The field experiences of the Russian-Ukrainian war are influencing doctrines, operational plans and projects of organic framework and equipment for the armed forces. In the connected debate on the evolution of Defense, the supporters of the "technological turn" of conflicts and the "traditionalists" are in conflict, convinced, on the contrary, of the fact that, despite being faced with a radical modernization of weapons and systems, the principles of war remain immutable.
When in 2023 the then commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian troops, General Valery Zaluzhny, wrote in a comprehensive strategic document that the opposition of forces in the field had entered a stalemate, many experts ruled that it was the result of the "dronization" of both armies. Franz-Stefan Gady in "Foreign Policy" had explained that analysts belonging to this school believed that “the advent of pervasive surveillance (of drones), has created a completely transparent battlefield”, such that “the forces, once identified, are immediately hit by barrages of artillery fire, missiles and suicide drones”.
Those who support this claim believe that the massive use of drones (and the first rudiments of artificial intelligence systems) has led to a “revolution in military affairs” and changed the very nature of war. However, if we analyze the situation on the ground in Ukraine, we realize that the main deficit with which the generals of Kyiv are clashing is the lack of troops to feed the infantry brigades at the front. It is no coincidence that these very days there is discussion about reforming the structure of the Ukrainian Army, moving from the brigade model to the corps model. The issues have come to a head at this stage, not by chance because military aid from the United States and Europe is "diluted" and drones and missiles have revealed themselves for what they really are: ammunition like any other, not "game changers".
Gil Barndollar wrote well in “War on the Rocks”, arguing that the soldier in the trenches cannot be replaced by a drone and that the organic deficit – which is the problem of a “Materialschlacht” where man himself is a “consumable material” – cannot be filled with the massive use of systems. unmannedThe task of holding or conquering ground still falls to the infantry and cavalry, which can be assisted by drones, missiles, AI, but do not replace. Such that there is a risk that even the Ukrainian experiment called “The Drone Line”, aimed at creating a buffer “unmanned kill zone”, could fail, because it is the assumption that is fallacious.
Photo: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
