IDF Shoots at UNIFIL? Is It Just One Side's Fault?

(To Antonio Li Gobbi)
12/10/24

The press gave wide coverage to the fact that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) opened fire on UNIFIL positions. Wide coverage was also given to the firm and indignant reactions of the Italian ministers as well as to the fact that, for once in agreement, the governments of the three main contributing nations (France, Italy and Spain) formulated strong and vibrant protests. Protests that were absolutely predictable but which, I think, will fall on deaf ears.

Even more predictable for several months was the fact that Israel, as soon as the situation in Gaza stabilized, would have to enter South Lebanon to eliminate a permanent threat against its civilians that came from South Lebanon. A threat, that of Hezbollah, against which neither the weak Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) nor UNIFIL seem to have been particularly effective, not only in the last dramatic months but for years and years.

In fact, Israel in South Lebanon as in Gaza, is waging a war campaign for its own survival, fighting against its existential enemies, which are not regular Armed Forces, but political-military formations directed by Tehran, which make terrorism their normal instrument of struggle. Terrorist formations that obviously cannot be fought and eradicated by resorting to tactics used in clashes between regular armed forces.

One could argue whether the Israeli actions were the result of errors, of individual initiatives (which with units of reservists, under incredible psychological stress for themselves and even more so for their families, I as a former commander of men would absolutely not exclude a priori) or, as more likely, deliberate actions conducted, calibrating the use of force to a minimum, on the instructions of the top political-military authorities to give a political signal before a military one to UNIFIL and through it to the Glass Palace.

Sure, it could be interesting to check for the purposes of a possible future search for those responsible by Israel. For us, however, it does not seem too relevant to me and I believe that the problem is another.

Or, Has UNIFIL maintained its authority with all parties? Because a UN force, given all the limits imposed on it in relation to the use of force, can be effective towards the parties only if it is perceived as authoritative and absolutely impartial.

Personally, I fear that the answer is unfortunately negative and in this newspaper I have already highlighted the progressive deterioration not so much of the security situation in South Lebanon, which is evident even to the most distracted observer, but of the credibility of UNIFIL (read article "UNIFIL: it is useless to invoke resolution 1701 now, we have closed our eyes for too long")

In my humble opinion, the most relevant point for us Italians would be to reflect on the fact that If UNIFIL had been able to enforce Resolution 18 by Hezbollah over the past 1701 years, the IDF would probably not have had the need to enter Lebanon these days..

It therefore appears necessary to reflect on the the UN's inability to conduct military missions beyond its own "monitoring and reporting" between state entities that truly accept its presence and that, in any case, truly have the capacity to exercise control over all military formations operating in the area (for example in the case of India-Pakistan). It goes without saying that, if such a favorable context were to occur, the UN mission could also operate without weapons.

The problem with UN missions is that they can only be truly effective if they operate between consenting state entities that are able to exercise effective control over all parties involved (and neither Lebanon nor Israel control Hezbollah, which is directly directed by Tehran). Every time it was thought that the UN's military role could be expanded, as in Congo in 1964, it failed, because there were also non-state militias in the field, as Hezbollah is now in Lebanon. Furthermore, there is astructural inability of the UN to manage complex military operations, as seen with UNOSOM II in Somalia (1993-94) where we Italians also paid a heavy price in blood, and even worse UNPROFOR in Bosnia in 1992/95, a mission remembered above all for the shame of Srebrenica and where NATO then had to step in with a very different mandate, different rules of engagement and, above all, different political credibility.

The point is that the UN is not structured, politically before even militarily, to conduct its own operations. peace enforcement (Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter), but only of peace keeping (Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter).

It is certainly true that when UNIFIL II was launched in 2006, all the aforementioned negative experiences of the UN forces were learned from and many measures were taken to make UNIFIL more efficient and credible than all previous UN missions. Perhaps, however, the "UN" sarcophagus did not allow for many improvements and was reluctant to allow rules of engagement and measures for the use of force that would allow it to operate effectively in the southern Lebanese context. It is therefore necessary to ask ourselves today whether these "adjustments" made to the structure of the Force were sufficient, but above all to take note of the limits that an operation under UN command will always have.

In fact, a UN mission can only be institutionally based on the consent of the parties to its operations and this is based on trust. If one of the actors (in this case Israel) were to believe (rightly or wrongly) that that Force no longer guarantees compliance with the conditions agreed for its deployment or, even worse, that instead allows the other party to acquire advantages deemed illegitimate, it is inevitable to expect distrust in the work of the UN mission.

For this reason, Israel has asked UNIFIL to retreat 5 km, in order to be able to act against Hezbollah, which has its positions right in that area. It is not because, as some claim, it wants to avoid there being "inconvenient witnesses" (something that is in fact impossible in South Lebanon as in Gaza, thanks also to the widespread use of social media), but simply because having a neutral military force in the way prevents operations and, moreover, makes things easier for Hezbollah, which can count on the fact that the adversary will not hit it due to its proximity to UNIFIL positions.

Moreover, to see the problem of UNIFIL's credibility from an exclusively military perspective, of a realistic mandate, of adequate rules of engagement, of authority to use force and also political willingness of the contributing nations to assume the risks that the use of kinetic force entails, would be to look only at the last segment of the problem, losing sight of the general picture.

In the Middle East, the UN itself has lost credibility and authority. Above all, the UN, for reasons we could discuss, has not been considered by Israel as an “impartial judge” for too long.

One cannot honestly deny the anti-Israeli attitude of the UN General Assembly (defined by Netanyahu as an “anti-Semitic swamp”), where the majority of member countries have too often shown themselves hostile to Jerusalem for religious reasons (Islamic countries) or for their deep-rooted anti-Westernism. This is demonstrated by the more than 200 resolutions of the General Assembly censuring Israel from 1948 to today, probably more than those issued against North Korea and Iran combined. We know how, in relation to the initiatives of the General Assembly, Jerusalem has all too often been saved only thanks to the US veto in the Security Council. It is also no secret that the current Secretary General, Antonio Guterres (whom Jerusalem recently declared “persona non grata”), has been heavily criticized by Israel for having condemned the Israeli reaction to October 7, 2023 without, in Jerusalem's opinion, ever having condemned in an equally firm manner the brutal massacre that gave rise to such a reaction.

Nor can one deny any longer the involvement, which now appears to be proven, of several officials of UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Work Agencies for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) in activities supporting Hamas, including the cover provided for military and terrorist activities of Hamas in the Strip as well as the participation of some of its members in the events of 7 October themselves.

Above all, however, one cannot pretend not to understand Israel's natural sense of distrust towards an International Organization that, since 1948, has been massively present within and around Israel with its various military (UNTSO, UNEF I and UNEF II, UNDOF, UNIFIL I and UNIFIL II) and civilian (UNHCR, UNRWA, etc.) branches, without ever having managed to prevent attacks from neighboring countries against the Jewish State or to facilitate the normalization of its relations with neighboring Arab countries (the normalization of relations with Egypt, with Jordan and more recently, thanks to the Abraham Accords, with other Arab countries were obtained thanks to US mediation and without any role on the part of the UN).

It was therefore inevitable that in such a context, the Israeli distrust towards the UN, perceived rightly or wrongly, as hostile and biased, would also be reflected in military articulations under UN command, such as UNIFIL, regardless of the professionalism and commitment of its soldiers. Soldiers, whose hands, moreover, are often tied by the UN itself.

And now? After the necessary protests of our Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs, what to do?

Meanwhile, I do not believe that Israel wants to take into account such formal protests... Above all, however, I believe that Israel, although aware of the risk of alienating the support of some countries, cannot at this point take into account such protests.

A few months ago the most important contributing nations (Italy, France and Spain) should have, in the opinion of the writer, to forcefully raise the issue with the Secretary-General and the Security Council: “Either the mission is changed to make it capable of truly implementing 1701 or the contingents are withdrawn!”. That window of opportunity has now definitely vanished. Now a withdrawal of the Italian contingent alone cannot be politically accepted and would appear to be a unseemly escape, unless the UN Security Council decides to withdraw the entire mission.

Let us only hope that the passivity of the Glass Palace does not force us to see a repetition in South Lebanon of episodes to which the UN Forces, despite themselves, have accustomed us years ago, like the shame of the Canadian UNPROFOR soldiers taken prisoner without a shot being fired by the Bosnian Serb militias or that of the Dutch blue helmets who were silent witnesses to the Srebrenica massacre.

Photo: UNIFIL archive