Geopolitics of the Red Sea

The Red Sea, a thin strip of sea that separates two continents from desert shores, is increasingly under the spotlight of the international community. The theater of rivalries and power plays by regional actors who claim "ownership" of it, it has now also become a sounding board for the long Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while it is and remains above all a frontier between two worlds that do not seem to share the same destiny.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh has (re)discovered the Red Sea since it began studying alternative routes to the enormous revenues deriving from oil trafficking, which are not expected to last much longer. In anticipation of the end of the oil era and the probable lesser Western economic presence in the Persian Gulf, the Saudis are therefore looking for alternative initiatives to ensure the political status quo in the area and the continuation of the delicate system of internal balances, strongly correlated to the availability economical. In this context, the Red Sea appeared as a new horizon, capable of offering previously unexamined opportunities, earning a prominent place in Mohammed bin Salman's (MBS) post-oil strategy.

A strategy that would tend to transfer the center of gravity of the Saudi economy from the shores of the Persian Gulf to those on the Red Sea, emerging from the Caudine Forks of the Strait of Hormuz, notoriously threatened by the Iranian Pasdaran, and at the same time differentiating lucrative activities (read article “The Iranian maritime strategy in the context of the geopolitical balances of the Persian Gulf").

In MBS's vision, this strip of sea should essentially become a "Saudi lake", through the construction of ultra-modern tourist centers, futuristic cities and the revaluation of archaeological sites, capable of giving breadth and breadth to Saudi economic and political interests in the region and in the world.

His approach, however, is characterized by impulsiveness and extreme cynicism, and has so far not attracted much sympathy, involving foreign investment, towards his initiatives aimed at establishing Saudi hegemony over the Red Sea and has profoundly undermined his international credibility as a protagonist capable of uniting the various actors and guaranteeing stability in the region.

Starting from the disastrous conduct of military actions against the Houthis, in the aftermath of the coup with which they took power in approximately a third of Yemen (2014). In fact, the untargeted military action led to the devastation of infrastructures, cities, villages and massacres of defenseless civilians. Not to mention the substantial failure of the embargo decreed in 2017 against Qatar, which did not see the adhesion of Kuwait and Oman and which ended up strengthening the economic independence of the Qataris themselves, who also had a notable return in terms of image in the Arab-Muslim world. Finally, the Kashoggi murder (2018), an event that cast international distrust towards his figure as a politician, even if it had no repercussions in Riyadh, a clear sign that MBS had and still has the reins of domestic politics firmly in his hands Saudi, however largely insufficient to project his figure on the international stage. This explains the failed investments in the purchase of many international football stars and the rapprochement with Iran, still to be verified in its concreteness, also in light of the possible negative returns on image, given Tehran's closeness to the aggressor Russian (read article "Verba volant, acta manent").

The Horn of Africa

The area represents a hub of complex relationships between the actors overlooking that stretch of sea. Among these, the contrasts between Ethiopia and Eritrea remain on the agenda, even after the apparent "reconciliation" of 2018, abundantly watered with billions of USD, which brought the then Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed Ali, to obtain the Nobel Peace Prize. In this context, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have strongly sponsored the agreement between the two countries, in the context of their growing presence in the Horn of Africa and, in particular, in Somalia in competition with Turkey and Qatar, conditioned in their behavior by the with Egypt on various levels.

Overall, however, it is about the achievement of a precarious calm which masks the persistence in the area of ​​a profound malaise and an apparently incurable rivalry, as well as tensions of various kinds, primarily ethnic, which certainly do not help the overall situation of the respective populations. Ethnic tensions, in fact, persist despite the great hopes placed in the aforementioned path of national reconciliation, which put an end to 20 years of low intensity war. In this context, peace does not seem to have brought, as hoped, greater economic and social development for Ethiopian and Eritrean citizens. The stalemate seems largely attributable to the approach of Asmara, which maintains its traditional isolation from the international community and which fears the risks associated with the prospect of becoming Addis Ababa's outlet to the sea which, through the reconciliation process, intends to use the port of Massawa as a terminal for its mercantile traffic. Furthermore, according to some observers, Eritrea indirectly supports Ethiopian internal conflicts, with the aim of weakening the large neighboring country, in order to allow Asmara to acquire the place it aspires to on the regional and international scene. In this action he would have registered the complicity of Egypt, which remains opposed to Ethiopia on the issue delicate and vital issue of control of the waters of the Nile (read article "Strategic aspects of global warming").

The destabilizing role of a series of other external actors must also be highlighted, as a further element of weakness in addition to those already mentioned. The new actors in Africa (Turkey, Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Russia, China, etc) operate on the continent, in fact, with hidden agendas and for purposes often linked to mercantile and religious expansionism. Agendas carried out without scruples and with predatory intent, therefore, destined not to facilitate the peaceful conclusion of disputes and likely, for example, to lead Egypt and Ethiopia towards an armed conflict to be used as a tool for further destabilization of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.

Ethiopia has historically been exposed to external interference from those who had an interest in making a country with considerable demographic, military, political and economic potential more fragile. Interferences that may be related to the flow of money for infrastructure. In this context, Ethiopia sees massive private investments from the Saudis, particularly in the agricultural sector. Added to these are the colossal Chinese investments, as part of a privileged relationship between Addis Ababa and Beijing, which sees Ethiopia as a gateway to the African continent close to the Red Sea, despite having no access to the sea. Faithful to their traditions, their philosophy and their practices the Chinese are in no hurry. In that part of the world they are developing an extremely onerous policy, which has relatively few immediate rewards, but which will predictably offer significant fruits in the future.

It should also be underlined that in the area China has taken control of the cargo traffic of the port terminal away from the UAE.containers of the port of Djibouti, which today has also become its only and stable naval base abroad. Chinese ambitions on the African continent therefore seem to have found a solid "landing" point within "call reach" of the Camp Lemonnier base, home of the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) of United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM).

To complete the disarming picture of the Horn of Africa, it should be underlined that in 2016 Somalia drew up a draft Constitution which, however, immediately appeared to be a product inconsistent with the reality on the ground, with five federated states and a central government controlling autonomously parts of the territory but which did not collaborate with each other in a context of lack of clarity regarding the use of natural resources, demonstrating all their weakness due to internal tensions and external interference with conflicting purposes.

The repercussions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Following the fighting in the Gaza area, following the massacres of 7 October 2023, the Red Sea proved to be a sounding board for that ongoing conflict. The unexpected military support of the Houthi rebels, actively supported by Iran, has resulted in retaliatory attacks against commercial traffic transiting the Yemeni coast, initially limited to merchant ships attributable to Israeli interests but then extended to any ship, military or civilian, flying the flag of a country friendly to Israel.

Economically, this all translated into an initial loss of revenue for Egypt which recorded a reduction in traffic through the Suez Canal and, therefore, in related revenues, which represent one of the main national resources, together with tourism. and natural gas. This is precisely at a time when Cairo is working on the construction of large infrastructures, of which the doubling of the Canal represents the main item. An economic loss that not only affected the Egyptian economy, but also the European economies and China, the main country exporting goods to the West, along the Red Sea route.

The Houthi militia's continuous attacks on freedom of navigation were subsequently joined by sabotage actions against international communication systems, such as the underwater digital and telephone cables that pass through the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, which connects the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

The USA and Great Britain, together with other Middle Eastern and Far Eastern states, launched the "Prosperity Guardian" mission in December 2023 and, in the following January, the two countries also launched the "Poseidon Archer" operation, which plans to hit the threat at the source, i.e. the Houthi drone and missile launch sites on Yemeni territory.

The United Nations response to the Houthi attacks took shape on 10 January with Security Council Resolution no. 2722 (2024), which called for the immediate cessation of the attacks and noted the right of member states, in accordance with international law, to defend their ships.

For its part, the EU Council approved on 29 January a concept for managing the crisis in the Red Sea, thus starting the formal acts which then led to the definitive approval of the European Union naval operation called "Aspides", approved in large majority (271 yes and 6 no) by the Italian Parliament on 5 March. Among the countries that had declared themselves immediately available to take on an operational role in the mission (France, Germany, Greece and Italy), however, Italy and Germany were already preparing themselves in the area of ​​operations (Caio Duilio) and had already taken steps to shooting down drones aimed at military units, repeating itself in the following days, in response to new Houthi attacks. (read article "Evolution of the threat in maritime scenarios")

The "Aspides" mission was thus added to the other two EU missions already active in the area for other purposes: the "Atalanta" operation (Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean near the Somali coast) and the "Agenor" operation (Arabian/Persian Gulf).

Nonetheless, the Houthis have declared that they will only stop their destabilization action if a definitive political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian (two-state) conflict is reached. Having the terrible images of the October 7 massacre still in our eyes, at the moment such a solution would seem rather complicated to reach and, even if it were achieved, it is not certain that the Houthis would respect what they promised. Even more so if we consider the fact that the Houthis have other priority objectives, in which the Gaza issue offers only a source of international visibility (and propaganda). In fact, they are playing a game that concerns the future structure of Yemen and their show of strength is a "pizzo" sent to the negotiators regarding their claims. But the questions are: how trustworthy are the Houthis? Even assuming that the diplomatic efforts of the United States with the help of Saudi Arabia and Oman to resolve the Yemeni situation were successful, what certainty would there be regarding keeping their word? In this whole situation, the presence of the delicate and very busy passage of Bab-el-Mandeb, and the possibility of interfering with free navigation (even with not particularly expensive/sophisticated means) increases the reasons for perplexity and concern.

External actors

We have already mentioned the role played by actors external to the region, such as the United States, China and the European Union. In this context, Djibouti is of particular importance, as it hosts, as mentioned, USAFRICOM and the only Chinese naval base overseas. But French, Italian, Japanese, etc. military devices are also present in Djibouti (with varying intensity). The presence in what can be defined as the gateway to the Red Sea is important for the different geopolitical objectives of the various countries.

For France, for example, whose ability to influence regional dynamics has undergone a significant reduction, due to some ambiguities highlighted over the last twenty years, Djibouti is also the springboard towards the Indian Ocean, where Paris has some interests. For the United States, however, it is a position from which to observe the Sahel and the north-eastern region of the continent.

For China, as mentioned, it is the ideal landing point to further its interests in Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula (also through the Chinese presence in the Saudi port of Jizan). A presence that has grown slowly, through investments in the infrastructure, agricultural and mining sectors, facilitated by the reforms of Deng Xiao Ping and his successors and which definitively took off with globalization, at the basis of the great exploit economy of China. Such investments, it should be underlined, are almost always accompanied by expensive loans with severe collateral guarantee instruments. Investments which, in the Red Sea area, also concern the railwayⁱ which should connect Port Sudan to N'Djamena, the capital of Chad.

But these are not the only geopolitical actors present on the Red Sea. The "foreign" structure is much more fluid and branched and, to influence regional dynamics, is always connected to maritime structures.

Turkey, for example, is developing a kind of widespread and punctiform presence that is evident from Suakin (a port in northern Sudan) to Mogadishu, through the presence of military instructors.

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia withdrew from the regional scene for over a decade, with the diplomatic representations themselves being reduced to the bare bones. Nonetheless, over the last twenty years Moscow has replaced Paris in some areas of the region and the continent, indulging its propensity towards warm seas. In this context, the Russians are working for the construction of a naval base on the Sudanese coasts, in order to constitute an ideal connection line between Sevastopol (Crimea), Tartus (Syria), with the connected air base, and Dongoleb (to the south of Port Sudan), through the Suez Canal. An axis that would allow, among others, the mercenaries of the Wagner group to access, through Darfur, the regions of central Africa, where this group is particularly active and whose brutality and indiscriminate violence in the so-called action of stabilization and fight against jihadism they are probably destined in the medium to long term to produce rejection by the populations, with effects opposite to those intended.

As part of the dynamic competition for control of the ports on the Red Sea, the Emirates Abu Dhabi Ports instead, it obtained the management of various terminals on the Somali and Yemeni coasts of the Gulf of Adenⁱⁱ.

Final houghts

The sea is the common good par excellence, on which our progress depends. Eighty percent of the world's population lives within the first two hundred kilometers of the coast. 90% of all world trade moves along maritime routes, not only for the resulting economic advantages or geographical constraints, but also for the lower impacts on the environment in terms of pollution. By using the sea as a communication system for the transport of materials, the level of pollution is in fact five times lower than that of wheel traffic and three times that of rail traffic.

Italy, a medium-sized regional power that geography and economy ineluctably link to a maritime vocation, owes much of its prosperity and security to the sea and the activities connected to it. In this context, the strategic importance of the so-called must be highlighted shock point. Without freedom and safety of navigation in these forced passages our system import Export it simply stops. This means first of all navigation and commercial flows through Suez, Gibraltar, the Strait of Sicily, the Turkish Straits, Hormuz, Malacca.

Regarding the Suez Canal, it is worth remembering how the grounding that occurred in 2021 of the Ever given caused 9,6 billion euros of damage per day and the blocking of 400 ships. This episode shows the vulnerability and the related important, if not critical, consequences on our and the global economy (read article "The economic and geopolitical importance of the Suez Canal").

Over time, the geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic concept that identified our area of ​​primary national interest has undergone a progressive geographical enlargement, consistent with the expansion of our national interests, which from the Mediterranean Sea has now come to include the Somali basin, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Strait of Hormuz and the Indo-Pacific. To protect its national interests, to count in Europe and the Mediterranean, our country must therefore be authoritatively present on the seas of the world. Italy has, therefore, become one regional middle power with global interests. It is for this reason that our country, with the Navy, is extremely active both in cooperative and operational terms, supporting and promoting actions for maritime safety and the defense of maritime communication lines and freedom of navigation, for the protection of national interests, for contributing to regional stability and crisis management, in the context of bilateral, multilateral relations and within the framework of adequately structured Alliances.

In this context, it is important to underline that, consistently, Italy continues to assume growing and important international responsibilities for the protection of freedom of navigation and for the security of energy supplies and telematic communication lines, deploying all the professionalism of the operators of the sector.

A professionalism recognized internationally, so much so that Italy took command at sea of ​​all three of the European naval missions mentioned above. A specific sector, that of maritime safety, which after years in which the European Union has not been able to exercise real leadership in the various crisis theaters, it has allowed and continues to allow Europe to have a high profile role in the international arena. The “Aspides” operation, in fact, shows the will and ability to effectively protect Europe's interests and is an example of the EU's (and Italy's) ability to be a maritime security provider. It also demonstrates how the creation of an effective European Defense is possible, starting precisely from maritime issues, a vital element for the economic, geopolitical and social progress of the old continent. A European Defense that must be understood as complementary to the NATO structure which is and remains a fundamental pillar of Western Defense and the basis of transatlantic relations.

In this context, the Red Sea, despite being a region strictly monitored by land, sea, skies and space, remains one of the most unstable and vulnerable areas in the world, threatened by numerous internal conflicts and persistent rivalries between states, constantly competing for a prominent place on the international stage. A theater whose security and stability is crucial for Italy and the European Union.

The volatility of the regional geo-political context, heavily conditioned by the declared and latent conflicts in the Middle East and by the repercussions of the war in Ukraine, has an effective and growing impact on our country and on world economies, which amply justifies the need to work to secure maritime communication, energy supply and telematic connection lines.

The Red Sea continues to remind the world that it is a channel that is neither antagonistic nor alternative for connection and exchange, but that it remains a fundamental economic artery for the European economy and for Far Eastern suppliers. The new Silk Roads, land or sea, through Central Asia or Iran, or the hypothesized new routes along the Arctic routes are not yet capable, nor is it foreseeable that they will be for many years, to threaten this quasi-monopoly of maritime communication lines worldwide.

However, a very complex situation remains in the region, exposed to exploitation of various types, which aim to achieve external interests opposed to others, with the risks of a general further destabilization of the entire area. The need to avoid this is evident due to our composite interests in that theater and, in this sense, a serious and in-depth political reflection on the matter by the European Union would be appropriate.

Europe is, in fact, essential for the purposes of security and maintaining stability in the region, both through an authoritative naval presence and by establishing a network of relationships based on shared interests and problems, avoiding leaving the entire theater in the hands of actors neo-colonialists.

Finally, the future strategic and geopolitical role of the Red Sea cannot fail to take into account the legitimation of the governments of the coastal countries and the reliability of the network of international relations that they will be able to weave by isolating, where possible, the endogenous elements of the crises and favoring a overall vision that allows us to ensure sustainable conditions of stability in the region.