The issue of “European Defense” has recently galvanized social attention involving all possible channels of communication available today. An attention that focuses on a very specialized topic on which, however, as often happens in these circumstances, theories and proposals are formulated that range from the creative to the extravagant, not to say from the imaginative to the unrealizable.
“European Defence” is part of a long, bumpy journey that has sought for years to acquire both its “definitive identity” and its “strategic autonomy”.
In order to have a correct point of observation of the current issue, and understand its political-military mechanisms, it is appropriate to make a very brief mention of how the concept of "Common Security and Defense" has developed over time in Europe. The European Union has as its foundation an economic basis aimed at creating a common market, hence the name "European Economic Community" (EEC - Treaty of Rome - 1957), but only in 1992, with the "Treaty on European Union" (TEU), better known as the "Maastricht Treaty" which is also considered the Founding Act of the new "European Union" (EU), was the need to create a common military instrument represented at community level: the search for a "European Security and Defense Identity" was thus promoted through a common policy that could lead to the establishment of common military forces.
After Maastricht, there was a continuous succession of organizations and bodies to consolidate the idea of political-military cooperation in Europe, also providing different models of consistency of military units. A very brief summary of the main structures and initiatives, present in the EU, provides a significant idea of the complexity of a substantially fragmented and often overlapping political-bureaucratic structure, which has always accompanied the development of the idea of a common European defense:
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the establishment of the WEU organisation of Western European countries (“Western European Union”), which was conceptually born in 1954, but was only reactivated in 1984 to expressly create a military identity capable of competing with NATO for “common defence” and contributing to both “operational missions” and “peacekeeping missions”, in agreement with NATO or under a mandate from the UN or the then CSCE, which later became the OSCE – Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The structure was made inactive in 1999 (European Council of Cologne) and definitively dissolved in 2011. For the military part "WEU", in this period various autonomous naval operations of "maritime security" and military/police operations took place which fell within the scope of the missions for "Conflict prevention" and "Crisis management", limiting the missions/operations mainly to humanitarian and rescue missions, peace-keeping missions and peace-making missions.
A very brief but significant summary of the evolution of the initiatives to shape a common defense:
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the constitution in 1992 (Maastricht Treaty) of the current “European Union” (EU);
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the proposal in the 1996 to create and develop a “European Security and Defence Identity” (ESDI) to enable European countries to conduct military actions in situations where NATO has no interest in intervening;
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the constitution in 2001 of the “Political and Security Committee” (CPS or COPS) (also called PSC – Political and Security Committee), composed of Ambassadors of the member countries and responsible for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (also called CFSP- Common Foreign and Security Policy) and the “Foreign Security and Defence Policy” (ESDP), later changed into the “Common Security and Defence Policy” (CSDP) to also develop a strategic defence culture;
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the constitution in 2001 of the “EU Military Committee” (EUMC – European Union Military Committee), composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the member countries;
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the constitution in 2002 of the “EU Military Staff” (EUMS – European Union Military Staff), composed of approximately 200 military specialists from various countries, created as a structure responsible for managing any missions under its jurisdiction;
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the constitution in 2004 of the “European Defence Agency” (EDA – European Defence Agency) which deals with common foreign and security policy, providing for transatlantic cooperation with the USA in specific sectors;
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the definition in the 2016 of the “European Union Global Strategy” (EUGS) program which aims to outline an EU with strategic autonomy and operational capabilities in synergy with NATO as well as with European countries;
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the creation in 2017 of an “initiative” aimed at promoting a permanent structural integration of armed forces belonging to member countries called “Permanent Structured Cooperation” (PESCO – PErmanent Structured COoperation);
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the approval in the 2022 of the document called “Strategic Compass” whose purpose is to propose itself as an instrument of “Operational Planning”, both at operational and strategic level, translating the political intentions of the EU, as well as to achieve common objectives with the UN and NATO. Among the various intentions also appears that of establishing a new “rapid deployment” force (which would mean “rapid reaction”…but this is a NATO term) at the level of Battlegroup with a strength of approximately 5000 men.
In this rather complex context, different types of military forces have been employed up to now:
EUFOR. (European Union FORce). Generic term used to identify those military forces, but also police forces, employed in various “peace missions”;
EUROFOR. (European Union Rapid Operational FORce) or “European Rapid Reaction Operational Force”. It is a multinational force that was active from 1995 to 2012 for use in “Peace Support Operations” (PSOs. Peace Support Operations) which in Europe are called “Petersberg Missions” (so defined during the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers held in Petersberg in 1992);
EUROMARFOR. (EUROpean MARitime FORce) or “European Maritime Force”. It is a Maritime Force, established in 1995, capable of conducting naval, air and amphibious operations, providing for a minimum size of a naval “Task Group” (from 4 to 10 ships). The composition of the naval force depends on the type of mission assigned, it has a permanent command cell (the Force is on activation), the command is designated for 2 years and is rotated among the National Authorities of the participating Nations;
EUROCORPS. (EUROpean CORPS), also called EUROCORPO, or “European Army Corps” with the aim of being a “European Defence Force”. In the military lexicon of the Anglosphere the term “Corps” can identify both a military force at the level of “Army Corps” but also an entire “Armed Force”, such as the “US Marine Corps”. It is a multinational force established in 1991 as brigade and since 2002, following an agreement with NATO, it has been classified as “Rapid Deployment Force” taking the name of “quick reaction” (NRF – NATO Reaction Force). Institutionally, it has the task of planning and conducting broad-spectrum military operations both within the European Union and NATO. Since its actual numerical strength is however around 1200 personnel, its use for projection abroad has never exceeded 150 personnel at a time and for limited periods of time.
In general terms, the possibility of operating jointly between military forces from different countries, with different types of training and operational procedures, requires a high level of specialization and professionalism as well as the possession of command, coordination, control, communication and logistical support systems adequate to the possible assignable missions. Furthermore, the operational capabilities of the military units involved must all be "at level" so as to be able to operate jointly or to be able to integrate rapidly into larger devices. Without such prerequisites, it is not possible to give consistency to "compatible military modules" in order to fulfill the assigned tasks. In practice, we return to the old concept of the ability to generate the so-called “Multinational joint force for specific mission” (CJTF - Combined Joint Task Force), also called in military jargon “Lego Legion” (from the famous Danish game “Lego” which consists of building the most disparate things by assembling different plastic bricks).
If it is complex to set up a CJTF, it is even more so to set up a military force of such a size as to be able to defend the whole of Europe.. Without forgetting the habit, consolidated over time, of participating in military operations using "contingents" of very limited size, or "operational detachments" of Special Forces, even smaller, as well as "naval groups" made up of only two ships, just to be able to state in the end-of-year reports that in that particular operation “we were there too”. Furthermore, in contrast to the dominant thought of recent years, where it was believed that the only possible future conflicts were those “low intensity” (where small military units are used for limited clashes and for limited purposes) we have moved, with the reality of events such as the conflict in Ukraine, to having to reconsider that type of conflict “high intensity” (where large, complex units come into play and hundreds of thousands of men, thousands of weapons and thousands of means are employed for the total annihilation of the enemy).
From these main considerations the idea of how to establish a European Defence Force can take shape. There could be two theoretically feasible models within which, however, some questions should be asked:
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the establishment of a “European Defence Force” unique, totally autonomous and supranational. Would there be a single supreme command? Would the command be assigned to a country that possesses a nuclear deterrent? Would this Force absorb all the Armed Forces of the European countries? Should the troops swear allegiance to the European flag and no longer to the national one? Would there be a single uniform? Would there be uniformity of economic treatment coming from different countries? .....
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the establishment of a “European Defence Force” similar to the NATO structure. Would there be an economically “leading” country? Who would be given command? Would the command be permanent or rotating? If the command were rotating, would all countries have the same value? Who would establish the “level” of capability and operational readiness of the troops? Which “military assets” should be made available to the Force, which would remain national and which NATO? How many and which weapon systems, aircraft, ships, land vehicles would be requested from individual countries? Which land, air and naval bases should be granted to the Force? .......
The two models are completely different in two fundamental aspects: in the first, European countries would no longer have their own Armed Forces, while in the second, the costs of maintaining their respective national Forces plus the Forces granted to the EU and NATO would be extremely high.
Clearly no country will want to give up its own Armed Forces and it is therefore plausible that we will move towards a model similar to that of NATO. This model would translate into a tripling of costs, having to finance the Armed Forces of the various countries for individual national needs, having to finance participation in the NATO military instrument and now also having to finance participation in the EU military instrument.
Of course, all military organizations need considerable economic resources, but it is not only this availability that defines their structure but also the threat from which they should defend themselves, which they should confront and, when necessary, eliminate. Furthermore, the political will of the moment does not always guarantee a long-term vision of the future, especially in an unpopular perspective of “possible war effort” to which one might be called.
Then there is the geographical reality that must be considered in any case: Europe is essentially the western peninsula of a large Eurasian complex. If it is considered in this sense (as not being part of that territory) it would be natural to give pre-eminence, in general terms, to the naval component.
Also considering the existence of a strong alliance such as NATO, one would be tempted to follow this perspective, at least as long as the Russian nation is perceived as a permanent threat. Of course, changing the point of approach would open up new and unthinkable perspectives. But at the moment it is better to focus on the resolution of the Ukrainian conflict which, although geographically rather limited, is in any case accelerating a possible new order of the continent in which European Defense would be nothing more than the “operating pivot”, or a static defensive structure from which it is possible to conduct a dynamic reaction.
