Knight Doctrine"5, which expresses in extreme synthesis, what is the exacerbated spirit that guides Israel's military action on the ground. Irony aside, the IDF has increased attacks in Lebanon, both quantitatively and qualitatively:

The escalation of violence in late September far exceeds any other phase of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict. After averaging about 160 strikes each week for the 11 months following October 7, Israel struck Lebanon more than 300 times in the week of September 15 and more than 700 times in the week of September 22. But even before Israel began Operation Northern Arrows in September, there were signs that the conflict was entering a new phase. The number of violent incidents related to the Israel-Hezbollah conflict fluctuated between 150 and 250 incidents each week between October 7, 2023, and August 18, 2024. But in late August, the number of incidents rose to more than 280 per week, with Israeli strikes driving most of the increase. Another sign was an increase in Israeli warplanes conducting threatening overflights of Lebanon. Before the summer of 2024, such incidents were extremely rare, but Israel has sent warplanes over Lebanese cities with increasing frequency throughout the summer, frequently breaking the sound barrier in what now appears to be an implicit threat.6

And in choosing the HVTs they certainly did not include the interventions to the north on the Litani River – therefore beyond theArea of ​​Responsibility of UNIFIL – systematically targeting Hezbollah's logistics and command and control centers in the Beqaa Valley.

We must not forget that in the Eastern sector there are also the heights of the Shebaa Farms, a strip of land on the border between Lebanon and Syria currently occupied by Israel. Lebanon claims the area as its territory, and Syria agrees with this position. Israel claims it is part of the Golan Heights, Syrian territory it has occupied since 1967 and effectively annexed in 1981. This dispute plays a significant role in contemporary relations between Israel and Lebanon.

The Eastern sector, in addition to the conformation of the territory, is also more difficult from a climatic point of view, especially in the winter season, when temperatures can go below zero Celsius and the general bad weather conditions inhibit the use of drones and fire observation. There is a saying that goes “Bad weather makes peace better”, however, it is during this period that there is an increase in clashes on the border between patrols of the opposing factions.

In this sector, Hezbollah has the advantage of a detailed knowledge of the terrain, to be exploited, as mentioned, for its compartmentalization which constitutes a high impediment to the maneuver of regular units. Furthermore, let us not forget the dense network of underground tunnels created by the militiamen, also taken as a model by the Hamas terrorists in Gaza:

Hezbollah has an extensive network of tunnels in southern Lebanon, both the group and Israel say. The tunnels have increased since the group’s 2006 war with Israel, according to a 2021 report by the Alma think tank. Israel estimates they stretch for hundreds of kilometers. Hezbollah’s field commander said the tunnels “are the foundation of the battle.” Hezbollah has worked hard for years to build them, he added. “Their time has come,” he said. The Israeli military has released footage it says shows deep tunnels captured by its soldiers. One video released on Oct. 5 appears to show an underground room equipped with landline phones. Reuters could not verify the date or location of the footage. The source close to Hezbollah said the tunnels identified by Israel were built for its Radwan special forces units to one day enter the Galilee region of northern Israel. The source said Israel did not know the full extent of the tunnels.7

Hezbollah exploits the orography to ensure the concealment of its bases and on the surface, it has organised a series of defensive strips from Blue Line to the Litani River, about ten kilometers deep and very reminiscent of the Russian defensive organization, structured on three bands: advanced, intermediate and rear. All connected by the underground network of tunnels, of course.

As I said, it is likely that the IDF knows perfectly well which targets they want to attack, but it is also conceivable that, in reality, everyone knows everything about everyone and every attack is carried out with certainty, in an endless cycle of reprisals.

And in this context, Hezbollah's change of pace also occurred:

The Iranian missile operation “The True Promise 2” has changed the balance of power in the region, which was questioned by the Western media after the assassination of Sayyed Nasrallah.

For days, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been acting as if he were the only actor in the region, over whom no force in the world can influence and prevent him from committing massacres and crimes against Palestinians and Lebanese. Therefore, the Iranian missile attack - which was preceded by a qualitative operation by the Palestinian Resistance - was, in addition to the operational and tactical results, which were 90% successful, strategic results that restored the military balance. The most significant scene, and one that only confirms this, is the popular joy that spread across the various countries of the region, from the Gaza Strip, through Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, to the Islamic Republic of Iran, while over 10 million Israeli settlers were hiding in shelters, under bridges and in subway stations. This prompted the mayor of Tel Aviv to call for an end to the war and to comment that Netanyahu "has brought Israel to a state of madness." Returning to the details of the operation, it was surprising how much media coverage accompanied it and how many Israeli leaks that military censorship failed to completely prevent, which showed scenes of the operation's success..8

The tone of the quote suggests clear hostility toward Israel, and while it is true that Iran and its Lebanese armed wing have, as they say, “raised the bar” in missile strike capabilities, it is also true that the picture painted is exaggerated.

True Promise 2 has shown an almost absolute Iranian dependence on missile systems, insufficient however to balance the Israeli force where not accompanied by the nuclear weapon. Tehran's research and development in the sector is increasingly breathless and it is clear that the symmetry of attacks and reprisals highlights Iranian technological limits such as to push Iran to take greater risks in order to achieve a credible deterrence. The nuclear aspect, and I say this with regret, is fundamental for both contenders. All this in a climate of growing ambiguity. Let us remember that the "hybrid war" is also defined as "ambiguous warfare” and here all the hallmarks of hybridization, asymmetry and ambiguity are respected. Theoretically, the decrease in ambiguity would allow us to say that Tel Aviv is ready to cross the threshold of nuclear retaliation to punish all acts of aggression, dominating any escalation in the current asymmetry that could even induce Tehran to resort to its North Korean nuclear ally. It is not political fantasy, North Korea under the watchful eye of Beijing, is “expanding” to the four corners of the globe.

But what is theend state set by Israel? First, to stop, if possible permanently, the continuous rain of rockets on its territory. Nevertheless, Tel Aviv claims to want to guarantee the return of tens of thousands of people who evacuated northern Israel after Hezbollah began launching rockets in solidarity with Hamas in Gaza a year ago. On the other hand, however, the Lebanese authorities claim that Israel's offensive has uprooted more than a million people in Lebanon, mostly members of the Shiite community from which Hezbollah draws support. The Lebanese government does not want to abandon the territory in the hands of the IDF and for this reason, it has chosen to support Hezbollah. Incidentally, it should be said that the Christian villages were not exploited in their operational organization, because the Christian communities did not allow the pro-Iranian militiamen to deploy in their population centers. For this reason, the IDF did not attack them.

The UN has demonstrated, once again, its limits. The one who benefits, in this particular historical moment, from the chaos generated in the Middle East, is without a doubt Russia, which thanks to the geopolitical maneuvers of its faithful ally Iran, manages to divert the attention of the International Community from the conflict in which it is engaged in Ukraine and of which, these days, we hear very little, almost as if to want to consider it of lesser interest or, even, concluded. This is not the case.

1 UNIFIL liaison: A vital communication link, UNIFIL, 13/12/2017. https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-liaison-vital-communication-link.

2 Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance.

3 Three UNIFIL soldiers 'lightly' injured in southern Lebanon, Lorient Today, 18/08/2024. https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1424126/three-unifil-soldiers-li....

4 N. Cristadoro, The Evolution of the Art of War: From Sun Tzu to the Black Knight, Online Defense, 30/09/2024. https://www.difesaonline.it/mondo-militare/levoluzione-dellarte-della-gu...

5 N. Cristadoro, ibid.

6 Byman D., Jones SG, Alexander Palmer A., Escalating to War between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran, CSIS, October 2024.

7 Bassam L., Perry T., Cornwell A., Hezbollah forges new command for crucial ground war after heavy Israeli blows, Reuters, 11/10/2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/after-heavy-israeli-blows-hezb....

8 True Promise 2: Balance Shifts Back to the Resistance Axis, The Lighthouse on the World, 05/10/2024. https://ilfarosulmondo.it/true-promise-2-equilibrio-ritorna-favore-asse-....

Photo: IDF / UN / web