During the Cold War - but its precursors can be traced back to the first reflections of General Giulio Douhet and in the translation from the operational theatre to theory during the Second World War - there were two main schools of strategic thought connected to air warfare, whether conventional or nuclear: the "countercities" and the "counterforce".
As the names themselves indicate, while the first approach focuses on cities and civilian infrastructure (and consequently also on civilians) as preferential targets of an offensive air campaign, the second approach "narrows" the field of legitimate targets to the enemy's armed forces and infrastructure connected to its war effort.
The "countercities" theory has a clear reference to the later systematizations of the Douhettian doctrine, considered as a "rational vertical" of Jominian type towards the employment of the atomic weapon. On the contrary, the theorists of the "counterforce" approach have formulated their assumptions almost in opposition to the general principles of the first generation of nuclear strategists.
The interesting and important aspect to take into consideration, which emerges from the war between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, is the substantial breaking down the theoretical-doctrinal walls that separated the two strategic approaches. Thus, while in Ukraine the Russians have not, in essence, deviated from their "countercities" approach, conducting an air campaign aimed at the civilian population and energy and logistical infrastructures; in Gaza a new mix has occurred, not even comparable to previous conflicts between the State of Israel and the various expressions of Palestinian nationalism and its allies.
Hamas's strategy - with the co-presence of military and civilian sites in the same buildings, the use of hospitals and schools as military bases, the presence of a deep and well-established network of tunnels under the city - and Israeli needs - above all that of avoiding getting bogged down in a tough urban battle, which would have prevented Tel Aviv from achieving its objectives - forced the Jewish state's troops to consider civilian targets as legitimate as part of Hamas's military device.
The Israeli approach to the Gaza air campaign has left legal ramifications, politically it can be blamed, but militarily it was the only conceivable and feasible one given the conditions on the ground. And precisely from a purely military perspective, the Israeli air campaign in Gaza contributes to fueling critical thinking against a rational-scientific, systematic and dogmatic approach that has influenced reflections on conventional air power even after the Cold War, especially in the West.
Photo: IDF
